FEBRUARY 1961

Commentary

ISRAEL & THE A-BOMB
GIDON GOTTLIEB

S. Z. ABRAMOV
THE LAVON AFFAIR

HANS J. MORGENTHAU: **PROSPECT FOR A NEW FOREIGN POLICY**
KATHLEEN NOTT: **DANILO DOLCI: NON-VIOLENCE IN ITALY**
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in Esquire . . . on Eleanor Roosevelt

Figures from every movement for social betterment in the country criss-crossed on Mrs. Roosevelt's White House calendar: folk-dancers, arts and crafters, Communist organizers, campfire girls, Negro waitresses, delinquent boys, unmarried mothers, young people's leagues for this and that. She found time for them all. She encouraged them all. She was a pushover for the word "youth."

TENNESSEE WILLIAMS

in Esquire . . . on the hero of "Period of Adjustment"

I happen to know he didn't come on as strong with these dolls in Tokyo and Hong Kong and Korea as he liked to pretend to. He'd just sit up there on a pillow and drink that rice wine with them and teach them English! Then come downstairs from there, hitching his belt and shouting, "Oh, man! Oh, brother!" —like he laid 'em to waste.

RICHARD ROVERE

in Esquire . . . on television

After Breakfast television almost beggars description. There is the master of ceremonies who is always doubled up, and there are these people from Glen Falls who come in to see if they can win a little folding money by identifying Barney Google by the first four notes or by guessing which of three men in jodhpurs is the riding teacher, and, as heretofore noted, there is this studio audience which laughs at every answer, right or wrong.

DOROTHY PARKER

in Esquire . . . in a book review

I carry about with me through all my days a list of Things I Do Not Understand. One is the principle of the zipper; the other is the precise function of Bernard Baruch.

JOHN CHEEVER

in Esquire . . . on Rome

Some Americans live in Rome because of the income tax and some Americans live in Rome because they're divorced or oversexed . . . but we live in Rome because my father's bones lie in the Protestant Cemetery.

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in Esquire . . . on William F. Buckley, Jr.

LINCOLN KIRSTEIN

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

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

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ISRAEL & THE A-BOMB

GIDON GOTTLIEB

THE disclosure at the end of last December that Israel was secretly building an atomic power reactor in the Negev, with the assistance of France, set off a flurry of rumors and suppositions concerning Israel's intentions and the role of her French allies. Is Israel capable, or desirous, of manufacturing atom bombs? If so, what should be done about it? If not, what accounts for her curious and not altogether consistent efforts to conceal the construction of the Negev power reactor? And, finally, what is the nature of France's involvement?

Within the scientific community it has been common knowledge for quite some time that the nuclear club is bound to expand and to be joined by newer and not always welcome members. In 1958, three American scientists, William C. Davidon, Marvin I. Kalkstein, and Christoph Hohenemser, made a careful study of this subject under the title *The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control,** and this is how the scientific community now refers to the matter. Public opinion, however, has been ill prepared for the expansion of the number of nuclear powers, in part because it is widely assumed that vast riches are required, and in part because the myth of the great atomic secrets has contributed to the popular belief that what a country must also have to build the bomb is a sound espionage network. But the truth is that any country with a substantial level of economic development and technical know-how can now set up installations capable of producing bomb material.

In other words, the capacity for making bombs can now be achieved by powers of the second and even of the third order. Israel is certainly one of them, but so are Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Egypt, India,† and a score of other countries. Technical personnel of high caliber is perhaps the first prerequisite for this capacity. In Israel there is a large number of scientists and engineers —trained both locally and in America— who are well informed of the latest (non-secret) scientific developments and techniques. Israelis have also gained some atomic skill and experience in the small research reactor built by the United States near Nahal Rubin, which was formally inaugurated last summer. These scientists and engineers pursue their research in five major organizations—the Israel Institute of Technology (called the Tech-

GIDON GOTTLIEB was born in Paris in 1932; he is a citizen of France, and now makes his permanent home in Israel. Educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, and the Harvard Law School, he is a member of the English Bar and has also served as clerk to a Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel. Currently, he is a lecturer in government at Dartmouth College, and is engaged on a project to propose constitutional reform in Israel. This is his first appearance in COMMENTARY.

* National Planning Association, Planning Pamphlet No. 108, January 1960.

† The new Israeli reactor is, according to official information, of the same type as the one Canada recently built in India, though it is smaller (24 megawatts as against 40 for the Indian reactor).

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nion) at Haifa; in the Weizmann Institute at Rehovot; the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; in the Atomic Energy Institute; and in Hemed, the scientific branch of the Israel Defense Army. Israeli scientists have for some time been doing work on a level high enough to induce the U. S. Air Force to contract with them for secret research projects; and the significance of the general program of work carried on in Israel can perhaps be gauged from the fact that last summer a leading Technion professor was arrested on the charge of spying for an Iron Curtain country.

The unknown quantity in Israel's scientific establishment is Hemed, the scientific research branch of the army. Hemed was instrumental in developing an important light armaments and munitions industry and—what is most significant in this context—has some high-explosives experts of the kind who would be needed to make the complex detonation devices for atomic bombs. It has also developed weapons like the "Uzzi," a new type of submachine gun which was sold, amid considerable controversy, to West Germany and other NATO countries. No one knows to what extent, if at all, Hemed engages in atomic research, but news reports state that the Negev reactor is under the jurisdiction of the army and not of the Atomic Energy Institute of Rehovot. The reason for this may well be that the security of the plant demands army protection. The reactor appears to be situated near Dimona, which is only about fifty miles from the Gaza Strip and not more than twenty miles from Jordan. (It is, one must remember, extremely easy to sabotage atomic reactors by the insertion in the right place of a glass of saline solution.)

ISRAEL, then, very probably, has the technical personnel for building a bomb. What of raw materials? The necessary raw materials for the production of atomic weapons are uranium and heavy water (or high-grade graphite). Some uranium deposits have been discovered in the Negev. (Apparently this discovery, unlike that of the copper deposits, was made without the assistance of Biblical texts.) How much uranium is mined in Israel is not known. But in any case if Israel were bent on manufacturing bombs, she could probably obtain all the uranium she needed from the many countries in which this mineral has been found, for the quantities involved are not large. Experts estimate that one hundred tons of uranium could yield enough fissile material for two atomic bombs—and a hundred tons of uranium per year is not very much to acquire. As for the other raw materials, the Negev reactor utilizes heavy water rather than graphite, and Israel is known to have developed new methods for the extraction of heavy water.

In addition to scientific personnel, uranium, and heavy water, a country engaged on a nuclear weapons project must also be capable of furnishing the necessary economic and industrial basis. The "Nth Country" report considers that any country with a gross national industrial product of $100 million or more annually can embark on an atomic weapons project provided that its industry is sufficiently diversified. Israel—with a gross national industrial product of 340 million in 1958 and a not very highly diversified industry—is a less likely candidate for fifth or sixth place in the nuclear club than Sweden, Denmark, India, or Switzerland.

The estimated cost of an atomic bomb project is about $100 million before the first bomb can be produced. However, once the outlay and the operating expenses for the initial experimental period of three to five years have been borne, the actual cost of each new bomb is surprisingly low. The figure of $5 million per bomb has been mentioned for the United States, but figures as low as $700,000 have also been given—and given even before the new German invention for the cheap separation of fissile material had been developed. This German process makes it

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possible to separate—with the aid of a centrifuge valued at $35,000—0.3 kg. of fissile material per year at an estimated cost of $300 per kg. of uranium per year. Though the new process cannot yet produce quantities of fissile material large enough to interest the great nuclear powers, and is not yet economically competitive in large amounts, it does provide small countries with a cheap method that can separate enough fissile material for one or two atomic bombs—which would utilize five to ten kgs. of fissile material each—per year.

There is no indication that Israel is using this technique, but its secret could well be known in Israel since Germany exported two of the new centrifuges to Brazil and one to the United States before the device was classified as secret under American pressure. But even the more expensive conventional technique of bomb production is within the means of a state such as Israel. A weapons reactor of the French type, according to the experts, would cost about $28 million, and Israel's last defense budget contained a special appropriation of $75 million for undisclosed purposes.

One difficulty facing the development of Israeli nuclear weapons is the absence of sites suitable for testing them. The small size of the state makes it quite impossible to test a weapon anywhere on land without serious danger to the population and to the neighboring states. If Israel were to test an atomic weapon, she would have to do so underground, but a crude weapon could also be developed without testing. Finally, the possibility—unlikely though it be—that an actual member of the nuclear club would supply Israel with bomb blueprints must also be mentioned.

THUS Israel is one of the many countries capable of building an atomic armaments plant that could produce from two to four bombs annually. But before we can answer the question of whether or not Israel was actually trying to join the nuclear club, it is necessary to clear up the widespread confusion that exists on the relation between the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the production of nuclear weapons.

Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan—which appeared to establish a direct connection "between (a) the allocation of limited amounts of fissionable material for peaceful purposes, and (b) a reduction in the peril of atomic destruction"* —has heightened this confusion. It is not generally appreciated that a reactor primarily devised to generate electric power is capable of making fissile material as a by-product. (Research reactors which use weapons-grade material as a fuel are the only ones *not* capable of producing fissile material.) "In travelling the road to an operational power reactor, a country is simultaneously travelling well over half the way toward an operational plutonium [atomic] bomb. The only process which separates the reactor stage from plutonium is cooling, followed by chemical processing for the extraction of plutonium."† This means in effect that a reactor primarily devised to generate electric power is different only in being somewhat less efficient in the production of weapons-grade material than a reactor specially built for that purpose.

Any country, then, which possesses an atomic power reactor for peaceful purposes, may, in the absence of control, be producing fissile material. The crucial question concerning the development of atomic weapons, therefore, is not whether a country builds reactors capable of producing fissile material—for all power reactors can do so—but whether that country is willing to submit its reactors to inspection and control. In the International Atomic Energy Agency, Israel has consistently favored the control of nuclear

* *The U. S. in World Affairs*, Council of Foreign Relations, 1953, p. 432.

† *The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control*, p. 38.

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power plants,* and last December (after the news of the Negev reactor leaked out) Prime Minister Ben Gurion offered in the Knesset to open it to scientists of other countries. Thus, the moment Israel submits its new reactor to international control, all conjectures relating to the building of an atomic bomb will have been disposed of.

But if this has been Israel's intention, why was the reactor built secretly? The only explanation so far offered for this puzzling secrecy is the controversial and groundless comment of a New York *Times* correspondent who attributed it to the habit formed by ghetto and underground life. There are, however, other, more plausible explanations available.

The first of these is that Israeli government officials now have information which leads them to believe that Egypt is building a nuclear power reactor of its own.† The Soviet Union some time ago signed an agreement for constructing a research reactor in Cairo for peaceful uses, but there has been no public announcement of a power reactor project. (The declared policy of the Soviet Union, incidentally, is not to request control as part of its assistance agreements.) If Egypt is indeed building a power reactor, as Israeli leaders believe, the reason for the secrecy surrounding the Egyptian project might be that President Nasser was planning to announce his country's spectacular nuclear progress in the dramatic manner for which he is known, and thus bolster his prestige in the Arab world and among the neutralist nations. Israel's secrecy may therefore have been motivated by an attempt to forestall President Nasser's propaganda coup by some spectacular announcement of her own.

This, of course, is mere conjecture, but if Israel was using the policy of secrecy in order to break the news of its reactor in such a way as to gain a maximum propaganda advantage, it is clear that the policy has already borne fruit. Certainly, no announcement by Nasser of Egypt's nuclear achievements can now have the resounding effect it might have had before the world learned of the Negev reactor. (It should be added here that Israel's intention to build a power reactor in the Negev and to complete it in 1963 was made public by Finance Minister Eshkol as early as August 1958. The secrecy was, then, at best only partial, and was perhaps also aimed at forestalling the economic pressures and the criticism that any nation helping Israel must face as a consequence of the Arab blockade.)

In any case, even the mere prospect of the development of an Egyptian power reactor could account for the decision to build a similar reactor in Israel. Nor are we forced to suppose that Israel's purpose in having such a reactor is to produce nuclear weapons; it could also be to exert pressure on Nasser to submit his own plants to international control—and Egypt's record in the International Atomic Energy Agency indicates that pressure of this kind might indeed be necessary. The capacity to make atomic weapons would then add to Israel's security without actually enlarging the nuclear club. For only if Nasser were to refuse international control of Egypt's power reactor would Israel be compelled to embark upon a nuclear weapons program. This is the atomic deterrent at one remove—it is not a balance of terror, but of the capacity to create terror.

A situation in which both Israel and the Arab states possess power reactors, *and* put them under international control, would probably increase rather than di-

* On the other hand, when the Charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency was drafted, Ceylon, Egypt, India, and Indonesia endangered the foundation of the control system by seeking to remove source material from the effective control of the commission and by permitting the stock-piling of fissionable material.

† Egypt's atomic capability was alluded to by President Kennedy before the elections. "But I'm most concerned about the spread of atomic weapons. China may have it by 1963, Egypt" (New York *Times*, Oct. 22, 1960, p. 9).

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minish the stability of the area. It is a situation essentially more stable than that in which one side only, or neither side for that matter, has yet developed a reactor. In the latter case, each side must live in the fear that the other will build a reactor first and not submit it to international control. Such tensions could well lead to preventive wars and other desperate measures. If Israel completes her reactor first, and submits it immediately to the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency, she will have contributed to her own security and to the stability of the Middle East.

Moreover, this could help to open the way to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons by international controls in areas like the Middle East where local conflicts are acute—that is, precisely in those areas where atomic weapons would be most dangerous. Great power diplomacy might then encourage in such areas the development of *controlled* power reactors, instead of trying to perform the impossible task of preventing their construction altogether. An agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western nuclear powers to press for international control over the reactors of other states could also serve as a first step in establishing the principle of international control over *all* reactors.

The period of danger to peace is the period that precedes the submission of the reactor to international supervision. During that period, all kinds of rumors may spread as to the actual uses to which a reactor is being put. The recent scare concerning Israel's intentions is a clear example of the dangers of secrecy in such sensitive matters, and Colonel Nasser's speech threatening the destruction of the Israeli "base of aggression" illustrates the delicacy of the Middle Eastern balance of power. There is general agreement that whatever Israel's intentions may be, she cannot develop nuclear weapons before 1963. Thus between now and 1963 is the time in which Israel must decide to submit the Negev reactor to inspection or risk either encouraging Egyptian preventive measures, or—what is perhaps more perilous to the country's security—reviving the old attempt by the United States and Britain to impose a settlement along the lines suggested by Prime Minister Eden's Guildhall speech of 1955. This would involve concessions (the ceding of territory and the admission of a large number of Arab refugees) that would seriously jeopardize Israel's security without stilling the major Arab grievance, which concerns the very fact of Israel's existence. Israel's nuclear achievements have evidently led some American diplomats to urge the imposition of such a settlement before either party to the Middle East conflict acquires the capacity to produce atom bombs. It is therefore doubly important that Israel submit its new reactor to international control as soon as possible.

We come, finally, to the question of France's reasons for assisting Israel in the construction of the secret reactor. The first serious cooperation between the two countries was the secret shipment of arms to Israel by the Mollet administration. These arms were given to restore the balance of power in the Middle East after the 1955 arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia. The two countries were also allied during the Suez adventure. From the incomplete accounts so far published, it appears that Franco-Israeli cooperation was genuine and widespread, in contrast to Anglo-Israeli cooperation. The French entered the Suez venture in an attempt to remove the Nasserite threat to their hold on Algeria. We can now only speculate whether, if Nasser had been toppled, the French might also have managed to put down the Algerian rebellion. It must be remembered that the Nasserite threat was not only one of military assistance; it was perhaps principally of a psychological character, for Nasser's continued existence—like Castro's in Latin America now—has furnished to the Arab world encouragement and example in

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flouting the interests and the policies of the West. France realized in 1956, and realized correctly from her own point of view, that the removal of Nasser was necessary for crushing the rebellion in Algeria. Today, the situation is somewhat different, but Nasser continues to obstruct the ambitions de Gaulle entertains for the building of a Franco-African community more or less on the model of the British Commonwealth. Since these ambitions no longer rely on the physical presence of French rule, they are more than ever vulnerable to the influence of Nasserite radicalism, particularly in the many new states like the Senegal, the Islamic Republic of Mauretania, the Republic of Niger, and the Republic of Chad that are of Moslem complexion. Thus it is still in France's interests to strengthen Israel. Israeli assistance to the new African nations (which will now presumably include atomic technology and supply) is an especially effective barrier to Egyptian influence—as we can tell from the recent attack by Moscow on Israel's activities in Africa immediately following the Egyptian defense chief's visit to the Soviet Union, and from Nasser's successful efforts last month to include a condemnation of Israel in a resolution signed by five neutralist African nations at Casablanca.

In the past years French assistance to Israel has taken the practical form of continued arms supplies; the Israeli Air Force is now equipped with French Mystère jets. Nevertheless the alliance between the two countries has not been formalized in a treaty. The Israelis perhaps prefer not to have a formal alliance with France at a time when they seek the friendship of the new African states which might resent Israel's connection with the one remaining power that is waging a colonialist war in Africa. And for her part, France may find her dealings with Arab or Moslem states more comfortable if she does not have to explain an alliance with Israel.

French assistance on the construction of the Israeli power reactor thus follows a long string of other projects (including a pipe-line that will link the Red Sea to the Mediterranean and offer competition for the first time to the Suez Canal). It is also, in France's eyes, further evidence of the return of France to the rank of a great power. For it demonstrates to the whole world, and particularly to the French community, that close links with France bring their rewards. The whole thrust of de Gaulle's African policy is the utilization of rewards and punishments in an effort to induce the new states to participate in the community. Hence Guinea, which left the community, saw itself stripped overnight of its civil service and of financial means, while the states which have remained in the community are receiving generous economic aid. The Constantine plan for the development of Algeria shows the same attitude.

From Israel's standpoint, the French alliance is a first breach in the wall of diplomatic isolation that has surrounded the State since its inception. Neither Britain nor the United States has been willing to compromise its interests in the Arab world by outright assistance to Israel in the field of defense. England persisted in her refusal to sell Israel substantial quantities of arms even after the Egyptians arms deal, and Prime Minister Eden, in his Guildhall speech, outlined a policy of considerable danger to Israel. During the same period, however, England continued to supply the Arab world with armaments, thus aggravating the imbalance of power created by the activities of the Communist bloc in the Middle East. It was also at the insistence of England that the Franco-British intervention in Egypt was cloaked as a police measure designed to protect the Suez Canal.

As for the United States, in spite of its generous financial support to Israel, it has been most hesitant in offering military assistance. Neither at the time of the Arab invasion of Israel in 1949, nor at the time of the Egyptian arms deal, was the United

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States prepared to restore the balance of power in the Middle East. The Sinai operation itself came about in large measure because of the failure of the United States to respond to the Israeli request for armaments to restore the balance of power.

The Eisenhower administration's condemnation of the use of force by Israel when in her view she was acting in self-defense, and the considerable American pressure to yield the Gaza Strip back to Egypt without first securing the lifting of the unlawful blockade of the Suez Canal, are particularly well remembered by those Israelis who now resent the indignant tone of American reaction to Israel's atomic plant. The lack of sensitivity in Washington to Israeli defense problems does not, in their opinion, strengthen American claims to be kept informed of Israeli security measures. This resentment is reinforced by the widespread belief that the United States must have known much earlier than December that Israel was building a reactor, and that Washington attempted to release the news of the Israeli reactor in a manner calculated to imply that Israel was making a bomb, and to embarrass both the Israelis and the French. In Israel, references could be heard to the Negev reactor as early as August of 1960. It is hard to credit that the United States intelligence services got on to the news only in December.

In general the episode of the Negev reactor may have rendered a service to the advocates of disarmament. An Israeli atomic bomb would indeed be a terrible thing, not because Israel can be trusted less than Russia or the United States, but because it would show that nothing at all has been done since Hiroshima to prevent the spread of that weapon. C. P. Snow's warning last December that a score of countries will soon build not only power reactors but atomic bombs, has now been vividly and frighteningly illustrated. If it achieves nothing more, perhaps this latest episode may reawaken the sense of urgency over disarmament which has been lost in the exhausting wrangle of proposal and counterproposal of the past few years.

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S. Z. ABRAMOV

THE LAVON AFFAIR

AT THIS WRITING (early January), the final outcome of the Lavon affair—which three months ago triggered the most serious political crisis in the history of Israel—is still uncertain. But whatever the final outcome, one thing is already clear: Mapai, Israel's most powerful political party, has been rocked to its very foundations. Mapai will continue to guide the destinies of the country for a long time to come, but it will never be the same. Although the Lavon affair has ostensibly involved a security matter—the probity of two army officers, and their relationship with a former Minister of Defense (Lavon himself)—the real issue being fought out is the future character of Mapai and the related question of who is to rule Israel when Ben Gurion goes into final retirement.

Since the Lavon affair originally centered on a matter of military security, certain facts of the case are still classified as secret. But a fairly detailed picture of the background can nevertheless be drawn. In December 1953, Ben Gurion, who was then acting both as Prime Minister and as Minister of Defense, retired from the government and withdrew to Sde-Boker, a kibbutz in the Negev. He was replaced in the office of Prime Minister by Moshe Sharett, while Pinhas Lavon—a man in his early fifties, ambitious, intelligent, and forceful—became Minister of Defense. In February 1955, a surprise announcement was made that Mr. Lavon had resigned from the Cabinet, that his resignation had been accepted, and that he would be succeeded in the Ministry of Defense by Ben Gurion, who had agreed to abandon his Negev retreat and return to politics.

The full story of the circumstances leading to Lavon's resignation was not told, nor is it likely to be disclosed now. What we do know is that sometime in May 1954, a senior army officer issued an order calling for a certain action which ended in disaster.* This action was of such importance that the officer who ordered it should only have done so with the approval of the Chief of Staff (then Moshe Dayan) or of Lavon, the Minister of Defense. The officer in question claimed that he had secured Lavon's consent for the order (Dayan at the time was out of the country) and that he was therefore not responsible for the disaster. Lavon, on the other hand, denied ever having been consulted. In the face of these conflicting stories, Prime Minister Sharett—with the idea of keeping the matter secret, since it was embarrassing not only to the party but to the country—appointed an unofficial commission of inquiry consisting of Chief

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* The most common supposition is that it was a sabotage or espionage action in Cairo. The name of the senior officer in question has never been revealed.—ED.

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Justice Olshan and Mr. J. Dori, President of the Haifa Technion. After conducting an investigation, the committee decided that the evidence was insufficient to determine whether or not the unfortunate order had been issued with the knowledge of Lavon.

One of the witnesses who testified before the commission—so it now appears—was Shimon Peres, then Director General of the Ministry of Defense. It is not yet clear whether Peres came forward on his own initiative or at the commission's request. But in any event Lavon surmised that Peres—who was not involved in the scandal and consequently could not throw light on the question of responsibility for the order—had given testimony aimed at proving that Lavon was generally an incompetent Minister of Defense. Presumably outraged by such disloyalty in a subordinate, Lavon informed Prime Minister Sharett that he intended to dismiss Peres (as well as the officer who had issued the disastrous order). But Sharett, upon being warned that if the two men were dismissed, Chief of Staff Dayan and other members of the High Command would resign, refused to sanction Lavon's plan. This left Lavon with no alternative but to resign himself, which he immediately did.

AFTER spending two years in political retirement, Lavon came back into prominence as Secretary General of the Histadrut, the all-powerful Israeli confederation of labor, which, like the government and the Knesset, is controlled by Mapai. Ben Gurion, meanwhile, had again become Prime Minister, and the 1954 scandal was apparently a closed incident. But sometime in 1959 an unexpected development took place that revived the affair and set a torch to the conflicts that had been smoldering quietly in the bosom of Mapai. An army officer being tried *in camera* before the Jerusalem District Court for disclosing secret information to enemy agents (he was subsequently convicted and imprisoned) testified that the senior officer who had issued the 1954 order and an associate of his had forged certain documents in order to implicate Lavon and had also committed perjury before the Olshan-Dori commission. The presiding judge of the District Court ruled that this testimony had no bearing on the case at hand, but since he was inclined to believe it, he drew it to the attention of the proper authorities.

Word of the new disclosures (despite the fact that they were confidential) soon reached Lavon, who, it turned out, had over the years been collecting other evidence himself. Armed with all this, Lavon proceeded to Ben Gurion and requested his rehabilitation. A commission of inquiry was again appointed, and it found that there was reason to believe that the senior officer who issued the 1954 order and his associate had indeed committed perjury before the Olshan-Dori commission. The Attorney General—to whom this finding was forwarded—pointed out, however, that no action could be brought against the two offending officers (one, the associate, long retired, and the other only just discharged last month), since the Olshan-Dori commission had been neither a statutory tribunal nor an official commission of inquiry, but merely an unofficial body called into being by Mr. Sharett for the purpose of advising him on certain aspects of the controversy.

After receiving the Attorney General's opinion, the government set up a Cabinet Committee of seven to consider all the written evidence that had so far been accumulated, and on December 25 last, submitted a report which in effect cleared Lavon of all responsibility for the 1954 order. The report was approved by the government, with Ben Gurion and Messrs. Dayan, Eban, Josephthal, and Shitriet (all partisans of Ben Gurion) abstaining. After the vote was taken, however, Ben Gurion criticized the report on the ground that the Cabinet Committee had not heard oral evidence, and demanded a ju-

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dical body to investigate the affair *de novo*. He then left the Cabinet meeting with the announcement that he intended to take a long leave of absence, and hinting that he would not return until such time as the government reversed its decision and otherwise complied with his demands.

When Ben Gurion failed to attend the next Cabinet meeting, the leadership of Mapai was thrown into confusion, which was deepened further on January 12 by Ben Gurion's denunciation of Lavon as a slanderer and backbiter at a meeting of the Central Committee of Mapai. The party had been driven into choosing between Ben Gurion and Lavon; and as the matter now stands, any number of things may happen by the time this article reaches print. Mapai may yield to Ben Gurion and try to force Lavon out of the secretary-generalship of the Histadrut (which would not be easy to do, especially since the Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, and the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Pinhas Sapir, are partisans of Lavon); Ben Gurion may retire once again to Sde-Boker and let Mapai get on without him; or he may form a new government without Sapir and Mrs. Meir.

WHY HAS THE Lavon affair stirred up so much trouble? First of all, we must remember that Lavon resigned from the Ministry of Defense not because any blame was attached to him for the 1954 order, but because he could not secure the dismissal of Peres (who at the moment is Deputy Minister of Defense) and the senior officer who issued the order. We must also remember that it was Moshe Dayan (now Minister of Agriculture) whose threat of resignation as Chief of Staff saved Peres. Now it is a matter of common knowledge that these two young politicians, Peres and Dayan, are protégés of Ben Gurion. Lavon evidently felt that they had been conspiring in 1955 (with the aid of Ben Gurion) to eliminate him from high political office and thus pave the way for the advent to Mapai leadership of the younger generation sponsored by Ben Gurion—a group that also includes Abba Eban and Dr. Giora Josephthal. And indeed, when Lavon resigned from the Ministry of Defense in February 1955, his prospects of succeeding Ben Gurion were regarded as finished. Lavon, however, staged a political comeback through the Histadrut; and by using to the full, as Secretary General, the enormous powers of that organization, he became a national figure who could at will either advance or check the implementation of policies adopted by his fellow members of Mapai in the government and in the Knesset. In fact, he made such full use of these powers that the government began to resent the existence of the Histadrut as a state within the state. Thus the conflict between Lavon and the old party stalwarts on the one hand, and Ben Gurion and the younger set on the other, soon took on the aspects of an ideological controversy revolving around the question of whether the existence of the Histadrut as presently constituted is compatible with the normal functioning of a democratic state. This controversy, although apparently internal to Mapai, involves all parties, and because of its manifold implications, is emerging as the most important single political problem that Israel will be called upon to resolve in the next few years.

The Histadrut is a centrally controlled federation of trade unions embracing about 90 per cent of all employees, but it is also far more than that. For affiliated with it are important associations of self-employed people as well as groups of employers—i.e. the various kinds of cooperatives, both agricultural and industrial, all have large bodies of employees, often exceeding in number the members of the cooperatives themselves. In addition to the self-employed and the cooperatives, the Histadrut also includes within its ranks a managerial group which controls factories, banks, insurance companies, ship-

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ping, air transport, retail and wholesale marketing concerns, and a variety of other businesses. Thus the Histadrut is not only a trade union organization but also the single largest employer of labor and the single largest owner of capital in Israel. The trade-unionist section is by no means the dominant element within this colossus, although it supplies the Histadrut with its justification for styling itself as an "organization of workers"—that is, of employees whose interests are to be professionally protected by collective action.

As the Secretary General of Histadrut, Lavon took the position that it, rather than the government, was the custodian of the destiny of the people of Israel. The government, in his view, was only one of several instrumentalities employed by the Histadrut for carrying out its historical mission and for promoting its moral and social objectives. This ideology was naturally attractive to the vast Histadrut bureaucracy, and all the more so since office in the various arms of government has in recent years acquired greater prestige than that attached to important positions in the Histadrut. It was, indeed, to gain protection against the rising prestige of the state and against the people in whom this prestige was vested, that Lavon elaborated his ambitious ideology.

Ben Gurion, who more than anyone else personifies the state, did not hesitate to repudiate Lavon's ideology. To Ben Gurion the Histadrut is a "partial organization"—that is, a voluntary association embracing only a part of the population and, despite its power and wealth, very little different in kind from any other voluntary association. The only organization that is not "partial," in Ben Gurion's view, is the state, for it represents the people as a whole, and by reason of this, the state alone must assume responsibility for the destiny of the nation and its citizenry. The supremacy of the state is limited only by the will of the electorate and the national interest.

This assertion elicited an immediate reply from Lavon: "I consider it a bitter injustice to hear that the Histadrut is placed on the same level as other 'partial organizations' in Israel. It is true that in the eyes of the law, the Histadrut is a partial organization, like the Farmers' Union, Merchants' Association, etc. But since when do we behave in accordance with formal law? We behave in accordance with an unwritten law that elevates the Histadrut, making it the one and only organization in Israel that assumes unto itself the duty of caring for the welfare of the State of Israel and of the Jewish people, and which bears the responsibility for all that happens." Lavon went on to place the Histadrut on an equal footing with the state, from which it logically followed that "cooperation between the state and the Histadrut is not a one-way traffic; cooperation must be in a spirit of good will, mutual understanding and consideration, and mutual recognition that they jointly carry the burden of responsibility for the state and the workers." Stripped of its rhetoric, this amounted to a declaration that the Histadrut has the right to exercise a veto or otherwise impede state action.

Lavon's declaration (which appeared in the Histadrut-owned daily *Davar*) was answered on April 26, 1960, in an editorial in the English-language Jerusalem *Post*, a paper controlled by Mapai and loyal to Ben Gurion's position: "[Lavon's] contention that the state and the Histadrut are a partnership with equal rights cannot hold water at the present moment, although it might have been true some years ago. Today the state takes precedence by a long way over any public organization, for the simple reason that the state has a total responsibility towards the citizen, while all other groupings of citizens deal with one or a few aspects of public or private life only."

The *Post* editorial was written at a time when the Histadrut was threatening to paralyze the entire educational system if

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the government should recognize the Secondary School Teachers' Union, and the writer therefore used this incident as a way of pointing to the consequences of repudiating the principle of state supremacy: "On several occasions since the establishment of the State, valuable organizations were broken up because their leaders could not arrive at a rational relationship with the state as such . . . Now an unnecessary clash is in the offing, with the teachers' crisis as the peg. Already, a likeable man and honest Minister has had to resign because of it. Now the whole complex of the Histadrut is in danger." The editorial, in short—which could not have been written without Ben Gurion's initiative—constituted both a warning and a threat to the Histadrut.

THUS TWO SCHOOLS of thought have gradually developed within Mapai and, what is more important, two groups struggling for supremacy within the party: the Histadrut—led by Lavon and deriving its power from the vast bureaucracy and the almost unlimited financial resources of this colossus—and the state-based group—led by Ben Gurion and deriving its power from the civil service, the army, and the managers of the state-owned monopolies.

Since the Histadrut came into existence some thirty years before the State, its forces tend to be composed of the older members of Mapai whose general point of view is still pretty much shaped by the rather rigid socialist doctrines embraced by the founders of the organization. By contrast, the younger set which has now emerged under the tutelage and protection of the ever youthful Ben Gurion is on the whole skeptical of ideologies and believes strongly in the empirical approach to political problems, as well as in the state as the major instrument of social and economic initiative.

To the extent that the Histadrut is a hindrance to the development of a competitive economy, the younger set would like to see its wings clipped, so as to assure greater industrial efficiency and a climate conducive to a greater degree of free enterprise. The attainment of economic independence is a paramount objective to the younger set, while for the older generation it is acceptable only insofar as its achievement does not impair the hegemony of the Histadrut or its traditional practices. The Lavon group contends that without a powerful Histadrut, Mapai cannot remain the dominant element in the country, but the Ben Gurion faction insists that the party's fortunes will be better served by control of the social and economic instrumentalities of the state. Consequently, it argues, some of the functions of the Histadrut—such as health insurance—should be incorporated into a comprehensive national health service, and Histadrut itself should ultimately be turned into a mere trade union. It is precisely this far-reaching intention that the older generation knows it must resist, for once the character of the Histadrut as a state within the state is undermined, the balance of power will irrevocably shift in favor of the younger set.

Many observers of the Israeli scene, while they would welcome the reduction of the Histadrut to the level of a trade union as a measure essential to the proper functioning of a democracy, still entertain serious apprehensions over the tendencies of the younger set. Devoid of any ideological preconceptions, brought up in the service of the state, and having seen how much can be done through state action, the new men struggling to succeed Ben Gurion regard the state as the source of all positive initiative and accomplishment. That such *étatisme* is fraught with serious danger is obvious to many sober observers, who console themselves with the reflection that so long as Ben Gurion remains at the helm, democracy will not be jeopardized in Israel. As regards the future, opinions are divided.

It is against the background of this great conflict between state power and

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the Histadrut that the Lavon affair ought to be assessed. Mapai today is a house divided against itself. On the personal level the conflict can be viewed as a maneuvering for position in the war of succession which will follow Ben Gurion's final retirement; on the political level, it can be seen as a fight to the death between the principle of state supremacy and the principle of Histadrut dominance. Provided the *étatist* tendencies of some of the younger set are kept in check, and provided further that the present economic prosperity continues for some time, it is reasonable to anticipate the eclipse of the Histadrut, the victory of the younger set, the emergence of a new political configuration, and a consequent strengthening of the democratic process in the country.

There is, however, one consideration of a purely personal character that rules out any assurance over these predictions. The younger set cannot possibly hold its ground without Ben Gurion's active support, and should he now withdraw from politics, his protégés would easily be crushed by the Histadrut forces. In short, the fortunes of the younger set depend on Ben Gurion's remaining in office for another few years, until his protégés are firmly entrenched in the party hierarchy. An inconclusive solution to the present crisis will be fatal to the younger set and to the political philosophy of Ben Gurion. From their point of view, it is now or never.

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HANS J. MORGENTHAU

PROSPECT FOR A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

EXACTLY EIGHT years ago, I sat down to write an article explaining why great things could be expected from Messrs. Eisenhower and Dulles in the conduct of American foreign policy. On paper, the estimate was reasonable. The President-elect enjoyed enough prestige to marshal popular support for any foreign policy he might have chosen, from unilateral disarmament to preventive war. The Secretary of State-designate was uniquely prepared, and appeared to be eminently qualified, for the position: Dulles's *War or Peace,* published in 1950, was as sound a statement of the principles of American foreign policy as could then be found. Yet before I was able to finish the article, certain depressing indications of what the new foreign policy was likely to be had already appeared. The article was never finished, and the history of the last eight years has shown how mistaken my original estimate was.

These sobering reminiscences provide an appropriate background for evaluating the prospects of American foreign policy under the new administration. On paper, again, Rusk, Bowles, Stevenson, and Harriman each looks at least as good as Dulles ever did, and Mr. Kennedy's *The Strategy of Peace* is as sound a statement of the requirements of American foreign policy for the 60's as was Mr. Dulles's book for the 50's. The foreign policy of the United States has probably never been entrusted to so high-powered a team, every member of which is qualified, in his own particular way, to be Secretary of State.

Nevertheless, while personal excellence in those who make and carry it out is indispensable for a sound foreign policy, it does not assure a successful one. The new men must work within old circumstances, domestic and international, and the circumstances will put their excellence to the test. Regardless of their convictions and intentions, they are the prisoners of the past—of established institutions, policies, and habits of mind. They may at best be able to gain a little freedom of movement by loosening some chains, but they cannot break down walls. Whatever they may have hopefully counselled or planned or worked for when they were not in office, once they assume office, they are in prison and their ability to do what they would like to do depends only in part upon themselves.

Eisenhower and Herter have left to Kennedy and Rusk a heritage much in-

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HANS J. MORGENTHAU here inaugurates a series of articles—to be written by authors of differing points of view—on American foreign policy in the new circumstances of the 60's. Future contributions will include, among other subjects, a critique of the strategy of atomic deterrence and an examination of the role of NATO. Mr. Morgenthau, whose many books and articles on foreign affairs have established him as one of the leading authorities in the field, is currently teaching at Harvard University. His latest book is *The Purpose of American Politics* (Knopf) and among the large number of articles he has written for COMMENTARY are "Our Thwarted Republic" (June 1960) and "The New United Nations" (November 1958).

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ferior to that bequeathed by Truman and Acheson to the Eisenhower administration. At the beginning of 1953, the foreign policy of the United States was still a going concern. Brilliantly conceived in the spring of 1947 to counter the threat of Stalin's imperialism, it was still serviceable five years later, even though its weaknesses had by then become clear. Those weaknesses were in part owing to inherent misconceptions, such as the nature of the military role of NATO and the German contribution supposedly indispensable to it; and in part they stemmed from such new circumstances as the changes in the balance of world military power and the awakening of Asia. (The persistence of the issues of our foreign policy is indicated, I think, by the chapter headings in a book of mine published in 1951: one reads "The Precarious State of the Atlantic Alliance"; another, "The Struggle for Asia as a Struggle for the Minds of Men.")

It was the great failing of Dulles that he subordinated the requirements of a sound foreign policy to the demands of domestic politics; in consequence, he was compelled to accentuate the weaknesses of the foreign policy he had inherited while at the same time resisting its adaptation to new conditions. When Dulles assumed office, he resolved that what had happened to Mr. Acheson would not happen to him. Mr. Acheson, the architect of a sound and successful foreign policy, found himself deserted by public opinion, and, more particularly, by Congressional opinion, and hence was handicapped in the conduct of his policy. Dulles made it his first order of business to secure for his person and policies the support of the Congress and of public opinion at large: in this endeavor, he was eminently successful. But as a result something happened to him that had never happened to Mr. Acheson: he became the prisoner of a public opinion—in good measure created by his own words and deeds—which limited his freedom of action to a foreign policy conceived in the image of a worldwide Maginot line around the Russo-Chinese empire, manned by invincible American military might and its steadfast allies.

However popular that policy was, it proved unsuccessful outside Europe. A military policy which vacillates between the implausible threat of "massive retaliation" on the one hand, and ineffectual response on the other, is incapable in the long run of containing the military expansion of Communism. And so far as the acute threat of Communist political expansion through "competitive coexistence" is concerned, the policy yields not only an irrelevant response—but actual ammunition for the enemy. Meanwhile, with the United States embarked upon an essentially futile, and even self-defeating, foreign policy, the world situation has changed in at least four important respects.

THE Soviet Union, of course, now ranks with the United States as an atomic power. And if the present trend continues, an indefinite number of nations will have acquired atomic weapons within the next decade. Second, the countries of Western Europe and Japan, having recovered their economic strength, are now in the process of building up their military and political strength as well. China, above all, is likely to become a first-rate power: it need only add to its enormous population and territory the achievements of modern technology. Third, the emancipation of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of the world has entered its last stage in Africa, and has begun in Latin America. Finally, both the Soviet Union and (to a lesser extent at the moment) China have embarked upon a new expansionist foreign policy: it is no longer based so much upon a combination of the infallibility of Marxist prophesies and open military pressure as upon the achievements, actual and potential, of the Communist system.

The task of the new administration, if

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it hopes for success in coping with the changed world situation, lies in rethinking and refashioning American foreign policy in five major areas: the relations with our allies, the relations with the uncommitted nations, the relation between domestic politics and foreign policy, the relations with the Communist bloc, and, finally, the supranational control of atomic power.

The several alliances of which the United States is a member owe their existence to two different factors: the need in which our European allies, as well as our former enemies, found themselves after the Second World War to have American economic, military, and political support; and the United States objective to contain by military means the Soviet Union and Communist China in the Middle East and Asia. In recent years, the foundations for the first type of alliance have changed radically; whereas the foundations for the second type were weak from the very outset.

The economic recovery of the nations of Western Europe and the former enemies has made them less dependent upon American support than they once were. As a consequence, they have at times been able to pursue their own narrower interests regardless of—indeed, to the detriment of—the common interests of the alliance. The Kennedy administration must find a new foundation for these alliances, one which reflects more faithfully the present underlying community of interests of the major nations of the non-Communist world. These alliances were primarily conceived in military terms. They must now be given an economic, political, and cultural content as well.

The transformation of the cold war into what is now called "competitive coexistence" has revealed the essential unsoundness of the policy of military containment as extended to Asia and the Middle East. For the conflict between East and West has taken on more and more the aspects of a struggle for the minds of men, especially in the uncommitted nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America: a struggle to be fought with the weapons of prestige, subversion, political pressure, foreign aid, and foreign trade. Military alliances—in any contest for men's minds—are likely to be at best of minor importance, and at worst a political handicap.

If the United States is to wage this struggle for the minds of men with any chance of success, the Kennedy administration must devise a new grand strategy. Two fundamental reforms are called for: the integration of all the factors involved in the struggle, for the single purpose of maintaining and expanding the influence of the non-Communist world; and the adaptation of these various factors to the local conditions prevailing in any one country. In particular, the Kennedy administration must develop, and act upon, a coherent philosophy of foreign aid and foreign trade.

The uncommitted nations confront the Kennedy administration also with a problem in political organization. Many of the new nations owe their existence to mere accidents of colonial history, and are therefore not likely to become viable political, economic, and military units within the boundaries they now occupy. This being the case, they present a standing invitation for a new imperialism to establish a new order where the old colonial order has disappeared; alternatively, they are threatened with anarchy—into which the rest of the world might well be sucked. This enormously complex problem will test the political creativity and determination of the new administration.

It is obvious that the domestic policies pursued by the United States, especially in the field of race relations, are bound to have a direct influence upon our ability to wage the struggle for the minds of men with any chance of success. The new administration needs to be fully aware of this influence in its conduct of domestic policies. Where it cannot entirely control these

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policies, it must at least give moral support to the positions which conform most closely to the best traditions of America. Throughout the better part of American history, our foreign policy drew strength and its attractiveness to other nations from the character of our domestic politics. The American experiment in government and social organization was intended from the very outset—and was received by other nations as being so intended—not only for America but for the world. It was meant as a model for other nations to emulate. The new administration has the duty to restore that meaning.

THE ultimate outcome of these new policies, which we must look to the Kennedy administration to undertake, will depend upon the kind of relations which are established with the Communist bloc. For if in the course of the successful pursuit of these policies, our relations with the USSR and Communist China should further deteriorate, our very success might in the end turn out to be self-defeating insofar as it would bring closer the probability of a Third World War fought with atomic weapons. Thus the Kennedy administration must achieve the supreme task of statesmanship of successfully waging the competitive struggle with the Communist bloc without at the same time increasing the risk of war.

The first pre-condition for minimizing that risk is the stabilization of the present territorial frontiers between the Western world and the Communist bloc. The second pre-condition is the maintenance and, if need be, the restoration of the Western atomic deterrent. The risk of war will diminish only in the measure that the points of conflict which might ignite a war can be reduced, at the same time that deterrence against the starting of a war is strengthened.

Finally, even if the Kennedy administration should be successful in the pursuit of all these policies, the United States and the world will still be confronted with a mortal danger: the spread of atomic weapons to an indefinite number of nations. This danger we can cope with only in cooperation with the other great nations of the world. The prospect of such a spread is bound to become a reality unless the present trend is reversed; if the trend continues, it is likely to cause unprecedented anarchy which will finally be beyond the control of the big powers. To bring nuclear weapons under supranational control is indeed the overriding task of the age. History is likely to judge the Kennedy administration by its approach to this task and its success in accomplishing it.

Nevertheless, even if the new administration were to devise sound policies for the five areas I have mentioned, their success would in good measure depend upon factors over which the government of the United States has no control, such as the policies of other nations. It would also depend upon the ability of the American government to put the policies, once decided upon, into actual operation. This problem is peculiar to the United States, stemming from our constitutional arrangements and political system. The problem arises in four different areas of policy formation: in the relations between the President and the Secretary of State; between the Secretary and the Department of State; between the President and the Secretary of State, on the one side, and other executive departments, on the other; and, finally, in the relations between the President and the Secretary of State, on the one hand, and Congress and public opinion at large, on the other.

The President is ultimately responsible for the conduct of American foreign policy, and the Secretary of State is supposed to be his main aide in the discharge of that responsibility. In reality, the relations between the President and the Secretary of State have conformed to this constitutional intent only when the President was in effect his own Secretary of State, and used the titular head of the

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State Department as a mere instrument—as in the Roosevelt-Stettinius relations; or if the President and Secretary were continuously of one mind, as in the case of Truman and Acheson. Otherwise, the President has either bypassed the Secretary of State, as Roosevelt did with Hull, or given him a free hand, normally ratifying his decisions, as Eisenhower did with Dulles. When both the President and the Secretary of State have had their strong and different convictions about foreign policy, conflict has more often than not been the result.

Within the State Department, the chance of conflict is always present, and conflict has frequently materialized when the Secretary's subordinates have had strong policy preferences of their own. The relations between Hull and Sumner Welles and the independent and contradictory policies pursued in the 30's by Ambassador Kennedy in London and Ambassador Dodd in Berlin come to mind. That problem is superimposed upon the ever-present task of fashioning a bureaucracy, set in its ways, into a pliable instrument of a new policy.

The new Secretary of State faces a slow-moving, if not recalcitrant, Department. He and the President must also impose their new foreign policy upon other departments of the executive branch which may be committed to a different policy. The official Far Eastern policy of the United States, for example—for all practical purposes the policy of two Chinas—is not only being obstructed by the government of Taiwan but has also been opposed in practice by certain groups within the State and Defense departments. The official policy of the United States concerning the cessation of atomic tests has been openly challenged in word and deed by the Atomic Energy Commission. The new administration, which must soon make crucial decisions on this latter problem, minimizes its chances for successful negotiations—slim as they are in view of the objective nature of the issue and Russian attitudes—if it is unable to commit its own agencies to a common position.

FINALLY, it is obvious that the government of the United States can only go as far in its conduct of foreign policy as Congress and public opinion at large permit. The task of combining sound foreign policies with popular support is always difficult, and the temptation to sacrifice the former to the latter is always great and at times has proved irresistible. The foreign policies upon which the new administration must embark are not only new in that they differ from those which have been pursued up till now. They are also startling in that they run counter to cherished popular preconceptions. The international developments of the last eight years have transformed these preconceptions into illusions: neither the words nor the deeds of our government took cognizance of those developments. The new administration, in order to marshal public opinion behind its new foreign policies, must first of all restore a sense of reality to the American people.

The demands which these tasks make upon the courage, wisdom, and ability of the Kennedy administration are superhuman, in view of which, the prospects for a wholly successful American foreign policy are of necessity less bright than is suggested by the contrast between the personal and intellectual qualities of the new team and those of its predecessor. Whoever expects spectacular changes is likely to be disappointed. We others will be grateful to the Kennedy administration if it can give American foreign policy a new spirit and awareness, and a consistent movement in the right direction.

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NORMAN BIRNBAUM

"EMPIRICISM" AND BRITISH POLITICS

IDEOLOGY and actuality are everywhere in conflict, but nowhere in Western Europe is that conflict so strenuously denied as in Britain. The mechanism of denial is peculiarly effective: it is the assertion that ideology is what other people suffer from. The British elites, with whose mode of thought this essay deals, claim that they face the world equipped only with a few simple and lucid notions, distilled by common sense from everyday experience. In fact, they do have an ideology—which so pervades the atmosphere that long-term residents of the British isles think of it as something natural, like damp, fog, or driving on the left-hand side of the road.

National self-examination is perhaps an American obsession—alternating significantly with outbursts of confidence. Britain's fixation, by contrast, is national self-congratulation—not unmixed with discreet undertones of doubt. On what, precisely, does the average Briton congratulate himself and his countrymen? Oddly, he deals rather negligently with what outsiders think of as Britain's most considerable achievements: its political stability, its generally unblemished record in maintaining civil liberties, the ways in which it has rid itself of some of the worst legacies of having been the first industrial, and the leading imperialist, power. Perhaps this sort of self-congratulation would be too crude an exercise. Crudity, in British culture, is discouraged. Moreover, explicit reassurance about Britain's past achievements might have the paradoxical effect of redirecting attention to the present, to new problems which have still to be solved or, in many cases, broached. Britain's ideological self-confidence can be maintained only if the degree of public awareness of society's contemporary conflicts is low. But this is not simply a mechanism adopted by the elite to avoid criticism. Buffeted by reverses in the past decade, and quite unsure of the durability of their successes, those who belong to the elite themselves require antidotes to doubt. They have found one: they keep congratulating themselves on their method, even if this is supposed to consist in the absence of method.

Questioned about the distinctively British way of doing things in politics and social affairs generally, the *articulate* business executive, higher civil servant, publicist, professional, politician (and trade union leader) might well reply in roughly the following terms: the supreme object of public activity in Britain is the maintenance of consensus; compromise and concession are indispensable means

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to this end.* Conflict has not always been settled in this way, the answer would continue, but now we have a method for doing so which minimizes tension. Moreover, we proceed empirically, taking problems as they come; our solutions are pragmatic, designed to settle immediate difficulties and not necessarily anticipating the future—which we can't in any case fully visualize. That the liberty and spiritual well-being of the individual is our shared aim need hardly be mentioned. We prefer to leave it to the individual to say where his liberty and spiritual integrity are involved, and a useful rule of thumb for doing so is simply to allow citizens (and groups) to consult their convenience.

For the moment the issue is not whether this schematic picture of public life in Britain is true or false (it is, as we might suspect, something of both, and the omissions are striking). What is remarkable, however, is that it finds an elegant parallel in the writings of a set of academic philosophers—men like Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper, and Michael Polanyi—intent on telling *all* mankind how to conduct its affairs. These philosophers in general refer only incidentally to Britain. Their insistence on the limitation of social thought to problems immediately given, their repudiation of ideology, is supposed to be universally valid. But it is striking that their view of how politics *ought* to be conducted fits so well the ordinary Briton's account of how affairs *are* conducted in his country.

People are now tired, these writers tell us, of grand systems of theory designed to give a comprehensive account of man and society, to dissect the past and sketch the future. The time has come to dissolve the large problems confronting us into their component elements, and to work at these piecemeal, until some pragmatic solution is devised. Such solutions will hardly last forever, but they may make society a bit more tolerable, and so allow men to get on with the ordinary business of living. Abstract approaches to social conflicts can produce ills far more profound than those they are supposed to diagnose and cure. They can blind men to reality, which refuses to be comprehended in some over-all way. Worse still, they can make men see themselves as servants of some higher historical destiny. They may thus legitimize compulsion, even savage retribution, against those who stubbornly refuse to accept the theoretical conclusions of some abstract system, either by failing to espouse the values it dictates or by behaving in some manner not predicted by the system. But abstract systems have an even deeper flaw: they refuse to see that men are as they are, neither more nor less. Social thought which takes as its point of departure some other version of human nature, some imaginative conception of its potential, must end in utopian futility or totalitarian ruthlessness. These general truths are not (as is sometimes asserted) a justification for an unreasoning conservatism. Rather, they constitute the only plausible progressive doctrine, since they alone open men's eyes to the difficulties of the real (as opposed to the specious) present. They prevent men from pursuing fantasies which, whether benign or not, can only fail of their intended consequences.

It is at this point that the philosophers

* I stress the word articulate because some American commentators—suffering, I suspect, from unrequited love for Britain and deep disappointment in their own country—have portrayed the British elite as composed largely of educated, cultivated, and wise men. The proportion of such types may well be high by contrast with the composition of the dominant classes in other countries, but it nonetheless strikes some of those who have to live in England as rather low, and not increasing. Many men in important posts have attended Oxford or Cambridge, but this in itself does not mean that the country is run by philosophers. British university education, and the secondary schooling that precedes it, is exceedingly specialized. It does not encourage a general view or intellectual risk-taking of any sort. Nor does the superior cultivation of some recent political leaders in England mean as much as Anglophile Americans think. Anthony Eden's interest in Persian art is no doubt more admirable than Eisenhower's addiction to detective stories, but it did not save him from his own misreading of modern history.

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in question descend to survey the British scene. They hold that in the British context the customary disputes between conservatism and progressivism assume a sickly, nay morbidly, abstracted cast—the work of European ideologues or American pedants. In Britain everyone, or at any rate everyone worthy of notice, accepts the above assumptions. Political conflict has to be resolved within this framework. Of conflict, there is, of course, no end. The point is that in Britain (and in any other country well enough advised to follow the British example) such stresses do not become the focus of moral passion. They are ideologically de-fused, and seen for what they are: inevitable but not irreparable dislocations. The political and social stability of Britain is living verification of these notions.

It is a philosophical feat of no small order to celebrate simultaneously the essential Britishness of British politics, and to derive from it prescriptions applicable to all of mankind's ideological ills. Not surprisingly, this feat has been accomplished by a European group of thinkers, long resident in the British isles. Deeply affected by the European tragedy, these thinkers not unnaturally tend to regard Britain as an island in the political as well as the geographical sense. The writings of Professors Berlin, Polanyi, and Popper, are adduced wherever British self-congratulation seeks intellectually reputable credentials. Foreign voices have also been heard. The books of an Israeli, Professor J. L. Talmon, have been praised by the *Times* itself, and Mr. Raymond Aron has been honored as though he were a modern Montesquieu, looking admiringly across the Channel from Paris.*

It is only fair to say that the writings of these men are far more varied (and far more contradictory) than I have made out. They do, however, lend themselves, despite the intentions of their authors, to what is in effect a demand for the extirpation of social philosophy. Since they have developed a viewpoint which implies, and sometimes states, that Britain is about as good a society as we are going to get, they ought not to be too surprised if, under their influence, some people find further social thought superfluous.

That something is seriously wrong with the philosophical discussion of politics in contemporary Britain is suggested by this: discussions are usually about the propriety or efficacy of different ways of thinking about politics, rarely about politics themselves. Certainly the thinkers mentioned above have dominated the scene at a time when substantive social philosophy is not so much in disrepute as simply missing. Professor Michael Oakeshott is said to be the most important conservative philosopher in Britain. Yet he has written virtually nothing since his celebrated 1951 Inaugural Lecture as professor of politics at the London School of Economics—when he indicated that the best politics consisted of doing nothing, or as little as possible, and the ideal political philosophy consisted of thinking of nothing.

The fact is that all social philosophy in Britain today seems to move on a plane remote from the actual conflicts being fought out in British politics. In short, the philosophers who have put a gloss on the self-congratulatory exercises of the men engaged in public affairs have done so without examining too closely whether the latter really act as they say they act.

Whether or not those who rule Britain are—as these philosophers suppose—restrained by firm conventions and gifted with profound insight into the working of things, one fact is certain: they are not self-conscious empiricists. They operate with ideas of one kind or another, most of them unexamined and many of

* It has been pointed out to me that Anthony Crosland, the eloquent intellectual spokesman for the present leadership of the Labor party, also thinks in these general terms. Why then single out these European thinkers? The answer is that Crosland's views on Labor party policy took root in ideological ground previously tilled by the philosophers.

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them far from internally coherent. The elite, indeed, often engages in internecine ideological warfare. Their ideas, of course, are influenced by the advantages they themselves possess.

Even a cursory view of recent British history suggests that this is a society in which conflicts over power, property, and status have been prolonged and bitter. Ideological division has accompanied these conflicts, and stability has often been the result not of consensus, but of the uneasy balance of a multiplicity of antagonistic forces. Thus the current insistence on a more sanguine reading of the British social situation is in some measure defensive. Britain's abrupt decline as a world power has disoriented many people of all classes, particularly those old enough to have experienced the Empire when it was intact and working. The full implications of the change have hardly been faced: the problems it entails are painful and extremely difficult of solution.

BRITISH complacency over having evolved an infallible technique for dealing with domestic problems is paralleled by delusions of grandeur in the international sphere. The conversion of Empire into Commonwealth is, of course, more than a change in nomenclature. The United Kingdom is no longer the dominant center of an empire. Its government, instead, has to struggle against the centrifugal tendencies intrinsic to an association of nations which includes India, South Africa, Ghana, and the Central African Federation. No amount of pragmatic statesmanship can absolve a British government of the necessity of having to choose, soon, between its white cousins and its former black subjects. Last January, Mr. Macmillan evoked the "wind of change" in a speech delivered in South Africa. Until now, successive British governments have tried to ride out the gale. A doctrine of "devolution" has been elaborated, but it is surprising how little has been done to alter Britain's economic relationships with the former colonial areas. Public opinion has been given bromides on Britain's duties of leadership: the crisis ahead has been conjured out of the general consciousness. On this particular point, informed and uninformed public opinion come together, for imperial nostalgia is a unifying sentiment. Most of Labor's working-class supporters refused to accept the pious liberal platitudes with which Mr. Gaitskell in 1956 attacked the government over Suez. Many of them had, in one sense, enjoyed colonialism while on military service overseas. Tory colonial policy of a retrograde sort has been denounced by radical anti-colonialist opinion with a moral fervor worthy of Gladstone, yet neither party to the debate seems prepared to consider the problems posed by the role of the Afro-Asian states in world affairs. The Suez defeat was treated by the Tories as an unspeakable humiliation, by the opposition as a just retribution. Hence Macmillan could liquidate the Suez adventure only by laying down a smokescreen, insisting on Britain's destiny and rectitude. Similarly, his Colonial Secretary, who is trying to find a way out of the Central African dilemma into which his predecessors marched, has to insist that Tory policy is continuous and unchanged.

The point is that these procedures are the opposite of "empiricist," if the word has any determinate meaning at all. British policy, whether the actual one of the government or the ideal one proposed by the opposition, staggers under a heavy ideological burden. Each side seems to live in the past. The government's supporters tend to ignore the implications of the Afro-Asian vote in the United Nations and the explosive stuff of nationalist discontent. The opposition cherishes sentimental views of the liberation movements in the colonial areas: one-party rule in the new states is not a phenomenon it can deal with easily. Both sides talk a good deal of British "responsibility" in these areas, a responsibility many of the inhabitants would be just as glad to see Britain shed.

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The more intractable the situation in what was once the Empire, the greater the danger of an ideological and practical immobilism on the part of the British elite.

Similar difficulties mark Britain's relationships to Europe and the United States. Despite, or perhaps because of, the decline of empire, many people in public life act as if Britain's real interests lay east (or south) of Suez. Europe may be uncomfortably nearby to be sure (a general has even expressed the view that the proposed Channel tunnel would be a grave danger to national security). What occurs there must remain, however, of peripheral interest to Britain—except insofar as Continental holidays afford the inhabitants of this island light relief from the serious business of being British. The fact that the postwar economic revival of Western Europe has enabled the Continental countries to compete against Britain in markets previously all its own, has not yet been assimilated. The remarkable resurgence of Western Germany is an occasion for resentment rather than sober analysis, the more so since the Federal Republic has appeared at times to enjoy American favor.

That the United States has displaced Britain as a world power is another fact the elite finds it difficult to live with. It takes refuge in the fantasy of an avuncular relationship to the United States, which occasionally dissolves (as at Suez) to be replaced by dismay and chagrin. Much of the current British discussion of mass culture carries overtones of resentment and fear at "Americanization"—emotions not shared by the working-class youth for whom America is a curiously vivid utopia. In general the relationship to America epitomizes a situation in which the louder the talk of "empiricism," the more stereotyped and rigid the approach of British society to its problems.

THE British elite is at the moment very heterogeneous and as such even more difficult to comprehend than its opaque predecessors. "Hard-faced men who did well out of the war" were alleged to have entered the governing class after 1918; soft-faced men who did well out of the peace appear to predominate now. Actually, differences of generation and personality make the members of the elite a good deal less uniform than their critics seem to think. These distinctions in turn reflect differences in the types of power exercised by the elite. The criteria that dictate decision vary from group to group. The pragmatism that some see everywhere in British social life may be nothing more than the uncertain and shifting outcome of ideological differences at the top. Yet one thing about postwar Britain is clear: the businessman has never had quite so much prestige and influence. Business is, however, internally divided. Old and new wealth, financial and manufacturing interests, exporters and home market producers, technically rationalized and stagnant sectors, jostle one another and impose contradictory pressures upon the government. That businessmen are pragmatic enough to wish to maximize their profits will surprise nobody. The ways in which they conceive of doing so vary. There is much less "community service" ideology than in the United States, except for three or four large firms whose directors may not read their own advertising copy. Business of course supports the Tories, and has a number of representatives—of strikingly disparate abilities—inside the Cabinet, but important sectors of business are deeply critical of the government's reluctance to go into the European Common Market, and other aspects of its policy.

The newer industrial managers see themselves as the most productive element in society. Ready as they may be to effect compromises with the unions, they assign themselves a correspondingly important role in the general distribution of power and influence. Together with their collaborators in the mass communications industry, they are not averse to remaking Britain—into a society of consumers. The consumers, in their view, ought to be able

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not merely to buy the goods produced by industry, but to raise up their children for the technical, and in fortunate cases the managerial, posts connected with it. Industry's demand for scientific and technological manpower might in any other society lead to a certain democratization of educational opportunity. In Britain this has occurred only to a limited extent. Instead, industry has taken to endowing the private schools. Those who suppose that the more enterprising men in business are interested in a society without status differences are wrong. Parvenus themselves, they are in important respects susceptible to the attraction of the old prestige hierarchy, even if their own successes modify it appreciably. Older sorts of business interests take a skeptical view of the society of consumers which prosperity appears to be shaping. Possibly they have been influenced by the (often imitative) aristocratic traditions affected by certain quarters in the City, London's financial center. Possibly their skepticism reflects a rentier attitude toward sound money or the natural disinclination of those who deal internationally in the pound to allow domestic economic growth to result in a steady inflation. At any rate important sections of British business tend to see the economy in rather less expansive terms. One suspects that they themselves work less hard than many of their colleagues, and that they engage in price-fixing, market closure, and a number of other restrictionist practices which exactly match the attitudes of the more backward trade union leaders. The City itself has recently witnessed some exceedingly bitter infighting. A set of lively intruders has appeared, quite disrespectful of the City's accepted gentlemanly conventions. They have at times even competed successfully with the older houses without asking permission.

THE new mass communications industry, based on commercial television and the daily and weekly press, purveys an image of a classless Britain—in which everyone appears to be a member of the new middle class. The problems dealt with in the new media are generally those of decorum, taste, and the acquisition of money and manners—not of relationship to society as a whole. It is the ideology of status, packaged for the mass market and it has excited opposition, not alone from the left but from the right—from the so-called Establishment.

The Establishment is named after the Established Church, and the designation is supposed to convey some of those traits associated with the latter: pomposity and arrogance, hypocrisy and compulsive deference toward authority. The Establishment is supposed to be a network of interlocking cultural directorships connecting the universities, the more sedate sections of the press, the more respectable politicians, the BBC, and "responsible" opinion generally. Its aim, according to the critics, is to smother radical thinking. It functions supposedly by personal contacts, discreet pressures, an unwritten but effective code of what can and cannot be said. Some critics, more conspicuous for their zeal than for their exactitude of analysis, have widened the term to include every institution they dislike so that "Establishmentarian" has become a term of abuse for those more or less comfortably settled at or near the top of society, particularly if they appear to be colorless conformists. Anti-Establishment passions go so deep that at the recent election for the Chancellorship of Oxford University (an honorary office), the left supported Macmillan because his opponent, Sir Oliver Franks, was thought to be even more typically "Establishmentarian": he had been an Oxford don, head of an Oxford college, a wartime civil servant, ambassador to Washington, and is now head of a bank—discharging all of his functions with elegance and offending no one.

If the term Establishment has any meaning at all, it applies only to those guardians of the present system who exude a faintly fusty odor. The order they are

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defending is in general that of pre-war Britain, with its relatively solid upper-middle-class values and its sharp demarcations between strata. In pre-war Britain, needless to say, critics of the Establishment held that it was defending the values of society before 1914. Today one can say that there is something of a directorate in the cultural apparatus, but its shape is difficult to outline. Moreover, it is no longer a power group defending a position by holding to a definite set of values. The Establishment today resembles nothing so much as a disembodied set of values seeking to attach itself to a power group. Its hostility to the newer tendencies in British society and culture suggests that a good deal of power has passed elsewhere.

The Tory party has to represent all these groups—and to win elections besides. Little wonder that it too displays an amalgam of ideas and impulses in uneasy equilibrium. The aristocratic tradition is by now hardly visible. The departure of the melancholy Lord Salisbury appears to have ended it, and the recent appointment of a nullity from the House of Lords to the Foreign Secretaryship does not presage a revival. The Tories are more restrained about their internal disputes than the Labor party, and these internal differences rarely find explicit expression. The erratic course of British policy since 1951 may be explained as a higher form of experimentalism. It also reflects the Tories' ideological difficulties.

Of the Liberals little need be said. The Labor party remains the great oppositional force in Britain. Important sections of it, however, are not prepared to advocate the reconstruction of society. They wish to attain social justice within a system whose major contours would be rather like the ones we see now. Grouped behind Mr. Gaitskell, these reformers are unequivocally opposed to many of the present inequalities and to the aesthetically repellent aspects of the new prosperity. What they propose is "a modest program of social reform," a phrase used by Mr. Gaitskell during the last election. No reasonable person can doubt that their aims are sensible and sound, as far as they go; they would, if transposed to America, realize the utopian aspirations of the more advanced Democrats. Yet their proposals fail to take account of the institutional resistances in the present system. The thinkers who cluster about Mr. Gaitskell justify their politics by insisting on the necessity of an empirical approach, but they are no less ideological than their left-wing opponents. Labor's reformists are generally middle-class intellectuals; their image of Britain's future emphasizes equality of opportunity, a euphemism for a society in which access to the middle class would be free and easy. Their view of the possible is derived from their conception of the desirable, if in a less obvious way than the views of their utopian opponents inside the Labor party.

There are two sorts of Labor utopians: old socialists who talk as though capitalism had not changed since the 1930's and youthful radicals, generally without the political influence of the old left, who feel that socialist concern should shift to the quality of human experience in daily life and to the problems of world society. Not surprisingly, they have concluded that only a total revision of social institutions can alter the character of human experience. On the whole, the new utopians seem unable as yet to make of their critical impulses a rigorous and substantive critique of modern society. They have a set of ideological attitudes and not yet a system of ideas. But one may say that insofar as "empiricism" does dominate British political thinking, the young are fed up with it. This group at least deals with phenomena which appear to have escaped the attention of the older empiricists: youth culture, generational conflict, and mass culture. These questions have not been assimilated to the categories of contemporary British political discourse. Perhaps they are unassimilable. If so, the new

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utopians have a point in complaining that the empiricism they oppose is not really empirical.

THIS account of what might be termed opinion-making groups in Britain does not deal with the consumers of ideology, the population about whose wants students of politics argue. Public-opinion-poll data are not very illuminating on popular ideology, and the British inhibition on systematic self-examination has precluded the development of sociological inquiries which might tell us more. It is characteristic of the current situation that fierce arguments on popular taste and opinion are conducted with little reference to the available material, much less to new evidence. Many middle-class intellectuals are suspicious of, and indeed hostile to, the general populace. Left-wing intellectuals are often indistinguishable, in this regard, from more conservative ones. What is certain is that the actual or potential capacities of ordinary men in this country to develop opinions is seriously underrated. The "empiricists" speak of men as they are, yet they seem singularly ignorant of their fellow countrymen. Indeed, the most striking thing about contemporary British "empiricism" is that it has become an ideology. In the heroic days of British politics in the 19th and early 20th centuries, empiricism as a method may have been genuine. Today's versions of it are programmatic and insubstantial, counters in argument rather than methods for exploring reality. The conversion of a method into a slogan is a sign that the country has yet to face its present ideological difficulties; its reluctance to do so is an indication that the social conflicts which underlie ideological divergence are deep and enduring. Once this defense is broken, new interpretations of British society more in accord with contemporary realities can be developed. But it will probably acquire a major assault to make the breach.

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KATHLEEN NOTT

DANILO DOLCI: NON-VIOLENCE IN ITALY

When I arrived in Sicily last spring, my hostess told me, with some excitement, that Danilo Dolci, not long back from England himself, where he had been toured and televised, was holding an international conference at Palma de Montechiaro in the west of the island on the theme of the backward areas and depressed people of Sicily. Dolci is the young artist-architect, now thirty-six, turned saintly reformer, the exponent of the philosophy of non-violence, who has dedicated himself to the purpose of reclaiming Sicily and the Sicilians. I have been told by people who have worked with him closely that Dolci is the "perfectly ordinary man." What they mean is that he is not an abstract missionary but that he is trying to deal with the everyday problems of an actual group of people.

Dolci's personal link with Sicily seems to be slight. It is true that his father was station-master at Trappeto, in western Sicily, thirty miles from Palermo, the capital of the island, but Dolci himself was born at Trieste in 1924. He finished his studies in architecture and town planning at Rome and Milan but did not feel that the comparatively prosperous North had the best claim on his skill and time. Although now an agnostic, he had always been a man with a semi-religious vocation, and as late as 1951 he published a fair amount of religious poetry which was quite good in itself (it was probably written somewhat earlier). Dolci's dedication to the ideas of non-violence showed early and in a way which in Fascist Italy must have demanded considerable courage: he went to prison for refusing to take a combatant's part in the war. After the war, he worked as a "brother" with Don Zeno Saltini, a priest who ran a religious community called "Nomadelfia," for the rescue of delinquent boys. But this, it became clear, was too limited in scope for Dolci. His twin beliefs—that you cannot root out bad lives unless you deal with the general soil and structure of poverty, and that personal creative work is regenerative both to the individual and the community he is part of—needed a larger laboratory. Perhaps he decided to work in Sicily for this reason, for it is a fact that any marked degree of historical and cultural isolation may well provide good conditions for experimentation and control. (Perhaps he merely felt the fascination of the islands.)

When he arrived in Trappeto in January 1952, Dolci had thirty lire in his pocket. As he told the local fishermen, who not unnaturally asked him what he had come for, he wanted to live among them as one of themselves, to help them and at the same time to learn to put up with their conditions. Dolci began his method of help by studying the nature and causes of the

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local misery, and it was after this—presumably as the most practical answer—that he borrowed the money to buy a piece of land and building materials and, with his own labor and the labor of those who volunteered to work for food (obtained by Dolci on credit), he built his first home for the homeless—destitute children and old people—and moved in his first couple.

This may look like piecemeal charity of a familiar kind, but Dolci's principles of self-help and cooperative work provided something radically different. It was almost more important that the unemployed should get together to build a home than that the homeless should move into it.

He next turned his attention to roads and water. The huge sad huddle of Sicilian towns and villages (a "village" may be up to 25,000 inhabitants) is not the mere hideous outcrop of industry as European cities have often been. They are the squatting-places of an unorganized proletarianism—concentration camps of poverty, as they have been described. They are populated largely by those who go out to work a strip of land in an antiquated agricultural system, or stand about waiting for work. Or, as Dolci reveals in his book *To Feed the Hungry* (in Italian, *Inchiesta a Palermo*), which is based on the first-hand reports of a good cross section of the inhabitants of Palermo, they "stand about counting the cobble-stones," or they are pickers-up of snails, of wild asparagus, of any wild fauna and flora that can fetch a few lire. Potential laborers pile up in these towns, instead of getting out to the fields, because of lack of communications and irrigation.

But communications and irrigation involve public resources, and at this point the civil authorities began to be sensitive to the subversive possibilities in Dolci's movement. They refused at first to contribute toward his plans for building a dam in a small local river. Dolci dealt with this by fasting: after only seven days the authorities gave in and promised a grant. (Dolci may have got this idea from Gandhi, but he seems to have read only Gandhi's autobiography, as nothing else is available in Italian, and Gandhi in any case did not invent the philosophy of non-violent resistance.) By the time that Dolci felt able to move on to the larger town of Partinico (also in western Sicily), the people of Trappeto had already provided themselves with sewers and roads, and, among other things, with two small hospitals.

After he had come to Partinico, Dolci married a widow with a large family. The couple now have children of their own and have adopted still more. It was in Partinico that the profound social and cultural change which he was trying to initiate revealed its outlines. Two more of Dolci's books, *Fare presto e bene perche si cuore* ("Act speedily and rightly because people are dying") and *Banditti a Partinico* ("The Outlaws at Partinico"—to be published here in March by Orion Press), belong to this period (1954–55). His method is that of minute investigation, in interviews with "witnesses" as he calls them in the later book *To Feed the Hungry*. We might call them case histories, except that they reveal a degree of imaginative and descriptive insight, and a freedom from preconception or theory as well as from cold-blooded and statistical detachment, which seem well out of the range of the typical social welfare worker.

The town of Partinico is a bandit center, and a very high proportion of its families lack a head because he was either a victim or a member of the Mafia (the woman Dolci married was the widow of one of these victims).

The Mafia, the bandit organization, is a cult as well as an industry. Vile though it may seem to outsiders, it has strong romantic associations for Sicilians. In 20th-century terms it is a powerful pressure group, administratively and as a form of insurance often working better than the legal authorities. For instance, provided that your Mafia dues are paid up, the Mafia will recover your stolen property

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for you, and without delay, where the police will probably fail. (I am not talking only of the obvious cases where they have stolen it themselves.) For many centuries violence has been an integral part of Sicilian society, but whatever the historical origins of banditry, general poverty seems to be what keeps it alive today and in Partinico Dolci began trying by non-violent methods to attack it at its core.

It is one of Dolci's guiding rules to start with *gli ultimi*, the lowest. This is not a form of salvationism; he is simply being consistent. Bandits are therefore no different from any other kind of *"ultimi"*—and Dolci interrogates them and records their answers with his wonted sympathy and understanding of the poverty and sense of hopeless inferiority which has driven them to banditry.

Though the day-to-day and piecemeal approach to violence and poverty was and continues to be what is most characteristic of Dolci's movement—it has been said that it works like yeast, to transform the situation from within—he can employ more spectacular means with deliberate effect.

The "strike-in-reverse" of January 1956 (this is the name given to the technique of finding some work which wants to be done, and doing it without pay) was initiated to call public attention to the evils of unemployment. The "strike" took place on the beach of Trappeto where the people of several towns gathered. It certainly called European public attention to Dolci, as probably nothing else would have done. Seven hundred people took part in it. They began by fasting all day. This was again a form of advertisement and is strictly consistent with Dolci's non-violent principle of giving the enemy all possible warning of your intentions—diplomacy-in-reverse one might call it.

Groups then took turns in repairing a road which had been cut by a stream. Thus not only the fact of unemployment was advertised, but also the still totally inoperative Article 4 of the Italian Constitution, which recognized that the right to work should be made effectual.

Dolci was arrested and tried for causing a public mischief, for trespassing on public property, and also for using violence and resisting arrest. This last charge seems to have been false—Dolci in any case had taken the precaution of ordering the strikers to leave their knives, with which they usually cut their bread, at home. The police, on the other hand, used some violence against some of the strikers. Dolci was sentenced to fifty days' imprisonment, but the sentence was suspended.

FROM then on the movement spread. Not only eminent Italian lawyers but a number of distinguished European figures gave Dolci their support. These included Camus, Cocteau, Gunnar Myrdal, Mauriac, Sartre, and Silone; Aldous Huxley wrote a preface to *To Feed the Hungry*. Honors too have come Dolci's way, but one, the Lenin Peace Prize, which might suggest a political alignment, was accepted by him—"apolitically." And he has used the money thus gained to found five "Centers" in western Sicily, at Menfi, Cammarata, Corleone, and Roccamena as well as at Partinico. A different nationality is responsible for each center. The Center consists of a permanent cadre of specialists and voluntary workers—except for the Italian workers, they come from the "high welfare" countries. The territory is divided into corresponding zones and each Center concerns itself wholly with the problems—economic, cultural, and human—of its own zone, for which it is entirely responsible.

How far Dolci's methods will continue to work in Sicily cannot yet be estimated. What has to be remembered when we look at any published figures, either of proposals or progress in the reclamation of Sicily, is that the western part of the island is a predominantly agricultural society which by ordinary European standards is abnormally retarded. The Sicilians are ignorant of methods of cultivation,

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and of the market, which are elsewhere commonplaces. The systems of land ownership and that of land exploitation are both completely out of date, indeed feudal. On the other hand, the Mafia is in one way more modernized: it has learned much from the cut-throat methods of big business and it largely controls the conditions of sale of whatever gets produced. Finally, in many areas, illiteracy is as high as 50 per cent.

In part, too, figures are unimportant now. What Dolci's movement is trying to give people is the basic tools of human existence. It is clear that many proposals are still, and will remain, in the stage of study. For instance, you only have to drive through Sicily to convince yourself that Dolci is correct in believing that the waste of water is Problem No. 1. On our way to the conference at Palma, we found rocky magnificent scenery. But life seemed to be drying up: the grass was faded and worn like a shabby carpet: the frequent *torrenti,* or mountain torrents, were nothing but a bed of pebbles. Yet in three of the five zones, projects for building dams still remain on paper—which is not surprising, since undertakings of this size obviously need cooperation and funds from the existing authorities. In the case of the dam at Trappeto, Dolci's methods brought the authorities to yield. But this broaches the question of the totality of Dolci's "open" revolution—"open" because it does not aim at dramatic and final achievement, but works by continuous contact and example.

Dolci's revolution, thus, is also a cultural revolution. Dolci studies not only the economic conditions of his subjects, but also their customs and superstitions (particularly in *Fare presto e bene*), and certainly Sicily is rich and strange in these. The most obvious tool which Dolci can put into the hands of the Sicilians, so that they can make a beginning with helping themselves, is literacy. In Partinico, one of the most unpromising places, he has founded a library and a cultural center. What schooling there is in Sicily seems to be at a very low level—and the children are given four months' holiday in the summer. Dolci is beginning to move in here with what may be called infant summer schools. In the structural aspect of the whole movement, what is most promising is the formation of local committees that are really beginning to organize discussion and collaboration among their own people. It will be seen by now that people make this movement, they do not just belong to it.

I CANNOT say that I enjoyed Dolci's conference at the time, but in retrospect I am glad I went to it. We got to Palma at about nine-thirty on a fine and beautiful morning: we had unfortunately smelled it a mile up the road. Like many other Sicilian towns, Palma has "sanitation" which consists of open drains down the middle of the streets, and it is a "village" of 20,000 inhabitants. Our meeting place was the Palma cinema—the congress turned out to be a great draw, particularly to the black-shawled women and the children. They climbed all over us and we had to fight our way through. Foreigners are rare in Palma, there is nowhere for them to stay. The only other place I know personally where you cannot stand still in the street because if you do you are flat on your back under a pile of beggars, is Calcutta. This gives, as it were, the real space-time of much of Sicily. Dolci chose Palma on the Dotheboys Hall principle of "Cleen winders." In the conference you learn that 84 per cent of the population have no W.C.: you then go out and see—or smell—for yourself. (This is perfectly consistent with Dolci's general approach. He wants to involve each individual with the real immediate problem. This approach meant additional difficulties for the organizers—who nevertheless actually achieved a simultaneous-translation equipment which was miraculous if not adequate; and they were not all satisfied that this was the best way to make a conference function.)

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Dolci's main theme at present is *spreco* (waste). The conference itself offered several examples of what Dolci means. At the opening session the president of the region, who was due to inaugurate the congress, did not make his appearance for about two hours. The "president" was spending this time in praying, it was said, with the local Bishop. (Could that have been for the success of the congress?) Sicilians, like all the rest of Italy, are not time-ridden: and in a depressed area where so many people have hardly known what it is to have a regular job, punctuality is not a virtue with strong incentive. On the other hand, superstition and violence have for so long been built into the structure of Sicilian society that the church, having abetted the one and compromised with the other, is not likely to favor Dolci, who is trying to undermine both. Notwithstanding, a local convent produced a clean, cheap, adequate lunch for the delegates—another miracle (the nuns also actively pushed their own handicraft products, a rare chance no doubt in this unhallowed and unvisited spot).

When the platform of speakers at last arrived, nobody could have doubted which was Dolci: an exceptionally tall, big-boned youngish man with a round, pale, mild countenance and dressed in what looked like a black soutane, with what might have been a black beret or skull-cap on his head. I say "looked like" because I did not really take in his clothing; it was like some rather abstract stage-direction to express a dedicated, even a consecrated personality.

The president made a good emphatic politician's speech about nothing in particular and all things at once. The writer Carlo Levi spoke movingly of the state of Sicily. Dolci spoke too, a quiet factual speech as far as I remember. But whether he spoke or not hardly mattered. The discussion dealt with the general ideas of the movement and its development in the five zones.

After his speech, I asked Dolci whether in view of the enormous strength of reaction in Sicily, he did not expect at some point to meet with a revolutionary situation which could not be side-stepped and which also could not be met by non-violent methods. The information given at the conference, it seemed to me, argued only to the converted. (I felt Palma itself to be a direct incitement to violence: I was convinced it was terrible and I wanted to get away from it.) Dolci answered, I thought at the time, illogically, even evasively; indeed what he said to me—"Go and look at this place"—seemed no answer at all.

I now see that Dolci could not have answered me in any other way. To have given an answer one way or the other about the future, as it might be determined by his opponents, would be doing a kind of violence to that present which he is trying to initiate. Though to outsiders Dolci can appear somewhat mysterious, I believe myself that this is only because he is so obvious, so naively honest, and so consistent.

WHILE the objective-minded realist—and this category can take in people of great integrity, sensibility, and intellect—may often admire the kind of character represented by Dolci, they can usually explain its success—admitting that within its worldly limits it is sometimes successful—only as a compromise with the violent and fraudulent methods of power and competition. Bertrand Russell (with many others) explains Gandhi as "an astute politician." Most people are unwilling to admit that anyone ever really means exactly what he says. To open your eyes and mouth and speak the simple truth which appears to be under your nose, lands you in the most complicated situations. In very artificial social circles it can appear as wit. In the intersecting circles of our various pressure groups, prejudices, and ideologies, it can appear as phony—and Dolci has even been accused of this. (It must be emphasized that most of the

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people who work beside him seem to be able to give and take honest criticism in a good-natured and constructive way.)

There have always been at all times a few people who cannot stand the split between moral theory and moral practice. Many of them go off their heads as Tolstoy nearly did. Obviously Dolci is more practical, less intellectualized and rationalizing than Tolstoy. He does not theorize as far beyond the work of his hands as Tolstoy did, and so he is always involved in a necessarily small, but definite, moral achievement. This, I think, is implied in a favorite word of his, "exactitude"—which means in effect, "Do the next thing, whatsoever your hand finds to do, as fully and precisely as possible."

Louis Fischer says in his *Life of Mahatma Gandhi*—"The gulf between word and belief is untruth. The dissonance between creed and deed is the root of innumerable wrongs in our civilization, it is the weakness of all churches, states and persons. It gives institutions and men split personalities. In attempting to establish a harmony between words, beliefs and acts, Gandhi was attacking man's central problem. He was seeking the formula for mental health."

The simple and fundamental fact which has to be grasped about Dolci and his philosophy—or "way of life"—is that he, like Gandhi, fits into the category of the mental healer: his goal, whether formulated or not, is to help to heal the split in the mind and personality which our social conditions largely originate and continually aggravate. (It must be noted that Dolci's practical problem of non-violence is very different from Gandhi's, for Gandhi's movement had to fight a foreign ruler and so was inherently revolutionary.)

In every moment of religious purification, one can see some signs of a swing back to the concrete suffering person, an attempt to shake off the bonds of abstraction and organization—of the "theology" and of the "church." (I use quotation marks because the analogy applies in the reform of secular movements as well as religious.) Dolci's is a religious movement in this sense, a reversion to the concrete, the immediate, the subjective, and the practical, as opposed to the abstract and theoretical. Hence the importance of "participation" and individual sacrifice. All the personal acts, like fasting, are symbolic as well as being a way of bringing pressure on the opposition.

This emphasis on "participation" with *gli ultimi,* criminals, bandits, and the pickpockets of Palermo (one of the most flourishing of occupations) in part accounts for the absence of theorization in Dolci's books. But in the particular and personal form which his investigations take, the method of non-violence is logically implied. If you come to a man with the honest and professed intention of looking at him as a real person in a real situation and thus—in a quite scientific and statistical spirit as well as a charitable one—of learning from him, you cannot come in a punitive or morally critical spirit at the same time. In broader terms, if you hold that means are logically and morally prior to ends, there can be no ends which you feel *justified* in obtaining by force (even if the circumstances of life may force you to do so). Our general aims, however admirable in theory, can in practice only be realized through actual people and actual situations as they arise, and to force the aim is always to some extent to disrupt delicate human relations.

IT WILL be seen that Dolci's philosophy and practice is opposed not only to the extreme forms of political violence which we have experienced in our day, the dictatorship and the genocide, but also to much that we in the West, from one side or the other, regard as our best social and moral achievements. On Dolci's definition of non-violence, our kinds of social amelioration—whether they come from the applications of science and technology or from organized religion, which can hardly help imposing either their material

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changes or their ideology, or from socialism in any of its forms (which shifts the national income to suit its own purposes) —are clearly in part *forcible*. Such institutions certainly cannot afford a *Jainist* attitude toward the poor suffering beetle: in one way or another, he may simply have to be got out of the way so that the best—according to our partial definitions —may survive and prosper.

It must be noted that this contradiction applies even to the milder democratic forms of socialism—and again because of a particular opposition of "means" and "ends." Socialism feels able to define what ends are good, and so how the means must inevitably be adjusted. In the case, for instance, of social democratic Sweden, affluence, a rising standard of life for everybody, is implicitly defined as the Good Life. Dolci's radically different approach to the problem of poverty can be put in a number of ways, but they all amount to the belief that we cannot deal by violent methods even with those evils which we most repudiate. The overriding of minority opinion which majority rule implies—even the social democratic countries like Sweden—would strike Dolci as examples of violence. Poverty is a disease but one which has to be cured by homeopathy rather than surgery. It has, like the symptoms of physical disease, its own natural significance and—provided that it is elected and not imposed—even its advantages. This point of view—rejection of affluence rather than choice of poverty—is open to misunderstanding, and to maintain it and act upon it in the circumstances of Sicily asks for great mental and moral courage. What Dolci implies is that work, not wealth in itself, is the cure—we want to restore poverty to a muscular leanness, not stuff it to unhealthy and unhandy obesity.

But if we think of non-violence first of all as a technique which has to prove itself, there is much to be said against it both practically and morally. Gandhi undoubtedly implied that a non-violent *technique*—since it entails tactics and manipulation—is something like a contradiction in terms. And non-violence is often interpreted as meaning all means short of physical violence. Gandhi once said that if non-violence is not of the heart it may be better not to try and practice it, for otherwise we practice fraud upon ourselves and others and so land ourselves in a moral paradox. (This whether or not the techniques of non-violent resistance are likely to influence actual and immediate situations.) Perhaps it is better to realize that all techniques are of this world. And perhaps, too, those more experienced people who organize marches and sit-down strikes against nuclear weapons should constantly impress on their younger and more idealistic supporters this crucial difference between technique and attitude.

Dolci lives in a world where he has had the unfortunate chance to know more of large-scale and well-organized horrors than Gandhi did, a world moreover which has been altered by such events, and so Dolci may have a more instructed and realistic view of violence. Gandhi exhorted the Jews of Germany to non-violence and said that those in the Warsaw Ghetto should have died without fighting, although it was pointed out to him that any passively resistant Jew would, still passive, arrive at the guillotine immediately instead of later. It is true that at the time, Gandhi, like the rest of us, could not know about the six million.

In any case, Gandhi did not accept the technological structure of the West which Dolci wants to use. Dolci is not a Luddite but regards machines and techniques as "means"—and servants. In fact he seems to be moving out of what can be called in a rather literal sense the "amateur" approach, and is thinking in terms of competence. He is now collecting experts of all kinds. And he has something to offer to professional sociologists—after more dynamic centers of field work, for example

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Africa, Sicily offers an interesting change because it is so inert.

Dolci's work and organization have in fact arrived at a fascinating point of consolidation—and no doubt a tricky one. Religious movements often (one might say usually) begin in this kind of hand-to-mouth, or hand-to-mind, fashion, the founder first healing himself and then laying his hands on others. But if the movement spreads and prospers, it tends toward a codification of its original doctrine and toward the formation of a body of disciples who make it their duty to keep the doctrine pure—or orthodox. This usually turns out to mean inflexible and incapable of growth: leading in the end to taking "sides," and the use of force. (Is it an inescapable paradox of human existence that we always have to fight for our "peace?")

Dolci's movement is intended to be, and still is, the antithesis of both "theology" and "church." That he should continue to draw the kind of people who understand and are imbued with this anti-orthodoxy, may be the test of his movement's viability. What sort of people does he in practice attract? There are a lot of students and young people, presumably full of idealism and energy, but there are also plenty in middle life. There are plenty of amateurs, and there are plenty of non-expert jobs for them to do. (I am told that there is the usual easily-spotted body of masochists working off their social guilt, but that you can often find jobs for them, too, not too close to people.) But it is the experts, the people who come to do a professional job, who will provide a real and important test. Will they become consecrated brethren in Dolci's order, at some spiritual remove from the world in which they live and work; or, on the other hand, will the existing material and conventional structure of their problems take over, will it be seen that solutions in economic, agricultural, and social life have to be at a certain standard of competitive efficiency? I should like to know the answer. At present, I am sure that Dolci has not moved away from his essentially limited aim of "valorization"—of making his depressed people more aware of themselves and of their potential human value—and thus more able to help themselves and their neighbors.

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BENJAMIN DE MOTT

JEWISH WRITERS IN AMERICA

A Place in the Establishment

SOME MONTHS ago Leslie Fiedler addressed himself in *Poetry* magazine to the question why, "in a time of cultural philosemitism," Jewish poets have failed to achieve a measure of the prosperity of "their opposite numbers in prose." The immediate object of his attention was Karl Shapiro's *Poems of a Jew;* most of his space was devoted to an assessment of Shapiro's career; his judgments about the latter, and his tentative answers to the question posed were neither startling nor tendentious. One aspect of the piece, though—its treatment of a heterogeneous group of successful Jewish novelists—did bring the reader up short. Fiedler began his remarks by observing that "We live in a time when everywhere in the realm of prose Jewish writers have discovered their Jewishness to be an eminently marketable commodity, their much vaunted alienation to be their passport into the heart of Gentile culture." Later he claimed that the transformation of Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn, figures of ancient American myth, into Holden Caulfield and Augie March, "leaves the best Jewish writers amused, the second best embarrassed, and the worst atrociously pleased!" And at one point he went so far as to speak jocularly of "Wouk and Salinger, Bellow and Malamud, Philip Roth and Uris" as the "bandwagon which travels our streets, its calliope playing *Hatikvah.*"

These slighting remarks are obviously not to be thought of as part of a "considered estimate": the bandwagon metaphor and the careless linkage of good and bad writers are offered as jokes. But to say this is not to say that either item lacks interest or point. When considered in light of other signs currently appearing in Jewish critical comment on Jewish writers, the jokes qualify as symptoms of more than trivial significance—symptoms of a new and uneasy condescension, a reluctance to come to positive terms with the "parade" that is mocked.* The ground of this reluctance is complicated; no observer can be certain that the map he makes of it is precise. But since the hesitations or reservations or embarrassments of the Jewish critic have greater than local effect now, and may increase in influence, an imprecise account of their bearings is probably a shade better than none at all.

Such an account begins necessarily with commonplaces: the relations between Jewish critics and Jewish fictionists are of special character, but certain general truths about hostility between authors and critics (of any background) are never-

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* Another appearance of these symptoms is Alfred Kazin's review in the *Reporter* of Norman Mailer's *Advertisements for Myself,* which turned an ironic remark of Mailer's about running for President into a joke about a Jew running for President.

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theless relevant to them. First among these truths is that nowadays tensions exist between critics and authors even when the critic's purpose is to offer praise. The reason for this is that the act of writing a book of criticism is an act of self-definition whose very form amounts to a judgment on the literary selves of most contemporary imaginative writers. The form in question, the self created by the critical act, is above all masterful—the projection of a mind eager to choose some ground on which to meet the world and certain of its power to maintain its position. The voice that speaks this mind is forthright, energetic, slightly managerial, suggestive of a nature inclined (at those moments when it dramatizes itself) not to brood on its own defects but to assert, with a touch of flamboyance, its special strengths. And it is because this mind and this voice have fewer and fewer points of contact with the literary personalities about which they speak that the critical self now stands forth as a pronouncement —even before it pronounces—on contemporary literature as a whole.

The decrease mentioned in points of contact, or harmonies of interest, is not a product of chance: it is the result of the invention by modern writers of a wide range of "non-literary" literary voices. If the fictionist does on occasion still speak in the masterful voice, he far more often settles upon one of the sub- or non-literary voices or roles that are now open to him. Instead of representing his nature and intelligence as superior in quality, instead of speaking as the rational commander, he is likely to do the opposite—turn inward, present himself as a child, a lunatic, a beaten soul; parade his own defects, his own wretchedness. More than likely, indeed, for in modern fiction the tendency to make the latter choice—to speak in the voice of the victim, the weakling, the figure who admits his shame—has grown immensely strong. In face of this development the critic's position is awkward. His task is to address himself to a literature of shame and defeat—yet the "traditional" voice of criticism is poorly adapted to the expression of a poised though sympathetic response to such writing; to maintain the "correct" voice of judgment is difficult without checking the effort to enter completely into the experience of the work at hand. The critic is of course free (in his writing) to allow sympathy with shame to contend against confidence in his own power—but confidence must win; for it is upon the mask and show of strength and impersonality that critical authority still depends. Just here lies the explanation of that peculiar but not infrequent critical piece in which the reader senses a struggle between an original response of admiration and a tone that nevertheless seems to condescend. And just here, to repeat, lies the key to the new complexity of relations between critics and authors.

THE specific relevance of this observation to Jewish literary criticism needs little demonstration. The voice of the Jewish critic, like that of any other, is at its best firm, elevated, impersonal. Rarely does the Jewish critic announce that his view of this or that novel is a product of private experience. He speaks in the name of traditions of art and excellence that, ideally, are presumed to lie beyond local fact; he places himself in an adult world of substantial, general ideas (whenever he descends to the level of mere personal detail—even if the descent is only a matter of an allusion to his own education or to some boyish memory—he has ceased to function as a critic); he writes as a man in process of moving beyond provincial particulars to a more abstract position—one with special *dignus*. Like any man whose act of self-creation involves a step beyond or above personal experience, he is not eager to be brought down, embarrassed, reminded that his present nature is in fact the product of an act of will. But he can be "embarrassed"—that is the important truth. All that is necessary to bring this about is for a writer to force him into

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a confrontation with those facts of experience from which he—and most other figures self-elected to the community of intellectuals—has meant to deliver himself.

The range of the novel even now is not so narrow as to *require* the Jewish novelist to confront the Jewish critic with the facts in question—homely, un-elevated experience. But to spare the critic this confrontation he would have to avoid the subjects that he knows best. This is not to claim that all Jewish experience is homely and un-elevated; it is to say that the American Jew has only recently taken up full position in the Establishment—and that the life of the Establishment is the only source even of half-satisfactory substitutes for the grace, cultivation, or village simplicities (of certain European Jewish experience, for example), that command immediate critical respect. The notion of sparing the critic, though, has no attraction for the Jewish novelist. Like almost every novelist this writer is engaged at some point in his career in a scrupulous effort to express and thereby to understand his past. On his view nothing counts for less than that his past doesn't include the Faubourg St. Germain or rural pieties or urbane Anglo-Jewish gentility; the truth of Brownsville or Newark or Chicago is open to him, and the possibility that he ought to be embarrassed by it—because it nowhere connects with old Beacon Hill or the London of Henry James—never enters his mind.

The point can be overstated, to be sure. It would be absurd to suggest that the Jewish critic looks toward the publication of an agrarian tract by an urban Jew, or toward nostalgic stories of Newport or Porcellian days, or toward mythic evocations of the heroic American past. And it would be extravagant to imagine that he has asked himself straight out, about some Jewish story: Why should ignominy declare itself with so little shame? Why should men of wit and passion become absorbed in the kitchen and grocery store experience of their youth, when the world of elegant intellection and positive forceful talk lies open to them? It is *not* absurd, however, to maintain that the life created in Jewish fiction is an item less than intensely fascinating for the cultivated Jewish critic, or to argue that in order for the latter to be fully responsive to this life he would need to be stimulated by something beyond detail—by, in short, a voice and tone that he can admire.

As has been intimated, that easily admirable voice is not often to be heard in contemporary fiction. And the tone of Jewish fiction is especially remote from that which the critic might be disposed to consider as the ideal. It not only lacks suggestions of personal force, it seems to mock such force—seems in fact to imply that the role of the masterful man aloft in the world of ideas, the stance of positive control, is actually one that no Jew could ever bring off with total success, without winking reductively at himself in the process. There are, of course, qualifications to be entered beside this statement; left to stand by itself it amounts to an assertion that the stories of recent, serious Jewish writers have a unique tone or quality (or even archetypal situation) at their center that marks them as Jewish—and the dangers of such an assertion are obvious. For the present, though, the point is best made broadly: in most of his work the Jewish fictionist in America seems strongly responsive to that sense of things which holds that the key situation of life is one of personal humiliation and the dominant emotion of human experience one of self-pity. And this responsiveness in large measure governs his tone.

The man who pretends that the sense of life thus defined is historically inexplicable is, as ought to go without saying, either a fool or a brute. There are times in fact when the non-Jew wonders why the Jewish reporter of humiliations, the writer whose characters wail for themselves, bothers to take the artist's pains; his voice reverberates off bloody imagined walls in the mind that bear a history sufficient not

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simply to confirm the appropriateness of the tone, but to deepen its sounds to a point at which they become nearly unbearable. Where could a writer stand (this would seem the one human question to ask), a writer connected by blood or temper or name with millions slain, brutalized, humiliated—where could he stand except in the position of the poet of humiliation?

To the fictionist (but perhaps not as obviously to the Jewish critic) the answer appears to be—nowhere. Which is only to repeat that the label, poet of humiliation, is in no sense unsuitable for any of the younger Jewish novelists of present reputation. A catalogue of these writers, with a note on the relevance of the label in each case, can have at best only a limited validity—but it may at least testify to the frequency with which they set themselves the task of creating the totally mortified man. The ghetto child in Henry Roth's *Call It Sleep,* tormented by a vision of himself as pander to his own cousin, seeks out a kind of total oblivion of feeling at the book's crisis—hoping to silence the inward voice which, pleading for forgiveness, cries out: Look what I have done, oh look what I have done. The child Ozzie in Philip Roth's "The Conversion of the Jews" insults his rabbi for rejecting Christian dogma, flies into a dementia that gives him for the first time a sense of peace and power—and exacts, by a threat of suicide, a gesture of tolerance that is a kind of universal comic humiliation of his faith, forcing the crowd of Jewish parents on the street below him to pray as Christians and declare their belief in the divinity of Jesus. Isaac Rosenfeld, in "Coney Island Revisited," exacerbated himself by recollecting a moment of total public degradation in a garish tunnel of love—a loss of all pride and dignity incurred as a consequence of self-hatred. The floorwalker in Bernard Malamud's "Lady of the Lake" lacerates himself for denying his Jewishness and aspiring in fantasy to connection with some Italian aristocrat—for it is this self-deceit that takes from him the one human creature he might have truly loved. J. D. Salinger's heroes again and again are figures whose nearly pathological sensitivity reduces them to suicidal mumbling; they cannot utter save to children, they are paralyzed by self-indulgent grief. Nathanael West's two best novels are fairly described as powerful exercises in self-mortification. Tommy Wilhelm in Saul Bellow's *Seize the Day* is lost in the oblivion of tears at the end of that work. Asa Leventhal, the hero of Bellow's *The Victim,* bares shamelessly his terrible failures of independence, his hopeless need to be loved. Nor are those fictionists who in conscious revolution have togged themselves out as challengers, strong men, able always to still the voice of self-pity: ". . . I still feel rage," says Norman Mailer in his *Advertisements for Myself,* "at the cowardice of our time which has ground down all of us into the mediocre compromises of what had been once our light-filled passion to stand erect and be original."

No critic, Jew or non-Jew, could justify the adoption of a patronizing line on the basis of an abstract summary of themes like the one above. And if it were true that the themes cited emerged naturally as the inevitable and genuinely inclusive definitions of the separate experiences set forth by the stories in question, the very notion of abstracting them would be indefensible. But it must be said that the claim of inevitability cannot be sustained for all of them. Consider again the humiliation of Rabbi Binder's congregation in the Philip Roth story. The central human relations of this tale are those of a young student with his mother and his rabbi. The boy, in the accents of bright adolescent contrariety, objects to his mother's habit of measuring the seriousness of disasters—air crashes and the like—according to the number of Jews on the casualty lists; she slaps his face in response to his impertinence. The boy also objects, in the same accents, to his rabbi's certainty

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that the Christian dogma of the Immaculate Conception is not to be seriously entertained; the rabbi strikes him, half unintentionally, in Hebrew school, and bloodies his nose. The tale moves high-spiritedly to this point; in order for it to *become* a story nothing is needed beyond a redefinition of the blows already struck—a turn that will serve at once as a reminder (for the mother and rabbi) of the implications of the loss of self-control in adult religious argument, and as a sign of imminent initiation (for the boy himself) into the mystery and complexity of belief. But the writer does not work out the story in the terms he has earned the right to use. He locates his younger hero on the synagogue roof in the position of a new saviour, and allows him to demand penitence (or total humiliation) not only from his mother and his rabbi, but from every Jew in sight. "Everybody kneel!" the boy shouts, insisting that he will kill himself if his audience does not take up the posture of Christian supplication; and the exchanges that follow this cry are mere puffs of easy Saroyanesque sentiment:

> "Mama, don't you see—you shouldn't hit me. He shouldn't hit me. You should never be hit about God, Mamma. You should never hit anybody about God—"
>
> "Ozzie, please come down now."
>
> "Promise me, Mama, promise me you'll never hit anybody about God."
>
> He had asked only his mother, but for some reason everyone kneeling in the street promised he would never hit anybody about God.

The assumption here appears to be that since *all* Jews are vicious in defense of their religion, a reservoir of guilt exists that no writer should be ashamed to tap—when he finds the moral intricacies of particular human relationships too difficult to probe. But nothing in the story validates that assumption: it has not been shown that the Jews on the street have struck blows against (wise-alecky) tolerance, and therefore deserve to be humiliated in their faith. A critic who argued that the entrance of the theme of self-hatred in this piece is as arbitrary as that of the saving cavalry troop in old Westerns would have reason on his side.

And a similar observation can be made about a much superior piece of fiction, Saul Bellow's *Seize the Day*. This beautifully detailed, almost flawlessly composed short novel ends with a scene in which the hero is engulfed in "torn sobs and cries." Scorned by his wife and his father, gulled by a charlatan, wretchedly aware of the senselessness of his fantasies, Tommy Wilhelm walks blindly through the city, enters a chapel where a funeral is in progress and soon breaks down in appalling grief that is expressed, in the final paragraph of the story, as salvation:

> The flowers and lights fused ecstatically in Wilhelm's blind, wet eyes; the heavy sea-like music came up to his ears. It poured into him where he had hidden himself in the center of a crowd by the great and happy oblivion of tears. He heard it and sank deeper than sorrow, through torn sobs and cries toward the consummation of his heart's ultimate need.

The reader understands that the writer is attempting to create a moment in which the self momentarily passes beyond self-absorption, and there is a force and beauty in the language that communicates fresh, final excitement. But the excitement has a curiously truncating effect in light of the pages that just precede it. In those pages Wilhelm has been shaking himself free from the miserable self-pity that gravelled him from the beginning of the tale. His gestures momentarily let an accumulated violence out of his being; a fury that first issues in a ferocious effort to tear a telephone out of a wall seems about to be elevated to the level of a serious struggle against the cramming, whining hell of passivity.

The psychological possibility of a swift movement from private rage to general grief can hardly be dismissed—and the possibility is strong enough to allay all but

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a shade of doubt. But the shade does not quite pass away into final acceptance. That single instant of ferocity, of exposed violence ("He ground his teeth and seized the black box with insane digging fingers and made a stifled cry and pulled")—why should it be allowed no consequences, why should it be abruptly muffled in wailing? The answer that the familiar resource of tears and fresh mortification lay too near at hand to be rejected is probably too easy. But the question itself at least points toward the kind of reservation that might be felt by a reader whose enthusiasm was for the truth of action rather than for the truth of oblivion.

Enthusiasm of this or any kind, as should be said, leads in the direction of cant as well as toward illumination. The critic who pretended, for example, that self-mortification, admissions of personal wretchedness, provide impossible matter for art would plainly be deluding himself. In the Yiddish tradition, to go no farther, work of the very greatest beauty has been made of this matter—an art that widens out from the single beaten heart into a merging with experience, a tranquil understanding that for all his unique claims, this man or the next is in fact a creature of nature rolled round, simply, in earth's diurnal course with rocks and stones and trees. Not the least effective evidence here is the last, muscular, but still sweetly witty paragraph of Isaac Bashevis Singer's "Gimpel the Fool," in which after the blows have been taken, the deceits and self-deceptions named, the fabulist steps away evenhandedly to consider the world.

This story alone would be enough to establish that no critic and no writer can cut himself off from the matter of humiliation with confidence that a pure art will never be made of it. Again: the critic would be mistaken if he sought to persuade himself that in America no Jewish artist has yet made a book out of the conflict between masochism (or self-pity) and what once was called the clear and impersonal and general apprehension of experience. Bellow himself in *The Victim*, incomparably the finest American book about Jewishness, does precisely this. In chapter after chapter the impulse to self-pity is put under examination of superb rigor. This victim is doubled; as the Jew is victimized he victimizes; sane, chorus-like voices in the book speak in a language beyond contradiction:

> If a human life is a great thing to me, it *is* a great thing. Do you know better? I'm entitled to as much as you. And why be measly? Do you have to be? Is somebody holding you by the neck? Have dignity, you understand me? Choose dignity. Nobody knows enough to turn it down. . . .

And at such moments a vision of genuine and complex dignity is achieved.

It needs to be added, however, that the mortification of Asa Leventhal in this novel has no ending; the critic never quite hears the tones in which he himself aspires to speak. *The Victim* is rich and remarkable in understanding—but the product of its understanding is not the opposite of meagerness; what is expressed once more is the impossibility of strength or of beauty, the thinness of the chance for any movement toward the ideal. The critic who reads it cannot feel himself in the presence of a mind determined to break out, at all cost, from the mean cell of personal humiliation. He has only to remember such a figure, say, as that intellectual officer of Isaak Babel who in "My First Goose" cuts himself through a field of hostility with a sword of rage, to find fresh reason for rejecting Leventhal as representative of the possibilities of Jewish character.* *The Victim* is a made thing,

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* It is worth noting that the best work to issue from an encounter between Jewish critic and Jewish fictionist is Lionel Trilling's essay on Babel (COMMENTARY, June 1955). This strong, patient, essay takes as its subject the complication of Babel's nature—his consciousness of an inclination toward self-pity, his determination to change himself, his willingness to act against the sense of powerlessness. The critic's tone is of completely poised respect, as would be expected; nowhere is a trace of condescension to be found.

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a genuine book—and there is, after all, little reason for believing that any writer could make Hamlet out of an Asa Leventhal. But a critic ill-disposed to the conviction that all souls are beaten cannot think of it as a complete victory.

One question raised by these observations is worth a further word: if, as has been argued here, the Jewish critic could easily name the qualities in Jewish fiction that tend to put off exacting readers, why has he not named them? Why does he go no farther than to make an idle joke about bandwagons and calliopes and exalted ambitions? There are two answers. The first is that in a time of assimilation no one can be certain that an intense survey of specifically Jewish qualities in contemporary writing is justifiable. Again and again it has been said that Jewishness is a greatly exaggerated "influence" on Jews of any occupation in the present American context—a lost idea like the phlogiston theory, or like the difference between America and Europe. The real quality of modern experience is attributable to the development of the mass industrial state—a development which by chance occurred first in the New World; but the development has by now occurred everywhere, and it is only the fatuous or Tory mind that persists in emphasizing differences. By the same token, curiously reversed, it is sensible to doubt that the difference between Jewish and Gentile experience in America, for the youngest generation, is conceivably as significant as that between the experience of American and European Jews over the last thirty years. With this in mind it seems reasonable to ask whether in fact there is a Jewish literature in America. Is it not probable that the extraordinary influence of works by serious Jewish novelists signifies only that the voice of powerlessness speaking in situations of humiliation, nakedness, and weakness is the voice that speaks most directly to the *common* conviction about the nature of present experience? And if so, if there is no longer any special experience of Jewish powerlessness, what responsible critic would wish to single out Jewish representations of this experience as special objects of attack?

The other factor inhibiting a full assessment of Jewish writing is the traditional suspicion that, regardless of the new status of criticism in modern letters, and regardless of the existence of a classifiable "weakness" in the creative writers in question, the critic would be ill-advised to forget that in the final hierarchy he himself does not stand at the top. The effects of this suspicion are understandable—but they are also regrettable in the extreme. In literature hierarchies are always dependent upon the conditions of the moment; at this moment there is something to be said for the view that the Jewish writers who are most courageous, who rank as the men of strongest will, are those who have sought a release from the tones and gestures of self-humiliation here described, and have undertaken to speak their piece boldly and without tears. To make this point is not to dismiss the achievement of the Jewish fictionist; it is simply to assert that the achievement of Jewish critics, social observers, speculative thinkers could be allowed to have the force of an example —a representation of ranges of strength that no novelist would be the worse for admitting to his work.

There are good reasons, of course, for hesitating to press on too far in admiration of the active, vigorous voices in Jewish letters. The vaguely positive maundering of Luce-ite editorials has demonstrated that nothing is easier or more meaningless than to "call for" writers who speak not of personal suffering but of general plight, who encounter their subjects with some end in view beyond that of representing personal agony. Furthermore, over-praise in this direction inevitably works to diminish the force of necessary qualifications in the case about Jewish fiction itself: namely that there are stories by Jewish writers which are rooted in feelings at once deeper

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and more admirable than self-pity—Bellow's "Looking for Mr. Green" is one example, and that there are Jewish literary careers—Norman Mailer's, for instance—in whose very chaos can be read a rejection of the habit of lament. But when all this is said, the notion that a wider range of tones could strengthen the position of the Jewish novelist does not seem unsound. And it is plain that examples of a different kind of voice are ready at hand—in the strong line of Jewish critics (men like Lionel Trilling, Leslie Fiedler, Philip Rahv, Irving Howe, Alfred Kazin, and the younger COMMENTARY writers), and in the remarkable group of Jewish social observers (men like Paul Goodman, David Riesman, Daniel Bell, Irving Kristol).

THE outsider cannot claim with assurance about the writers just named that they themselves have silenced the inward plea, have checked the desire to say to the world, Ah how badly we have been treated. Their subjects, their forms, the tradition in which they write—all these permit them the manners of impersonality, and demand from them shows of moral intelligence and firmness. But it is possible to assert, on the basis of their work, that these manners do not signify the death of the imagination. Doubtless a critical work can never rank as the central, comprehensive book of an age, but it can serve as a reminder of the truth that a book worth such a description is not created out of mere local self-hatred but out of the desire (and the capacity) to reach beyond the self, filament, filament, filament—seeking otherness, meeting it, placing it at once fully and precisely. And the best Jewish criticism does at this moment serve as a reminder of that truth.

For the rest, for the future, it may as well be said bluntly that the Jewish novelist who fails to heed the reminder specified stands to lose his only considerable advantage as a writer. This advantage, as it appears to the eye of the non-Jew, is a matter of the Jewish writer's possessing at present a superlatively good chance of being believed to *be* a comprehensive man. The idea of impersonality and detachment from private circumstance as a difficult achievement, as a labor involving some serious inner struggle, some genuine victory over private pain: this remains an easy idea to contemplate in relation to the Jew, however well advanced the age of assimilation. He who accepts the idea uncritically can of course be mocked as superstitious or sentimental, but cynicism that responds in this fashion is perhaps best regarded as its own answer. What counts in any case is that the advantage, if it exists, is not permanent. The writer who until now has been content to rest on public sympathy ("philo-Semitism"), public belief in his familiarity with joys and miseries unknown to other men, should be warned that time can run out on him: his chance of producing a more moving book than the age as a whole deserves can be diced away in lamentation. Possibly the faint hints of condescension in Jewish criticism stem finally from an inkling of that truth—together with awareness that the critical voice of this day is itself less remote from inclusiveness than people usually assume. But until the Jewish critic spells himself out on the issues, this awareness will be of little service—to Jewry or to literature. To be genuinely useful the critic would have to cease snickering and venture on an effort to establish that even now, in art as in criticism as in life, the voice of authority is the voice of self-command. And the first effect of that labor would doubtless be that of acquainting his audience with the difficult truth that if there is at the moment a bandwagon or a calliope, there are not yet any heroes worth a full-throated serenade.

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HENRY POPKIN

JEWISH WRITERS IN ENGLAND

A Tradition Begins

DURING THE past few years several new Jewish novelists and playwrights have attracted considerable attention in the British literary world. Whereas Jews have long played an important role in American literary life, they have until recently been a negligible element in British letters. A few months ago, Brian Glanville (himself one of the new Anglo-Jewish novelists) remarked on this difference in an article in *Encounter* where he glanced longingly at the greater Jewish population of the United States (five million to Britain's less than half a million) and at what he conceives to be "a definite Jewish intellectual life, centered on New York."

Now, the contrast between Anglo-Jewish and Jewish American writing is striking, but the period for significant comparison is quite small. The Jewish populations of both Britain and the United States were relatively insubstantial until Russian oppression of the Jews in the 1880's stimulated a sizeable immigration to both countries. The Jewish population of Britain in 1880 is authoritatively estimated at 50,000; in the years from 1881 to 1914, approximately 100,000 Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe flowed into England. Most of the highly visible British Jews today—including the writers—are the descendants of these immigrants and others who followed.

In the period preceding the great immigration, British Jews made modest contributions to their nation's literature. We have, in the 19th century, no American counterparts to Benjamin Disraeli or even to such lesser figures as Sir Sidney Lee (best known as a biographer of Shakespeare) and Sir Francis Palgrave (who edited the *Golden Treasury*). Then, out of the first generations of immigrants, there came Israel Zangwill in England and Abraham Cahan in the United States.

Both Cahan and Zangwill were prolific, Cahan devoting most of his energy to Yiddish journalism and Zangwill to a great variety of literary genres. But their differences as writers of Jewish fiction in English were significant for the different course Anglo-Jewish writing took in the two countries. Zangwill, while he was capable of producing authentic Victorian period pieces (his *Big Bow Mystery* is one of the classic English detective novels), proved unable to adapt Jewish subject matter to English literary forms. When he turned to Jewish fiction (in *Children of the Ghetto* and that book's various sequels), he wrote an essentially alien story, a pathetic, tragi-comic, warm-hearted account of East European Jewish life transplanted to London's East End. He created no pattern for others to follow, and in consequence he was not followed.

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Cahan, on the other hand, fitted his Jewish subject into the most suitable fictional genre of the time. *The Rise of David Levinsky** is a Dreiserian novel, with a Jewish hero who bears a strong resemblance to Frank Cowperwood in *The Financier.* A few years later, when Sinclair Lewis and others were belaboring the American Babbitt, Ben Hecht and Ludwig Lewisohn —working directly in the tradition of Cahan—used the exotic, "different" Jew for the same purpose. In the 30's, when "social" novelists dominated, Meyer Levin, Albert Halper, and others wrote Jewish novels to match, while Henry Roth and Daniel Fuchs contributed some brilliant variations on the theme; Clifford Odets provided an equivalent in the theater. Still others, like S. J. Perelman, George S. Kaufman, and George Jean Nathan, were developing a peculiarly urban kind of wit, and Nathanael West came forward with a peculiarly original body at work of his own.

And where were the Anglo-Jewish writers all this time? British Jewry produced in Isaac Rosenberg a distinguished poet who died in the First World War but few others of consequence. A little research turns up the names of Siegfried Sassoon (so assimilated that he could write a novel called *Memoirs of a Fox-Hunting Man*) and Benn Levy (a Labor Member of Parliament and a facile comic dramatist whose most recent play, *The Rape of the Belt,* has just made a brief appearance on Broadway). But, except for Rosenberg, these are Jewish writers only by accident; they do not attempt any distinctively Jewish subject or manner. A popular writer, Louis Golding, sentimentally interpreted some aspects of Jewish life, and two "hard-boiled" novelists undertook Jewish subjects—Willy Goldman and Gerald Kersh. Their work is intended as social criticism, but some of it, Kersh's fiction especially, suggests Jerome Weidman more than Halper or Levin. According to Glanville, attacks from the Jewish community discouraged them from further development of their Jewish subject matter.

But still we may wonder at the comparative absence of Jewish writers. Where were the rebels of the 1920's, in Aldous Huxley's pattern if not in Sinclair Lewis's? And where were the responsible social critics of the 1930's? No coherent group of able Jewish writers appeared in England until the present youthful generation of Arnold Wesker, Dan Jacobson, Harold Pinter, Wolf Mankowitz, Dannie Abse, and others. What was responsible for the delay?

ONE IMPORTANT FACTOR is the cultural ideal that until very recently dominated—some would say tyrannized over —British life and letters: the ideal of the Gentleman. This ideal was intimidating and persuasive in a way that no single American image has ever been, and its prestige surely contributed to the powerful pressure toward assimilation and conformity that Glanville finds in the Anglo-Jewish community. Boys' books helped define this gentleman's image and to glorify it, and we have Maurice Samuel's testimony as to its damaging effect on young Jews of East European birth or parentage. In his autobiographical volume, *The Gentleman and the Jew,* Samuel makes a point of the implicit hostility toward Jews involved in the ideal of the British gentleman, and Richard Usborne's *Clubland Heroes* indicates the same strain in adventure stories from the Edwardian period on. Bulldog Drummond, for example, thrashed Russian Jewish conspirators whenever circumstances warranted, and when he disguised a friend as a Jew, he naturally expected of him the lisp that had become a standard feature of Jewish characterization. Drummond was not a professional policeman; he was a patriot and a lover of adventure, but he was first of all a gentleman, a gifted amateur like Sherlock Holmes or like Raffles, "the ama-

* Recently reissued in Harper's Torchbook series at $2.45.

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teur cracksman." John Buchan's Richard Hannay of the British Secret Service belongs in the same company. Gertrude Himmelfarb has recently commented on the comparative innocence of Buchan's anti-Semitism, but, innocent or not, it was there, and it was based on the conviction that the Jew was the antithesis of the gentleman who always played fair and gracefully but never played too hard.

A hostile image of the Jew frequently appeared in serious literature as well as in boys' books. We can easily enough list some of the serious British writers whose work exhibits the earmarks of anti-Semitism—D. H. Lawrence, H. G. Wells, Graham Greene, Evelyn Waugh, Hilaire Belloc, T. S. Eliot. It is no less easy to offer an American roster of equally distinguished contemporaries against whom similar charges have been made—Edith Wharton, Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner. But there are many cultural milieus in the United States, and to be excluded from one or another is not necessarily crippling to a writer. Such writers as Odets, West, Perelman, and Bellow joined their own literary circles, which were not so much Jewish as they were liberal and tolerant. In England, however, there was little alternative to the Establishment and its somewhat emancipated literary arm, Bloomsbury. Outsiders had tough sledding; obstacles existed not only for Jews but also for writers of working-class origin and for colonials. Only the other day, Edmund Wilson was observing that Morley Callaghan was unduly neglected because no one could believe that a Canadian was capable of writing so well. D. H. Lawrence and, years later, F. R. Leavis could give testimony to the difficulty of being a literary outsider in England.

IF THE OUTSIDER was to find any secure place at all, one might expect that it awaited him in the socialist movement. But British socialism had a considerable strain of anti-Semitism, of which the late Ernest Bevin was one of the last stubborn exemplars. Now, socialist anti-Semitism is not in itself unique; parallels are to be found in American Populism and French socialism. But the Fabian socialism of England was, unlike Populism, an intellectual movement, and of the Fabians we might have expected better, especially from someone like H. G. Wells, who continued writing well into the time of Hitler's ascendancy and persisted in his impression that the Jews primarily devoted themselves to amassing wealth, stifling social reform, and ignoring the rest of the world. In an early work of science fiction, *In the Days of the Comet* (1906), a comet threatens the world, and the British cabinet meets. The Jewish member is, naturally, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

> He made his confession for his race. "We Jews," he said, "have gone through the system of this world, creating nothing, consolidating many things, destroying much. Our racial self-conceit has been monstrous. We seem to have used our ample coarse intellectuality for no other purpose than to develop and master and maintain the convention of property, to turn life into a sort of mercantile chess and spend our winnings grossly. . . . We have had no sense of service to mankind. Beauty which is godhead—we made it a possession."

In *The Research Magnificent* (1915), a British agent tries to persuade some Russian Jewish survivors of a massacre to stop oppressing their peasant neighbors. For his pains, he is attacked by the Jews, who claw his cheek and tear his coat.

Neither revolutionary Russia nor Hitler's Germany induced Wells to reconsider his attitude. In *The Shape of Things to Come* (1933), he attributes anti-Semitism to two causes—Zionism and the Jewish failure to take a hand in monetary reform, especially in view of the reputed Jewish "cleverness in monetary processes." A novel of the same year disposes of the superficial signs that Jewish radicals might exist. The hero of *The Bulpington of Blup*

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meets a Jewish brother and sister at socialist gatherings. He is seduced by the sister, who reveals to him the true nature of her brother and her people:

> There are no Liberal Jews, my dear; there are only liberal Jewesses. Our men have got respect for property and propriety ingrained. Melchior for all his Communism is as greedy and wary and timid as a rat.

Wells continued to defend the same position in still other novels, not always expressing himself through characters. No evidence ever intruded to shake his firmly held view that the Jews were the dedicated enemies of social reform, that their misdeeds directly caused whatever persecution they encountered.

This hostility turns up in the work of writers more sophisticated than Wells. Bernard Shaw, a fellow Fabian, defends the Jews against it in several plays, reversing the stereotype by exposing anti-Semitism as a mask for Gentile sharp dealing. Thus, in *Major Barbara,* the Gentile munitions maker reveals that he has a Jewish partner only to support the reputation created by his own vicious practices:

> Lazarus is a gentle romantic Jew who cares for nothing but string quartets and stalls at fashionable theatres. He will get the credit of your rapacity in money matters as he has hitherto had the credit of mine.

But in a late play, *Geneva,* Shaw presents the stereotype without remembering to reverse it. The League of Nations learns that the world is about to be destroyed. A Jewish delegate excuses himself, and a British delegate informs those who remain that the Jew will use this information to make himself "a millionaire until the ice-cap overtakes him."*

In *The Dog Beneath the Skin*—an important product of the British literary left of the 30's—W. H. Auden and Christopher Isherwood briefly present an international financier named Grabstein—"The biggest crook in Europe. Got his finger in everything. Whatever happens, he's in on the ground floor." After indicating his sinister qualities, Grabstein bursts into a pathetic song about social anti-Semitism:

I want to be friendly
But it's no good, for
No one has love for me,
Only a shove for me . . .

The main purpose seems to be to satirize the conception of the ubiquitous, omnipotent Jewish financier, but the dramatists incidentally testify to the prevalence of this image. They remind us that the literary left did not provide the happiest home for the Anglo-Jewish writer.

SHOW BUSINESS did give a home of sorts to Jewish talent. British Jews have long been prominent and safe in what we call the entertainment industry. In London's theater district one finds the Jewish atmosphere of Times Square, with all the lively testimony of Jewish gastronomy. Right off Shaftesbury Avenue—the background of the recent British film *Expresso Bongo* (based on Wolf Mankowitz's popular stage musical)—are the delicatessens, row on row with their salt beef, their "haimische" pickles, and their "beigels."

Jewish dialect comedians have flourished in England, along with other performers who traded on the ludicrous aspects of lower-class or outlandish speech —Cockneys, Scots, and Irishmen. *Potash and Perlmutter* and its sequel—American dialect comedies of the garment industry, —won sensational popularity in London as they had in New York. (Their popularity was European, not merely English. Last summer, I found a new play, *Potash and Perlmutter on Vacation,* delighting unsophisticated audiences in Amsterdam.) When the American dialect comedian Harry Green found in 1934 that Holly-

* Lawrence Langner of the Theatre Guild has published in *The Magic Curtain* the correspondence in which he unsuccessfully urged Shaw to alter the Jewish references in *Geneva.*

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wood had no more roles for him, he went to England where he resumed playing George Washington Cohen in his famous vaudeville act, *The Cherry Tree.*

On the stage, Jewish characters were present mainly for diversion. They were not yet *persona grata* in the serious theater except as objects of earnest inquiry; a Jew was so presented in John Galsworthy's *Loyalties,* which explores the problem of the Jew as clubman. To suit this environment, serious Jewish actors often submerged their Jewish identity. Consider that actor whom Americans came to regard as the perfect British gentleman, Leslie Howard; his origin was Jewish, and, curiously, his nephew, Alan Howard, plays a Jewish role in Arnold Wesker's trilogy—the male lead, in fact, in the last play, *I'm Talking About Jerusalem.*

ALL THIS CONTRASTS sharply with the present situation. Jewish writers of some distinction have appeared, and they have begun to assess themselves and their significance as Jews. Some can be placed in reference to their American counterparts. Arnold Wesker has often, if inexactly, been hailed as a latter-day British equivalent to Clifford Odets; in his plays, he examines the problems of socialism more directly than Odets ever did, and he comments more affectionately, more nostalgically than Odets on the family ties that lie at the heart of Jewish life. Wolf Mankowitz is more frankly an entertainer; the characters and the milieu of his stories suggest the world of Bernard Malamud, but Mankowitz's treatment of these humble Jews is less intense or profound. In his musical comedies, *Expresso Bongo* and *Make Me an Offer,* he is obviously drawing upon the bickering dialect comedy of stage tradition. Bernard Kops does the same in his unpretentious play with songs, *The Hamlet of Stepney Green,* which loosely adapts the story of *Hamlet* to a poor Jewish section of London. (One of Kops's gags drew a few protests from the Jewish community. Some Jews at a seance encounter the ghostly spirit of Hitler. One suggests: "Maybe he just wants to apologize.") Lionel Bart's *Oliver!,* a musical based on *Oliver Twist,* offers a lovable Fagin who also reflects the stage tradition of dialect comedy. This Fagin is a jolly man, wide-eyed, unrestrained, loping about wildly, hugely enjoying his extravagant actions; fanatically caressing his treasures, he looks heavenward to beg pardon for his one small fault, his avarice. But if he is more explicitly Jewish than the Alec Guinness portrayal in the film of *Oliver Twist,* he is less villainous, and, finally, he does not go to prison like Dickens' Fagin but escapes, promising us once more that he will turn over a new leaf. (The Jews of England, by the way, take this in stride. The reviewer in the London *Jewish Chronicle* called this Fagin "the most lovable scamp of all . . . deservedly, it stopped the show.")

Expresso Bongo, Make Me an Offer, and *Oliver!* have an air of amorality about them which they share with the Cockney musical *Fings Ain't Wot They Used t'Be.* (*Fings* has songs by Bart, and, like *Make Me an Offer,* it was first performed at Joan Littlewood's Stratford Theatre Royal, a center for lively dramas of social criticism.) In *Make Me an Offer,* the sharp-dealing junk traders must take an unfair profit from someone in their sale of worthless china; Mankowitz solves his hero's moral problem by having him sell to some visiting Americans, who have more money than is good for them.

Of the dramatists, Wesker deals most directly with Jewish subjects, and with socialism and family life as necessary parts of the Jewish scene. His *Chicken Soup with Barley* shows a Jewish milieu warmed by the hope of socialism. In *Roots* we see a provincial Gentile family divided against itself and impervious to ideas. The daughter of the family, inspired by the socialist doctrine of her absent Jewish lover, loses the lover but—what is made to seem more important—keeps the socialism. In any of Wesker's plays, a certain self-conscious-

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ness intrudes, but his gift is real and his promise is great.* I have seen Wesker attacked in print for urging his fellow dramatist, Harold Pinter, to be more Jewish. Pinter's manner requires a certain anonymity, for the shaping influence in his plays is the work of Samuel Beckett. His characters tend to be Everyman; his one Jewish character, Goldberg in *The Birthday Party,* seems to stand for conformist vulgarity. But, obviously, Pinter's enigmatic dramas, serious, social, and psychological, should not be judged by a sectarian standard.

RECENT ANGLO-JEWISH triumphs in the novel are less spectacular but equally genuine. Dan Jacobson, a South African expatriate living in London, has in his stories and novels presented moving portraits of alienated figures—who may be Jewish, Negro, colonial, or even English. His fiction conveys the inevitable separateness of men, bridged only rarely and freakishly by the sort of instinctive tie that unites the Zulu and the Zeide in the title story of his collection. A parallel case is Dannie Abse's *Ash on a Young Man's Sleeve,* a sensitive, nostalgic account of a Welsh Jewish boyhood, of the life of a minority within a minority.

Some of the other Anglo-Jewish novels that have attracted critical attention are a little more smooth and commercial. Brian Glanville, in *The Bankrupts,* arrives, like Philip Roth, at the historical moment when Jewish tragedy arises out of Daddy's refusal to let Babs have the car and his insistence that her suitors have clean fingernails. But Glanville is personally caught up in the pattern he describes in his *Encounter* essay, the violent assault upon the older generation. Like Kersh and Goldman before him, he expresses considerable animosity toward repressive, conformist Jewish parents. Some pattern of reverence or guilt makes it impossible for corresponding American figures to return quite such bitter indictments of their elders. Even the hard-boiled Americans, Weidman and Budd Schulberg, differed from their British counterparts, Kersh and Goldman, in this respect; they found their primary targets in ruthless young entrepreneurs, not in the families that produced them. Even when Roth exposes parental stuffiness, as in the title story of *Goodbye, Columbus,* his intention is comic; in *The Bankrupts,* Glanville attacks the same job with a heavier hand, and never does he exhibit that Jewish nostalgia which shapes such a story as Roth's "Eli, the Fanatic."

Two new Anglo-Jewish novels have appeared within the last year; the stir they have created suggests that such books are hopefully anticipated, that an eager audience is looking for a writer who will do in fiction what Wesker has done in drama. Frederic Raphael, author of *The Limits of Love,*† probably will not turn the trick. His long, attenuated novel of conventional Jewish life arranges three sisters in significant order; one marries a reactionary would-be assimilationist, another marries a Communist, and the third, the good one who follows the golden mean, marries . . . well, in effect, she marries the novelist.

A more serious, more able novel is Gerda Charles's *The Crossing Point,* which observes Anglo-Jewish life from two vantage points. Much of the story is seen through the eyes of an Orthodox rabbi who is seeking a bride. Most of the rest centers about two daughters of a pious, vicious, old egotist. Typically, the rabbi thinks the old tyrant is saintly. One of the daughters would be the perfect bride for him, but again typically, he picks another girl. Of more interest than what passes for plot are Miss Charles's little sketches of an eligible rabbi besieged by a hopeful mother, of a Jewish girl taking her first hesitant steps out of the fold, of a possessive parent exaggerating his

* Wesker's three plays have just been published by Random House in a volume titled *The Wesker Trilogy.*

† In this country it has recently won the Lippincott Fiction contest and will be published in April.

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ailments to keep his daughters in line, of the idle Jewish rich playing at charity, of an international conclave busily conferring to no visible purpose. I am occasionally taken aback by Miss Charles's firm identification of an "Aryan smell," a "Gentile smell," and this or that emanation of "the Jewish psyche," but I am persuaded that her generalizations have meaning for the world she is describing. She is not only a shrewd observer but also a shrewd analyst, equally of Jewish affectation and aspiration. *The Crossing Point* stands virtually alone as a serious, substantial novel of Anglo-Jewish life. It is the nearest approach that recent fiction has made to the quality of the Wesker trilogy.

THE FORCES behind the new Anglo-Jewish writers are primarily the same ones that produced the so-called "Angry Young Men" and the new generation of dramatists. Writers of these groups, like John Osborne, John Braine, and Shelagh Delaney, tend to be of lower-middle-class or working-class origin. They are social critics whose attitudes range from a sharp-tongued hostility directed against the Establishment to a sentimental nostalgia for working-class warm-heartedness. They have been propelled into the literary scene by the declining prestige of Britain and the traditional British images, by the social mobility which the war induced, and by the economic and social leveling which they owe to the welfare state. The living standards of the lower classes have improved, and so they have risen into literature—as authors and as serious subjects. Among the beneficiaries of the welfare state have been the Jews; hence this present generation of Anglo-Jewish writers. The new generation has been stimulated also by the example and by the international success of Jewish-American writers —especially Bellow and Malamud.

Like their Gentile contemporaries, the Anglo-Jewish writers are dedicated to social criticism, but they direct their critiques mainly at the world outside while tending to show the same uncritical nostalgia for humble Jewish life that Osborne and Braine have for the life of the working class. The competitiveness and injustice they attack always seem to be imposed on the lower class from without. Even when some of the novelists (Jacobson, Raphael, Glanville) take self-critical positions, they are criticizing nouveau-riche conformism that seeks to remake the Jew in the image of his Gentile neighbor.

Their American counterparts have moved beyond nostalgia and defensiveness in their treatment of Jewish life, but the presence of these qualities in Anglo-Jewish writing serves to remind us that it is, in a sense, truly beginning only now. This beginning is, like all beginnings, quite modest, and consequently we must be careful not to overrate what has been done. Although writers of considerable ability have come to light, none has yet established the permanent importance of his work. What has been established is promise, and there is plenty of that.

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THE ORIGIN OF THE COLD WAR: An Exchange

In his article, "How the Cold War Began" (November 1960), STAUGHTON LYND *attempted—with the help of American, British, and Soviet sources—to view the struggle between the West and the Communist bloc "with the kind of perspective which commonly comes only after the passage of much time." The questions raised by Mr. Lynd's article are perhaps the most urgent, and certainly the most controversial, of our day. They are, it should also be said, questions that must continually be re-opened to discussion, since our understanding of how the cold war began does in large measure determine our present and future policy. The exchange that we publish below between Mr. Lynd and three of his critics is, therefore, an invitation to further comment and clarification.*

MOSHE DECTER, *formerly managing editor of the* New Leader, *is co-author (with James Rorty) of* McCarthy and the Communists, *and is currently working on a book about Communist influence on the mass media in America.* WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, *professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, is the author of* American-Russian Relations 1871–1947, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy *and the forthcoming* The Contours of American History. GEORGE LICHTHEIM *is a contributing editor to* COMMENTARY *and has recently completed a study of Marxism, soon to be published by Praeger.* STAUGHTON LYND *is Erb Fellow in American History at Columbia; he contributed "Urban Renewal—For Whom?" to our January issue.*

Moshe Decter: I must accuse Mr. Staughton Lynd of a grossly tendentious reading of history, indeed of rewriting history through an amalgam of exaggerations, omissions, distortions, and a double standard of moral judgment. In view of his statement that his primary object is to enhance "our understanding of the practical alternatives" presently before us, the impact of his article on uninformed and unformed minds is bound to be damaging—the more so because of its very patina of sobriety and balance.

From the outset, Mr. Lynd belies his claim to the perspective of the historian by disingenuous selection and omission. He places the cold war, by implication, in the category of crises—like the War of 1812, the Mexican war, and the Spanish-American war—caused by "blundering or hypocrisy or chicanery"; and thus forces the inference that U. S. chauvinism has also been largely responsible for generating the present crisis. He has neglected to mention other American wars, or other international crises that did not involve this country directly, in which even the historian's retrospective glance might discern, besides folly or knavery, *some* modicum of principle, some element of justification—say, the American Revolution or, to bring it closer to our own time, the Italo-Ethiopian war, the Sino-Japanese war or the Spanish Civil War. (Of course, the three latter were wars involving *fascist* aggression, so about them it is probably permissible not to be "objective.") So intent is Mr. Lynd on depriving the cold war of all principled significance and of reducing it to the level of a mere conflict of narrow interests and naked power that he even fails to mention the one truly great international crisis of our time which is most obviously comparable to the cold war: the crisis of Nazism and World War II.

How "squarely" does Mr. Lynd face what he calls the "childlike" question, Why did the cold war begin? How far back, how much "beneath the surface" of events, as Mr. Lynd puts it, must one go to treat the question adequately? Mr. Lynd sees fit,

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strangely enough, to go back only as far as 1941, where he discerns the conflict "in embryo." But how can one conceivably analyze the USSR's "characteristic, continuing objectives" with hardly a word of the strategy and tactics of Bolshevism in the quarter-century before 1941, and with no reference at all to Stalin's ruthless, cynical involvement with Nazism for at least thirteen years before 1941? How can one talk about the "characteristic, continuing objectives" of the USSR and never so much as mention Lenin or the Comintern? Every major pronouncement, article, speech, and book by Stalin and the Stalinists and by Khrushchev and the Khrushchevists emphatically calls itself a piece of "good Leninism." This has never been the empty rhetoric of filial piety; it is the deadly serious rhetoric of the Communist movement's drive to world power. The USSR's foreign policy, no less than its domestic policy, can be grasped only within the framework of the central Bolshevik doctrine of the "unity of theory and practice," of Lenin's pre- and post-revolutionary ideas concerning the Communist party's organization and objectives, and of the evolution of his concepts and practices under the aegis of his successors.

Stalin's involvement with Nazism takes its place within that framework and casts indispensable light on the USSR's objectives. Three periods can be distinguished in this involvement: (A) The Comintern's so-called Third Period, 1928–34, when the German Communist party, at Moscow's behest, joined the Nazis in major onslaughts on the democratic Weimar Republic and the Social Democrats ("social fascists"), and thus eased Hitler into power—on the assumption that Hitler would serve to aggravate the crisis of German capitalism and so ripen the country for Communism. (B) The Popular Front period, 1935–39, when the Soviet Union played the role of champion of antifascism and peace; throughout this entire period Stalin used the Popular Front cover to liquidate such "enemies of the people" as Social Democrats, Trotskyists, Anarchists; sought to gain a satellite cheaply through minimal support of the Republican forces in Spain, only to abandon them as a partial token of good will to Hitler, when success seemed no longer attainable; built up a lucrative trade with Germany and Italy; and made serious efforts to reach a political understanding with Hitler. (C) The period of the Stalin-Hitler pact, 1939–41—the pact under which the USSR obtained all the former Russian territories in eastern Poland, the Baltic States, and Bessarabia, and the former Austrian eastern Galicia to boot, and as a result of which Stalin gained more than two million slave laborers through the massive deportation of those countries' nationals to northern Russia, Central Asia, and Siberia.

Mr. Lynd's egregious omission of this pre-1941 history leads him ineluctably to miss the whole point of the USSR's "characteristic, continuing objectives." It surely makes it impossible for him to grasp the fact that for the first time in modern history—if not in all of Western history—we are confronted with an integrated, centralized world movement, propelled by the apparatus of a supranational party, abetted by auxiliaries, powered and directed by the ruling hierarchy of a national party and government, and motivated by an ideology which believes profoundly that it is attuned to History.

IN THE ABSENCE of this fundamental historical understanding, it becomes possible for Mr. Lynd to see Stalin's objectives in terms of mere national security and to accept the plausibility of Stalin's cruel definition of that security—"a more westerly frontier (incorporation of the Baltic nations and the Curzon line in Poland) and a friendly postwar Polish government." Mr. Lynd has forgotten that Stalin had just that, and more, from September 1939 to June 1941; how, precisely, did it hinder the swift success of the Nazi blitzkrieg?

Because of the same fundamental misunderstanding, Mr. Lynd is able to equate Stalin's objectives with Churchill's, "also thinking in terms of his nation's security." That, however, is as much as Mr. Lynd is willing to give Churchill; the rest of the "equation" is curiously more favorable to Stalin. For example, Mr. Lynd makes a point of noting the contrast between Churchill's signing of the Atlantic Charter "with its promise of democracy for 'all men in all lands' " and his subsequent statement to Parliament that the phrase was not meant to apply to the British Empire. But nowhere

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does he suggest the contrast between Stalin's professions of peaceful and democratic intentions and his actual deeds.

And what of the subsequent policies of these two governments whose "realistic" objective was national security? Under a postwar government headed by Churchill's wartime deputy, Clement Attlee, the Atlantic Charter was indeed made applicable to a series of South Asian nations which had been part of the Empire. True, this was done by Attlee the socialist—who also brought his country into NATO. But it was Attlee's Tory successors who extended the terms of the Charter to a series of African nations. And Stalin and his successors?

FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, Mr. Lynd notes, achieved his supposed role as mediator between Churchill and Stalin through his championship of the Second Front, the major military enterprise which both the USSR and the U. S. ardently desired—each for its own good reasons—to consummate as speedily as possible. But, Mr. Lynd adds significantly, "when in 1942 and again in 1943 Roosevelt failed to deliver on the Second Front, a foundation was laid for future ill will." The unmistakable implication here is that an earlier Anglo-American assault upon *Festung Europa* would have obviated Soviet hostility to the U. S. and the West. This is myth—the myth that Stalin and his whole propaganda machine did much to create.* Stalin's "ill will" derived not from anything the West did or did not do, but from *ideology;* his implacable hostility was revealed in every aspect of his policy toward the West from his earliest days in power. In fact, it is demonstrable that his fundamental hope during the period of his Nazi-pact neutrality was that German fascism and British bourgeois democracy, the two great representatives of "capitalist imperialism," would destroy each other and leave the field open to Soviet domination.

Mr. Lynd offers the usual neo-realistic criticisms of the traditional American preoccupation with general principles ("moralism"), political forms ("legalism"), and "simplistic solutions." Thus he taxes President Roosevelt with another "failure"—a lamentable predilection for free elections, which prevented him from perceiving, in the awakening of backward peoples, "the universal challenge to the big house on the hill." There follows one of the most extraordinary passages of bland distortion in the entire essay:

> Land reform, for example, was as germane to the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe as were free elections. Indeed land reform was a principal bone of contention between the Soviet-sponsored Lublin government and the Polish government-in-exile. Yet the Big Three paid it scant attention in their interminable discussions of the Polish question.

Now there can be no doubt that genuine land reform was long overdue, desperately needed in much of Eastern Europe—especially Hungary and Poland—and indeed "germane to the emergence of democracy" there. But—*whose* land reform? (And what kind of democracy?) Mr. Lynd makes it appear that the Soviet protégés in Lublin favored land reform (a "realistic" approach to democracy) while America's clients in London resisted or rejected it. And we can infer further from the same passage that one of the principal reasons for the ultimate victory of the Lublin Poles was their progressive, realistic grasp of East European necessities. Three crucial points must be made about this peculiar amalgam—concerning the Lublin Poles, land reform, and the Big Three argument over free elections.

* All of us, not just Mr. Lynd, were victimized by the endlessly reiterated demand for the opening of a "Second Front"—unquestionably the most massive and successful propaganda enterprise of the war, a remarkable achievement of the Communist "psychwar" apparatus. I do not mean to impugn the sound military and political considerations that made the Second Front desirable and even necessary. But the falsehood perpetuated by this elliptical phrase is that until the Anglo-American invasion of France in June 1944 there was only *one* front against the Nazis—in the East—and that while the Russians were doing their heroic sacrificial best, we were somehow hanging back. The truth is that there were many "second fronts": the Battle of Britain, when England stood alone against a foe fed by Stalin's wheat and fueled by Stalin's oil; Montgomery's fight against the Afrika Korps; the assault on the Continent through Italy; U. S. operations in North Africa; the American operation against Japan. Every historian who has faced the facts of World War II "squarely" has recorded that for Stalin all these other second fronts counted for little or nothing, that he showed no desire to understand their significance, but displayed only increasingly surly impatience with what he and Mr. Lynd call our "failure."

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First of all, it simply will not do to speak of two Polish governmental groups with apparently equal claim to legitimacy and authority, the one backed by the USSR and the other by Britain and the U. S. The Poles whom the Soviets set up in Lublin were a discredited group of Communists, fellow-travelers, and their hangers-on who had been carefully prepared in Moscow for their role. They emerged in March 1943 —led by such veteran Comintern agents as Boleslaw Bierut and Wanda Wassilievska— under the characteristically cynical guise of the "Union of Polish Patriots." One month later, supplied with a pretext by the legitimate government's request for an International Red Cross investigation of the 1940 massacre of Polish officers in the Katyn forest near Smolensk, Stalin broke off relations with that government. The "Union," waiting in the wings, underwent several transformations at appropriate moments, becoming first the "Polish National Council," then the "Polish Committee of National Liberation" in July 1944, and was finally recognized by the USSR as the "Provisional Government of Poland." The Lublin regime was no more a true government than the Vichy regime in France.

As for land reform, the facts in no way support the notion that the government-in-exile disapproved of it. Contrary to the myth perpetrated by Communist propaganda, the government-in-exile consisted not only of some conservative and center groups, but of major parties of the genuine left (Socialists and Peasants), by whom it was actually dominated. The most powerful group in that government was the left-oriented Peasant party. Mainly composed of peasants and smallholders, with considerable support from urban workers, the Peasant party had a long history of fighting for true land reform in pre-war Poland; for that very reason it had been subjected to harassment and repression by the reactionary pre-war Polish governments. This party was led by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Vice Premier under General Sikorski and Premier after the latter's death in 1943. Mikolajczyk had been the militant reform leader of the peasants ever since he organized their famous mass strike of 1937. His party and his government had good reason to fear and oppose Communist-style land reform. They had seen collectivization ruthlessly and forcibly imposed on those parts of eastern Poland which the USSR had incorporated, as a result of the pact with the Nazis, into Soviet White Russian and the Soviet Ukraine. This was not, then, just a "bone of contention." Nor was it merely a difference between "moralism" and "realism." It reflected a deadly struggle over who should have power in postwar Poland, the people or the Communist party.

Finally, it should be stressed that the Big Three's "interminable discussions" of the Polish question did *not* in the early years hinge on a dispute over free elections, but over another "formality"—the makeup of the Provisional Government of Poland, and its representative character. From April 1943 on, when Stalin broke with Sikorski, he consistently denied the representative character of the exiled government, attributing such character exclusively to his "Polish Patriots." This was what most of the wrangling was about. Roosevelt and Churchill knew perfectly well that the London Poles were as nearly representative of the whole people as wartime circumstances permitted, that they retained the loyalty of the hundreds of thousands of Polish fighting men in the European Allied theater of war and of the secret underground in occupied Poland. It was not until much later, after Yalta, actually after war's end, that the issue of free elections came to the fore. By then, of course, it was too late for such "formalities." The Communist regime was firmly in the saddle, and the Western powers had undermined even their moral right to protest by their prior accommodation to Stalin at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam and by their diplomatic recognition of the Polish Communist regime solely on its "promise" to hold free elections.

MR. LYND describes Roosevelt's intermittently expressed concern for East European freedom as sincere and idealistic, but "tragi-comic"—because it "did not really represent a practical alternative in the given situation." Why not? Here Mr. Lynd prefers to let Professor McNeill answer the question for him. Roosevelt and Churchill did not face the fact that "in Poland at least, genuinely free democratic elections would return governments unfriendly to Russia," that "the democratic process upon

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which so many eulogies were expended could not produce governments in Eastern Europe . . . that would further the harmony of the Great Powers and prove acceptable to all of them." This statement is a falsehood from beginning to end and can only be based, I believe, on unscholarly—and willful—ignorance. The fact is—as McNeill Feis, Churchill, and many others amply demonstrate—that both Sikorski and Mikolajczyk gave every evidence of commitment to close, friendly relations with the USSR. Mikolajczyk had long been known, even before the war, as an advocate of such relations, and the London Poles time and again made concessions toward that end. In fact, Mikolajczyk, to prove his good faith, joined the Communist-controlled Provisional Government in 1945 and stayed with it until 1947 in the fruitless hope of cooperation. There is no reason whatever to believe that a Polish government dominated by him and his party would not have established the most equitable, if genuinely independent, relationship with Moscow. The same can be demonstrated with regard to the Smallholders party in Hungary, which was, like its Polish counterpart, committed to economic, social, and agrarian reform and which actually won sweeping majorities in a couple of postwar elections.

The most dramatic—and tragic—illustration of the falsity of the Lynd-McNeill shibboleth is provided by the record of Czech President Edouard Benes.

Though a Western democrat, Benes profoundly believed his country's postwar safety and independence rested on a thoroughly friendly understanding with the USSR as well as with the West. And he thought he had achieved just that with the treaty of "friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar collaboration" he signed in Moscow in December 1943. There can be no doubt that if all Stalin wanted was a "friendly" government in Czechoslovakia, he got it from Benes. Why does the realistic Mr. Lynd omit such well-known facts?

Mr. Lynd argues that Roosevelt's refusal at Yalta to "back in an unambiguous manner" the Teheran "agreements" on Poland "only confirmed the Poles in their obstinate disregard of the realities of their situation." But what were the "realities" of the Polish situation? Simply that the Russians were in military control. And the Poles could only be considered obstinate in their refusal to accept total Soviet control as permanent and unnegotiable.

Mr. Lynd also chooses to ignore the many occasions on which Roosevelt and Churchill urged the Poles to give in on one point after another and negotiate with the Russians—which the "obstinate" Poles did time and again. At the behest of Roosevelt and Churchill, Mikolajczyk accepted the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern frontier in 1944 and he joined the Communist-controlled regime in 1945, sticking it out until October 1947, when he fled for his life.

The irony is that for all of Roosevelt's and Churchill's wrangling with Stalin over Poland, the whole dismal record of negotiations ended with just about everything Mr. Lynd would have asked from a "realistic" West. Obviously Stalin did not want authentically friendly governments, but Communist puppets. That is what he got in Eastern Europe and what he almost got in postwar France and Italy, where the Communists in 1947–48 were nearly ready to attempt the kind of coup they effected in Czechoslovakia. And the reason Mr. Lynd omits such facts from his "realistic" historical record is that he has deliberately avoided facing the prime fact of the cold war—the long-range ideological commitments of the Soviet Union and the entire Communist movement. Mr. Lynd's brand of realism is identical with that of the men of Munich (whom he would no doubt condemn on "moralistic" as well as "realistic" grounds), who faced the "realities of their situation" in quite the same way he would have had Roosevelt and our Eastern European friends face Stalin.

In his discussion of British and Soviet attempts to divide Europe into spheres of influence in 1943–44 and of America's reaction to these attempts, Mr. Lynd's profound bias is revealed further. This story, Mr. Lynd emphasizes, "is an important one, for it suggests that the Soviets, like the West, felt in 1945 that past understandings between the Big Three concerning Eastern Europe were betrayed."

The first major item of evidence which Mr. Lynd adduces concerns the tripartite arrangements for the occupation of Italy, on the one hand, and of the former enemy

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countries in Eastern Europe, on the other. According to Mr. Lynd, if we have anything to blame for our failure ever to win a say in the occupation of Eastern Europe, it is only the precedent we ourselves—led by the wily British—set in Italy.

The falsity of Mr. Lynd's parallel between Churchill and Stalin can be demonstrated simply by the course of subsequent events in Italy, Hungary, and Rumania. In the latter two, the "people's" regimes ruthlessly suppressed every element of opposition. In Italy, though Stalin was given no direct voice in occupation, his agents emerged from underground and from Moscow to assume commanding positions of power. Like all other parties, the Communists were given complete freedom of action, and rapidly achieved massive electoral and trade union support. The Communist party absorbed into its ranks former Fascists by the thousands, whom it armed from the huge secret caches its partisans had stored away in wartime, and it used these armed gangs for violence and intimidation in the same way Mussolini had done. So powerful did the Italian Communist party become that it could seriously contemplate a military coup in 1947–48. Even today, the party's strength remains considerable.

Mr. Lynd's second major item of evidence that the Soviets felt betrayed concerns Stalin's private negotiations with Churchill about their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. In October 1944, Churchill traveled to Moscow to seek a guarantee that Britain's predominant interest in Greece would be respected, in return for acceptance of Moscow's primary interest in the rest of the Balkans. Mr. Lynd damns the Americans for insisting on "complete freedom of action" concerning Churchill's private deal. He admits that "the reserved American veto imparted a provisional character" to the agreement, and the documents make it quite clear that Stalin was fully aware of U. S. reservations. Nevertheless, Mr. Lynd persists in reporting that "the Russians, *as in the similar case of the Second Front,* interpreted the wavering as simple bad faith" (italics mine). There is as little reason to believe that Stalin felt betrayed over this arrangement as to suppose he felt betrayed on the Second Front. He knew that Churchill could not commit the U. S. and he knew that Roosevelt had serious reservations about Churchill's proposals. In short, Stalin knew perfectly well that there was no understanding—how, therefore, could it have been betrayed by bad faith?

AND WHAT are we to make, for example, of the following deadpan passage: "Stalin protested that he had no idea whether the governments of Belgium and France [it should read "Greece"], created under Western aegis, were democratic; he simply accepted them. Did not the accord of October 1944, although expressly limited to provisional arrangements until German surrender, give him by implication a similar free hand in Eastern Europe?" Stalin's own cynicism, as revealed here, is well nigh incredible, but Mr. Lynd's credulity (if not cynicism) knows no bounds. Stalin had no good reason to question the representative character of the Belgian or Greek governments, whereas the character of the regimes he imposed on Eastern Europe is notorious. In the light of all the evidence of his treachery, Stalin could scarcely claim any right to cry foul. And only some tortured process of reasoning could give an "objective" historian—especially a realist—the right to share Stalin's cynical grievance.

In line with this brand of realism, Mr. Lynd credits Stalin with a genuine effort "to make the agreement with Churchill stick." Thus Stalin did not interfere with the British suppression of the Greek Communist guerillas in 1944, and Mr. Lynd is doubtless pleased to be able to cite Churchill himself to the effect that Stalin "adhered very strictly" to the bargain. Mr. Lynd thinks that Stalin did this to prevent armed conflict with the West—and that he attempted [*sic*] to curb the Communist parties in Western Europe, Yugoslavia, and China from bidding for power." But armed conflict with the West was never a live possibility in this period or a real fear of Stalin's. The true purpose of Stalin's "curb" was to gull the West by superficial concessions into believing that the days of Communist militancy were over, that Western hopes for extending the wartime friendship into peacetime were realistic, and that consequently any concessions the West might make would only serve to bolster the USSR's sense of

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security and friendship and would not be exploited for further Communist expansion. To feed such illusions, Stalin undertook a Grand Deception, in which the "dissolution" of the Comintern in 1943 was the first and ostensibly most impressive step. This was linked with a new version of the United Front tactic—the Communists would everywhere join as loyal allies, "no-strike pledges" and all, in the prosecution of the anti-fascist war and, by implication, in the making of a just peace. A third facet of this strategy was the "curb" on the Communist parties, especially in countries like Yugoslavia and China where militancy would anyhow be self-defeating, owing to the relative weakness of the parties there.

But by 1947, the Comintern had emerged in its new guise as the Cominform, which mounted an offensive against "rootless cosmopolitans" at home and "imperialist circles" abroad. And in Greece—that very Greece where Stalin had made such an effort to abide by his understanding with Churchill—the Communists in 1946–47 undertook a devastating civil war, with the massive support of the Cominform and especially of Yugoslavia. But Mr. Lynd omits all such facts from his consideration of Stalin's objectives and methods during the war—as if believing that the immediate postwar developments had no connection with Stalin's wartime purposes and tactics.

THE VERSION Mr. Lynd gives of the postwar switch in Britain's line, from accommodation to containment, is tendentious. He compares the British initiative on containment with the formulation of two earlier historical policies, the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door in China. In both cases, as in this one, he says, the British suggested to the U. S. a joint policy "for reasons altogether in the realm of Realpolitik." But there is a fundamental distinction between these two cases and the present one: never before in history has the expansion of a particular nation been inextricably linked with the drive of a disciplined world movement using all possible means to attain power. What has the Communist civil war in Greece in common with the traditional "realm of Realpolitik"? Or the massive, nearly successful revolutions by the French and Italian parties in 1947–48? Or the coup against the friendly, pro-Soviet government in Czechoslovakia in February 1948? Or, for this matter, the Berlin blockade of 1948–49, or the Korean war?

For Mr. Lynd all this is pure Realpolitik, and one must find objectionable his imputation of self-righteousness to the way the U. S. undertook the containment policy: we "lent it the panoply of a moral crusade." Does Mr. Lynd really believe that U. S. resistance to the expansion of Soviet power—as reflected, for example, in our reaction to the Berlin blockade or our creation of NATO—is wholly unrelated to the defense of free institutions, that there are not some fundamental respects in which this resistance assumes a real moral quality? Is it *only* our power interests that lead us to prevent Communist encroachment on the people of West Berlin?

After Yalta (read "after Roosevelt's death," an interpretation which Mr. Lynd appears to share with Soviet historiography and polemics) the Big Three alliance "suddenly seemed no longer capable" of new agreements—as if the earlier agreements had not been achieved only through the kind of Western concessions which appear realistic to Mr. Lynd. He calls the temporary military arrangements which the Big Three had made "supposedly" temporary, casting reflection—as he does throughout—on the credibility of Western interpretations. Had Mr. Lynd read Feis with the care and objectivity he pretends, it would have been obvious to him that Stalin and Molotov in their negotiations consistently affirmed the temporary nature of, for example, the reorganized Polish Provisional Government. Feis writes:

> But the most persuasive point which Stalin and Molotov made [at Yalta] was that the differences concerned only the question of the composition of the government during the *short period before the whole of Poland was liberated and general elections could be held.* How long, the President asked Stalin (on February 8th), did he think that interval would be? Stalin's answer was: "In about one month unless there is a catastrophe on the front and the Germans defeat us." And then with a grin, "I do not think this will happen."
>
> Molotov and Stalin reverted to this point at every remaining twist of the ar-

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gument. After all, if the new Provisional Government was to give way so soon to an elected one, was it essential to maintain the dispute? (Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin,* p. 527; italics in original.)

The President and Prime Minister yielded the central structure of their defense against the domination of Poland by the elements that were supported by Moscow. For this formula left the existing Provisional Polish Government, though called upon to absorb other elements, in the seat of authority. (*Ibid.,* p. 528.)

Every "agreement" reached by the Big Three was based on the same pattern: "The President and Prime Minister yielded the central structure of their defense . . ." How, then, can Mr. Lynd attribute the breakdown of the Big Three capacity for agreement to the "inertia" induced by supposedly "temporary" arrangements?

Certainly Western "indecision" was most encouraging to the Soviets, but not in the way Mr. Lynd implies. We encouraged "the hope," he says, "championed by Trotsky after World War I, of carrying the revolution westward on the bayonets of the Red Army." But this was not mere "hope." There is something disingenuous, or shockingly uninformed, about such a statement. The "hope" was a historical prediction—and toward its fulfillment the Soviets had created an extensive apparatus of action; the entire Bolshevik leadership, including Lenin and Zinoviev, the Comintern chief, were at least as zealous on the matter as Trotsky. (The singling out of Trotsky is also distortion—in fact falls in with the traditional Stalinist distortion of history, according to which Stalin took the moderate position against Trotsky's permanent revolutionism.) Nor, again, was it merely "after World War I" that this objective became a matter of supreme policy: it was directly in line with Lenin's policy, before and during that war, of "transforming the imperialist war into a civil war." Finally, it was not merely carrying the revolution westward "on the bayonets of the Red Army": any means would do, not least the party apparatuses and their auxiliaries.

Mr. Lynd's assertions about the West's postwar policies are a piece with his analysis of wartime events. The policy of containment, he says, though a perfectly "normal" diplomatic practice, was a gross error because it became the *"whole"* [italics in original] of our foreign policy. But neither in the immediate postwar period nor subsequently has containment been the "whole" of our policy. Mr. Lynd has omitted that part of our policy from 1945–47 which resulted in our contributing 70–75 per cent of the billions of UNRRA dollars expended for relief and rehabilitation in war-devastated Europe—including some $500,000,000 in Bierut's Poland, a similar amount in Tito's Yugoslavia, and hundreds of millions more in the Ukraine, Western Russia, and other East European countries. He has also omitted to speak about that part of our policy which was reflected in the Marshall Plan for the wholesale reconstruction and modernization of Europe's peacetime economy. And he has, of course, omitted the crucial fact that the Marshall Plan invitation was extended to all of East Europe—it was Molotov and Zhdanov who torpedoed the participation of such interested Communist regimes as those of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Nor has Mr. Lynd anything to say of President Truman's Point Four program (even if it did not go far enough); or of our staunch support of the various plans for the political, economic, and cultural—as well as military unity—movements in Europe; nor of the billions of dollars of economic and technical aid to such neutralists as India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon.

"THERE WAS nothing in the idea of containment itself," Mr. Lynd writes, "which would have precluded, for example, long-term credits for postwar reconstruction to the Soviet Union." But even if credits to the USSR seemed impossible "for domestic political reasons" (only?), "such loans might have been offered to Eastern Europe." The best reason for not offering them was provided by Stalin's postwar policy of massive, multi-billion-dollar depradations on the East European economies—a policy revealed in part by Tito in 1948 and by Gomulka in 1956. Such loans could not have relieved the misery to which the people were subjected by Stalin and his minions; they would merely have been diverted to the further military-industrial buildup of the USSR.

"When in the Marshall proposals the offer

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was finally made," Mr. Lynd goes on, "the international atmosphere had become embittered, Communist parties had strengthened their hold throughout Eastern Europe, and it was too late. In a sense, Eastern Europe was the first underdeveloped area where we failed." (But not the last?) Yet it was to the very Communist parties that had strengthened their hold on Eastern Europe that the Marshall offer was made. Why, then, was it "too late"?

Mr. Lynd charges that at war's end the U. S. made a "sudden, totalistic shift from reliance on ideals alone to a reliance only on the threat of war." He asserts that "American policy after 1945 exhibited a characteristic tendency to go from one one-sided solution to its opposite, equally one-sided. The Darlan and Badoglio deals, the unconditional surrender formula, the dropping of the atom bomb, also suggest an extremism of expedience and violence. . . ." The choice of these three examples reflects strange reasoning, and stranger morality. Mr. Lynd argues for the full acceptance of Soviet expansion, but calls the Darlan and Badoglio deals an "extremism of violence and expedience." He fails to note Stalin's full blessings on both deals, nor does he bother to explain that these ambiguous deals were made with people we didn't like in particular military contexts as a genuine effort to cut short military operations and so spare many lives. I cannot agree that they revealed "an extremism of violence." For Mr. Lynd, a deal with Stalin for the permanent enslavement of 100,000,000 people is acceptable—but not a short-term deal aimed at saving lives and making possible the eventual establishment of institutions of liberty.

As for the unconditional surrender formula, it was certainly extreme in appearance, but no one can accuse us of having committed extreme violence in Germany, not even against the Nazis. By omission, it seems to me, Mr. Lynd exculpates the regime and movement which are—permanently and totally—committed to an extremism of both violence and expedience.

The dropping of the atom bomb was certainly an extreme of violence. But to mention it within the context Mr. Lynd establishes—of our alleged sudden, total shift from idealism to militarism—is factually untenable and historically unfair. This is obviously not the place to go into that complex problem once more. Suffice it to say that Mr. Lynd does a grievous injustice to the many scientists *and* military men who opposed that policy, and to the careful and prolonged thought—and grave qualms of conscience—on the part of those, from President Truman and Secretary Stimson down, who decided the policy.

MR. LYND has adopted as his own some general statements made by George Kennan about our "habitual self-righteousness" in foreign policy matters, the lack of "objective understanding of the wider issues" of a war which lends to the democratic war effort "a basically punitive note." Would Mr. Lynd apply these strictures to our posture in the war against the Nazis? Were not the Nazis somehow truly different from all our previous enemies? Did we really have no right, then as well as in retrospect, to view them as moral monsters whose viciousness had to be suppressed? Had we no right to *some* moral position, to some punitive moral tone, where the Nazis were concerned?

Mr. Lynd makes much of George Kennan's *Russia, the Atom and the West,* but he has no room in his essay for this passage from that book:

> The hostility has been there, certainly; and it has been a deadly hostility, aimed at a destruction of all that we most intimately cherish—a destruction no less sweeping, no less final than that which would be occasioned by an outright war. . . . The Soviet design has consisted . . . primarily of a determination to exploit every element of disunity, of confusion, of shortsightedness in our society, with a view to causing us to eliminate ourselves as rivals to Soviet power and influence everywhere.

Toward the end of his essay, Mr. Lynd comes fairly close to seeing this point, only to veer away from it as fast as he can. He is willing to concede that the cold war began "because for the first time the challenge of authoritarian socialism to democratic capitalism was backed by sufficient power to be an ever-present political and military threat." But then he defines the nature of the crisis as one in which "socialism and

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capitalism, represented by different groups of countries," duel for the allegiance of the rest of the world. I submit that it is misleading to call the Soviet system "socialism" in any sense, even authoritarian. The Soviet system has no more in common with socialism than National Socialism had. Moreover, the crux of the conflict is not primarily the duel for other people's allegiance; it is the avowed war which the Communist movement prosecutes against all non-Communist peoples and institutions. To see the conflict, as Mr. Lynd proceeds to define it, as the "underlying tension between opposing social systems" obscures its true meaning and even garbs it in the very terminology which is now the keynote of Soviet "peaceful coexistence" propaganda.

THE ESSAY'S concluding section, on the alternatives before us, is surprisingly brief and vague. Containment, Mr. Lynd asserts, does recognize the seriousness of the problem, but it is inadequate. Why? The answer is only a series of *obiter dicta*. The possession of atomic weapons by both sides has made reliance on military reprisal archaic. Containment is "one-sidedly negative" and can only lead to frustration, slow defeat, and war. None of these propositions is exactly self-evident, but no further explanations are given. But a later passage, though quite vague, provides a somewhat better notion of Mr. Lynd's objection to containment: "It involves an identification of the United States with governments whose only qualifications for our friendship is their anti-Communism, and which in every other respect go against rather than with the grain of world-wide aspiration."

One wonders which allies Mr. Lynd has in mind. England? France? Germany? Thailand? Or is it Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam? Some in the latter group do indeed pose a problem for us—a *moral* problem, to be precise—and it is a great shock to discover this realist (who has all along hectored us to eschew moralism vis-à-vis a great self-declared enemy seeking to destroy us) suddenly raising moral problems about some of our small, inconsequential allies or others who pose no threat to us at all. By a sudden peculiar moral twist, such alliances are based on "only a narrow and superficial realism," whereas concessions to Communist powers are on a broader, more elevated plane.

Of course, Mr. Lynd does not specify, nor does he explain what he means by going "with the grain of worldwide aspiration." But suppose this "grain" is a bad thing—should we still necessarily go along with it? To judge by the line of reasoning Mr. Lynd employs throughout his essay, it must be Communist China, Cuba, Guinea, and the Congo of Patrice Lumumba, who represent this "grain" for him. Why is he so shy about telling us, in view of his desire to enhance our "understanding of the practical alternatives that are presently before us"? He is so shy, in fact, that he cannot formulate for himself the only "moral" he draws from his analysis: he lets George Kennan do it.

The moral is a double one. Lynd associates himself with Kennan's suggestion that we would be "safer and better off today if we could put our military fixations aside and stake at least a part of our effort to do the constructive things. . . ." What constructive things? Something original—like technical aid and cultural exchange with underdeveloped countries? Certainly these are good things, and we have not perhaps been doing as much of them as we should, but we have been doing a fair amount—enough, at least, to refute the charge that we are militarily fixated. And should not all advocates of such "constructive things" take into account the lively possibility that they may guarantee us nothing, neither safety, nor security, nor welfare? And why, finally, doesn't Mr. Lynd specify?

Secondly, Mr. Lynd associates himself with a concluding quotation from Kennan, who, though he recognizes that the Russians' "idea of peace is, of course, not the same as ours," sees "no reason for believing that there are not, even in Moscow's interpretation of this ambiguous word, elements more helpful to us all than the implications of the weapons race. . . ." Mr. Kennan, in the passage I cited earlier, gave a good reason for not believing this himself. There is a strange discontinuity between his premises and facts on the one hand, and his conclusions on the other.

I would conclude with the suggestion that we take a new look at the whole school of neo-realism, which, as represented by Mr. Lynd, could lead us into disastrous courses.

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Perhaps the time has come for a kind of "revisionist" view of the traditional and by now tedious realistic criticism of U. S. "moralism" and "legalism." I might suggest that the persistence of this pattern in our historical behavior, to which all the realistic critics point so untiringly, reflects something fundamental and persistent in the national character. And this persistent pattern ought perhaps to be taken seriously into account, as one of the *legitimate hard realities* of the American character, by sound realistic historians and political analysts. It is perhaps our "genius" to be able to combine a realistic concern for the national interest with a profound concern for human values in world affairs. Should we ever have the opportunity to come of age as a nation, this may well be our lasting contribution to developing civilization.

* * *

Wm. Appleman Williams: Were it merely a matter of responding to his representation of my own work to which he graciously refers, I would not ask for space to comment on Staughton Lynd's article. Those matters can safely be left to the people who read the books. But since Mr. Lynd is seriously concerned with the historical problem *per se,* it does seem worthwhile to offer a few brief suggestions.

Mr. Lynd refers to the fact that American leaders did not anticipate a Soviet attack, and accurately notes that I use that evidence in my own analyses (page 386). He then observes that "these quotations [illustrating the lack of fear] begin no earlier than 1946, when the readiness to mobilize military force to deter Soviet attack had already shown itself." The apparent purpose of that comment is to discount the significance of such evidence.

That approach raises two points. The first concerns his review and presentation of my analysis, and I should like incidentally to call attention to the fact that it is a very incomplete and hence misleading representation. I was primarily concerned in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* with the *Weltanschauung* of American leaders, a conception of the world which stressed (and still stresses) the vital role of expansion in preserving American wealth and welfare. Within that framework, and along with several other considerations, I did refer to the strong feeling among American leaders that the USSR would not initiate a military offensive.

But those other considerations, which Mr. Lynd nowhere mentions, are crucial to the big question he is writing about. Hence his emphasis on 1946 as the date when American leaders openly expressed their confidence that the Soviets would not attack seems to me to be very incomplete in several respects.

1. There is considerable evidence indicating that American leaders entertained such confidence as early as 1943 and 1944. In discussions of postwar planning policy, for example, the issue was defined as one of how the United States would use its assumed preponderance of strength—not of how to counter the Soviets. Furthermore, the anxiety about a domestic depression overshadowed any worry about the Russians. That combination of assumed superiority and fear of depression has often been misinterpreted as indifference, utopian hope, sophomoric naivety, or softness on and toward Communism. It was in reality none of those things, being simply a presupposition that the avoidance of a depression at home would create the conditions for reestablishing the liberal utopia. (In this connection, the neglected volume by E. P. Penrose, *Economic Planning for the Peace,* sheds considerable light on the attitude of American leaders.)

2. Evidence on the American asssumption of superiority vis-à-vis the Russians becomes truly abundant in the year 1945. Ambassador Harriman, for example, thought the Russians could be controlled very effectively through America's great economic supremacy.

3. Writers as different as P. M. S. Blackett and Professor Richard Current noted very early that American leaders had Russia clearly in mind when they used the first two nuclear weapons against Japan. Subsequent evidence (as in a recent issue of *U. S. News and World Report*) corroborates that analysis.

Put very simply, Mr. Lynd seriously underestimates two very important considera-

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tions: (a) the extent to which American leaders assumed prior to 1946 that they did not need a force in being because of Russia's weakness (and because of the resulting great absolute and relative strength of the United States) and (b) the degree to which they quite accurately realized that their nuclear weapons functioned as a force in being—and used them as such in their diplomatic dealings with the Soviets.

The point is not whether Mr. Lynd agrees or disagrees with my analysis. That is a wholly secondary matter. The issue is much more basic. Whatever one's final analysis of the origins of the cold war, the interpretation has to take into account the factors outlined in this note (along with some others not mentioned). It does seem to me that Mr. Lynd errs in neglecting them so completely.

* * *

George Lichtheim: On April 12, 1853, the New York *Tribune* gave prominence to an article by its London correspondent, one Dr. Charles Marx, who among others had this to say about the foreign policy of Russia:

> But having come thus far on the way to universal empire, is it probable that this gigantic and swollen Power will pause in its career? Circumstances, if not her own will, forbid it. With the annexation of Turkey and Greece she has excellent seaports, while the Greeks furnish skillful sailors for her navy. With Constantinople she stands on the threshold of the Mediterranean. . . . Flanking the Austrian dominions on the north, east and south, Russia will already count the Hapsburgs among her vassals. . . . [Moreover] the broken and undulating western frontier of the Empire . . . would call for rectification; and it would appear that the natural frontier of Russia runs from Danzig, or perhaps Stettin, to Trieste. And as sure as conquest follows conquest, and annexation follows annexation, so the conquest of Turkey by Russia would only be the prelude to the annexation of Hungary, Prussia, Galicia, and to the ultimate realization of that Slavonic empire which certain fanatical Pan-Slav philosophers have dreamed of.

More than a century after the Russo-Turkish war which prompted these reflections, and some fifteen years after the consolidation of the "Slavonic empire" in the wake of the Second World War, we are asked by Mr. Staughton Lynd to look for an alternative explanation of why Russia has expanded into Eastern and Central Europe. The cold war, he suggests, has been with us since 1945. "Because for the first time the challenge of authoritarian socialism to democratic capitalism was backed by sufficient power to be an ever-present political and military fact."

It is surely not without irony that quasi-Marxian language should be employed to obscure the simple reality of which Marx (like many other people) was conscious in the 1850's, and which still dominates European affairs today as it did a century ago: Russian expansion is not compatible with territorial arrangements which leave Poland, Hungary, etc., in the position of independent nations. One may of course argue that recognition of the military balance established at Yalta and Potsdam is a small price to pay for peaceful coexistence between the U. S. and the USSR. But why bring in a lot of pseudo-profundity about conflicting social systems? However important the "challenge of authoritarian socialism" (an odd description of the Soviet regime!) may be to sociologists and political scientists, its practical relevance in Eastern Europe is determined by geography and the balance of power. Mr. Lynd is of course quite right in saying that the postwar settlement was dictated by military realities which Roosevelt and Churchill felt unable to alter. He spoils his case by gratuitously introducing the notion that Eastern Europe was in any case ripe for social revolution. No doubt it was—but the direction given to this revolution by Stalin, in the interest of Soviet control, is another matter.

On the whole it would seem that Marx in 1853 saw the distant future more clearly than Mr. Lynd sees the recent past. Europeans in his day were conscious of the danger represented by a semi-barbarous Russia whose sheer size and weight might one day topple the existing political structure. Now that the disaster has occurred, we do well to recognize it for what it is, instead of seeking comfort in political so-

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ciology. Of course, there is always the hope that Russia will in due course become less intolerable to Europe. She may even, in the not so distant future, become Europe's shield against a still greater menace. But let us not confuse these still rather vague hopes with retrospective apologetics for the mistakes and illusions of the recent past.

* * *

Staughton Lynd: Mr. Decter's criticisms of my account of the origins of the cold war touch on four broad subjects: (1) The nature of the relationship between England, America, and Russia during World War II; (2) The problem of Poland; (3) Soviet intentions before, during, and after the war; (4) The proper integration of realism and idealism in present American foreign policy.

Regarding Big Three relations, Mr. Decter sees only a simple, one-way street. Agreements during the war were achieved "only through . . . Western concessions." There is little reason to believe that Stalin felt betrayed about the Second Front. "Every 'agreement' reached by the Big Three was based on the same pattern," of Roosevelt and Churchill yielding their essential positions to Stalin.

These formulations overlook a great deal of evidence. What about, for example, Harry Hopkins' memorandum to Roosevelt while the question of reparations was under discussion at Yalta: "The Russians have given in so much at this conference that I don't think we should let them down?" Other, impeccably anti-Communist witnesses, such as Charles Bohlen and Edward Stettinius, have testified that the Yalta agreements were by no means one-sided. The same conclusion is reached in the scholarly study, *The Meaning of Yalta* (ed. John Snell, 1956).

The question of the Second Front must be at the heart of any appraisal of the nature of the Big Three agreements, for as I indicated in my article, real agreements were reached only on military (not political) matters. The most telling evidence regarding the Second Front is the actual correspondence between Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt, now available in English. If Stalin did not feel betrayed when in 1942 and 1943 a Second Front failed to materialize, then Roosevelt and Churchill wasted an inordinate amount of time discussing, on the several occasions when it became necessary, "how to break the news to Uncle Joe." In August 1942, Churchill made a special trip to Moscow to tell Stalin that a landing in North Africa would be substituted for an invasion of France in that year. At one point in the conversations, Stalin accused the British of cowardice in making this decision. In June 1943, when Stalin learned that an attack on Italy would take the place of a cross-Channel operation in 1943, he sent Churchill a cable in which (in the words of Robert Sherwood)

> he reviewed at length all the assurances that had been given during the past thirteen months relative to the opening of a Second Front, and concluded with words which could be interpreted only as charges of deliberate bad faith by the Western Allies.

Perhaps Mr. Decter is just in calling Stalin's behavior about a Second Front "surly impatience." But he is wrong in denying that Stalin *felt* betrayed. And in assessing Stalin's feelings and behavior, Mr. Decter forgets that Roosevelt and Churchill, while rejecting Stalin's accusation of bad faith, agreed with what Mr. Decter calls the propaganda of the "Communist 'psychwar' apparatus," that the Russians bore the brunt of the fighting in 1942 and 1943. Roosevelt cabled to Stalin in August 1942: "Amercans understand that Russia is bearing the brunt of the fighting and the casualties this year and we are filled with admiration for the magnificent resistance you are putting up." In the spring of 1943, Churchhill, insisting that a Sicilian operation be launched by early summer, told Hopkins that "he considered it would be 'an awful thing' that for three months the Americans and British would be killing no German soldiers while the Russians were chasing around one hundred eighty-five divisions." It is one thing for Mr. Decter to say that at the conference table the Russians were all take and no give. When he goes on to make similar innuendoes about the fighting itself, in the face of twenty million Soviet casualties, I can only consider it an instance of what Mr. Decter terms unequal equations.

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Turning from Big Three relations in general to the specific problem which, above all others, proved too much for the alliance—the problem of Poland—one finds Mr. Decter again in a categorical mood. I understand him to assert that Stalin was not really concerned about the location of the Russo-Polish frontier, merely using it as a pretext to establish Soviet domination; that the Polish government-in-exile accepted the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern frontier; that "the facts in no way support the notion that the government-in-exile disapproved" of land reform. I pass by his curious notion that the exiled Poles "gave every evidence of commitment to close, friendly relations with the USSR" because I see little hope of answering the question of which came first, the undoubted hostility of the Soviets toward the exiled Poles or the undoubted hostility of the exiled Poles toward the Soviets. But let us consider the other three points one by one.

I believe that what underlies Mr. Decter's suspicion of Stalin's professed concern for the security of Soviet borders (and hence, for a more westerly Polish frontier) is his conception that Soviet diplomacy has at all times been fixed on expansive rather than defensive goals. I should like to reserve discussion of this conception and consider it a little later in connection with the overall problems of Soviet intentions.

But there is some good indirect evidence to show that the Soviet concern about frontiers was so intense that a Russo-Polish agreement on frontiers early in the war might have greatly facilitated an understanding about Poland's postwar government. Wladyslaw Kulski, an officer of the Polish government-in-exile, wrote in 1947 that could the exiled Poles and Soviets have settled the frontier in 1941, "the Soviet Union would have probably permitted the Polish government-in-exile to return to Poland" ("The Lost Opportunity for Russian-Polish Friendship," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1947). Winston Churchill was of the same opinion. "Churchill has stoutly insisted," state the scholarly authors of *The Meaning of Yalta,*

> that if the Poles had been willing in 1941 or even as late as the autumn of 1944 to agree to the Curzon line, Stalin might have been persuaded to permit the establishment of a truly independent and friendly government, much as he did in the case of Finland.

The autumn of 1944? The observant reader may have noticed that Mr. Decter states that "Mikolajczyk accepted the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern frontier in 1944." Mr. Decter fails to state that when Mikolajczyk returned from Moscow to London with this proposal, the Polish government-in-exile turned it down. H. Peter Stern, in his *The Struggle for Poland* (1953), says:

> The Polish policy on "not one inch of territory" forced the United States and Great Britain to make agreements with the Russians over the heads of the Polish government. Poland's stand may also have facilitated Russia's subsequent break of diplomatic relations with her. Moreover, her adherence to this stand throughout the war impeded the Western allies' efforts to heal this diplomatic wound. Thus, the Russians were free to recognize their own puppet government, establish it in power, and prevent the return to Poland of the Government-in-Exile.

Now as to land reform. It is perfectly true that the Polish government-in-exile issued certain statements during the war which included proposals for land reform (see Mikolajczyk's *The Rape of Poland,* 1948, pp. 266, 288, 292). It is also true, however, that in the words of no less an authority than James T. Shotwell, the government-in-exile "was averse to taking practical steps toward a solution of the agrarian issue. . . . No decisive action was taken by London Poles." In contrast, the Lublin committee, in its July proclamation and September decree of 1944, expropriated all estates with more than 125 acres of arable land; total expropriations in both the old and the new Polish territories ultimately ran to over 20,000,000 acres. "The Commiittee of National Liberation," Stern concludes, "thus embarrassed the Government-in-Exile which had been somewhat vague about land reform." Mikolajczyk may well have been to the left of his colleagues in this matter, just as he was less rigid on the question of frontiers. But his position in the Peasant party, which Mr. Decter makes much of, hardly proves this. Mr. Decter states that "the Peasant party had a long history of fighting

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for true land reform in pre-war Poland." Samuel Sharp, in his *Poland: White Eagle on a Red Field* (1953), says of the Eastern European peasant parties between the wars—and of the Polish party in particular—that

> they were conservative, if not outright reactionary in their outlook, and profoundly distrustful of socialism. . . . They served largely the interests of the well-entrenched elements of the village and catered to their conservatism.

Mikolajczyk, according to Sharp, led the conservative wing of this conservative party. One says this not to condemn him, but simply to indicate that there were socio-economic as well as political reasons for the estrangement of London from Lublin.

The Polish problem was a principal cause of the cold war, and as Hopkins told Stalin in 1945, was widely regarded as a test of the peacetime workability of the Big Three alliance. Hence the importance of all this detail. For once grant the unsoundness of the factual buttresses with which Mr. Decter surrounds his moral concern, and that concern, I believe, loses the character of absoluteness. The Polish story was not a morality play. It was rather a tragedy, in the precise sense that whatever alternatives were chosen, good and precious things stood to be destroyed. England and America could have prevented Russian dominance over its strategic neighbor only by going to war. The contending parties in Poland pitted political democracy and social reaction on the one hand, against political totalitarianism and industrialization on the other. Mr. Decter apparently considers I am as clear about what should have been done as he is. I'm not: I called the Polish problem as it presented itself to the West in 1945, "genuinely agonizing." Is it quite fair to lump me with the "men of Munich" for believing that one reasonable choice would have been to accept the fact that Russia would not tolerate a hostile government so near its borders, just as the American president has recently stated that the United States would not tolerate a Communist government in the Western hemisphere?

The Munich analogy brings us to the third and most controversial subject of Mr. Decter's critique: the nature of Soviet intentions. Mr. Decter states that I have "deliberately avoided facing the prime fact of the cold war—the long-range ideological commitments of the Soviet Union and the entire Communist movement." He asserts that ("strangely enough"), despite my concern to go back to the beginnings of the cold war, I stop at 1941 and hence fail to face the fact of Nazi-Soviet collaboration. As to my remark that Western indecision must have encouraged in the Soviets the hope of carrying revolution westward on the bayonets of the Red Army ("there is something disingenuous, or shockingly uninformed about such a statement"), Mr. Decter responds that this was no hope, but a historical prediction.

My two chief objections to Mr. Decter's assessment of Soviet intentions are: one, that he has no conception of the fact that until 1945 Soviet foreign policy was preoccupied not with expansion, but with defending the Soviet power from destruction; two, that he does not distinguish between expansion through military invasion and expansion through alliance with internal revolutionary movements in other countries, and hence, does not adequately distinguish Nazi from Soviet foreign policy. More of these points in a moment.

But I should like first to mention also a still more fundamental defect in Mr. Decter's approach: his conviction that he can read the minds of those who disagree with him. If his antagonist is Mr. Lynd, he feels able to say that I "deliberately" avoided a problem and practiced "disingenuous selection and omission." If he is dealing with Stalin, Mr. Decter is quite confident that "Stalin knew perfectly well that there was no understanding" as to a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and that "the true purpose" of Stalin's restraint on Communist parties outside Russia was "to gull the West by superficial concessions." Thus, to borrow a phrase from David Riesman, Mr. Decter belongs to the inside-dopester school of Soviet experts. Having once settled in his own mind the basic and unchanging purpose of Soviet policy, Mr. Decter can then write off all nonaggressive Soviet behavior as superficial or trickery, while presenting all aggressive Soviet behavior as revelations of the real Russian purpose. Thus the hard turn of

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Communist policy in 1947–1948 is to his mind simply a coming-to-the-surface of the true Soviet design, apparently uninfluenced (so far as Mr. Decter is concerned) by the flexing of atomic muscles or Truman Doctrine in the West.

I believe, as I said in my article, that there is simply not enough evidence of the kind historians would consider valid regarding any other problem, to permit a final assignment of responsibility for the onset of tension in 1945 and thereafter. I should think it would at least give Mr. Decter pause that Professor Williams and Mr. Lichtheim, who like Mr. Decter appear to be quite confident of their grasp of Soviet intentions, have two quite different theories: Mr. Lichtheim considers a stress on ideology "a lot of pseudo-profundity about conflicting social systems" and evokes the expansion of the Czars; Professor Williams considers that the West, not Russia, was the principal aggressor.

Now, to take up Mr. Decter's challenge to go back further than 1941, I suggest to him that his evaluation runs counter to that generally accepted by experts on Soviet affairs. Thus Kennan, in his new *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1941* (1960), states that between the wars "the dominant motive of Soviet statesmanship . . . was the preservation of the integrity of Soviet power within Russia." Again, *The Dynamics of Soviet Society,* a collective study by W. W. Rostow and others, finds that Soviet foreign policy before World War II was essentially defensive, not expansive. Indeed any consideration of the period 1917–1941 will have to deal with Professor Williams' brilliant chapter on "The Birth of Containment," in which he shows that within months of the Bolshevik revolution the United States took up a policy directed toward weakening and destroying the Soviet power (a policy which led eventually to armed invasion of Russia), *not* because the Soviet power was strong and expansive, but because its socialist basis seemed to Wilson, Lansing, and others to be destructive of civilization as they knew it.

Where I part company with Professor Williams is that, so far as I can see, he underestimates the change in Soviet foreign policy which came about at the end of World War II. It may be, as Isaac Deutscher argues, that Stalin did not plan or even wish the creation of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and China. But the massive and ineluctable fact of the expansion of Soviet power since World War II is something which no one with eyes to see can deny; nor do I think that I avoided it in my article as Mr. Decter charges.

What I do insist on is a distinction between expansion through military invasion, and expansion based on alliance with indigenous internal revolutions in other countries. The coming to power of Communist parties in Eastern Europe was unqestionably based on the presence of the Red Army. But such military invasion has not been typical of the manner in which Communism has spread. Surely it is a critical difference between Nazism and Communism that the former could not command the allegiance of mass movements in other nations, and so could only expand by invasion. And so far as Communist ideology is concerned, I am at a loss to know what Mr. Decter means by "the traditional Stalinist distortion of history, according to which Stalin took the moderate position, against Trotsky's permanent revolution." What was the "socialism in one country" debate about, then? What does Mr. Decter think the present debate between Russian and Chinese Communists is about? The fact is that the mainstream of Marxist theory has always characterized revolution by way of military invasion as Bonapartist, adventurist, and left sectarian. Soviet foreign policy is not based on the prediction that revolution will be carried around the world on the bayonets of the Red Army. It is based on the prediction that capitalism will crumble of its own internal contradictions, and will be overcome in one country after another by internal revolutions.

Now Mr. Decter is technically correct in calling this a mere question of tactics. Yet it is also more than a matter of tactics. For if the majority of Communist parties are convinced that time and history are on their side, and that peace can only help rather than hinder their cause, then the situation we face is rather different from a Munich. If Mr. Decter is arguing for a policy which makes it clear to the Soviet Union that military invasion of other countries will meet a military response, no reasonable man

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will differ from him. I tried to make this clear in my article by saying that the doctrine of containment (as distinct from the later doctrine of "liberation") was a normal invocation of the traditional practice of the balance of power. What I criticized in American foreign policy was *not* that its goals were too high (I said this explicitly in my article), but that it did not consider realistically the implementation of goals before they were publicly proclaimed, and that it wavered back and forth between extremes of idealism and toughness. If Mr. Decter retains any doubt about the wavering of America's wartime attitude toward Eastern Europe and the confusions (in every one of the Big Three governments, our own included) which this wavering induced, I refer him to an account by one who took part in State Department struggles in this area—chapter seven of Philip Mosely's *The Kremlin and World Politics* (1960).

But I suspect containment does not satisfy Mr. Decter. I suspect he believes that the only way to deal with "a great self-declared enemy seeking to destroy us" is to destroy that enemy. I suspect he would align himself with those who would decline any disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union because of the intensity of their fear that the other side harbored some tricky hidden motive. I believe that his line of argument leads to a toying with "preventive war" as legitimate policy, while at the same time sanctimoniously rejecting a philosophy which justifies the means by the end as alien and immoral. In a word, I am inclined to regard Mr. Decter's cast of thought on this problem as the approach of one who is the prisoner of his own fears, and who helps to bring about the very thing he fears.

SINCE MR. DECTER taxes me with being cryptic and "shy" about policy recommendations, let me try to give some indication of a line of policy which would avoid the twin extremes of an unenforceable idealism on the one hand, and a militarism which makes war more likely on the other. Mr. Decter wonders what I meant in saying that the United States since World War II had identified itself with governments which go against "the grain of worldwide aspiration." By the grain of worldwide aspiration I meant nothing other than Adlai Stevenson's "revolution of rising expectations," including in that phrase, however, the consideration that underdeveloped countries well-nigh unanimously consider comprehensive, central, public economic planning essential to make those aspirations and expectations real. In saying that the United States has worked against the grain of worldwide aspiration, I meant that in our fear of socialism (as well as Communism), we had made allies of anti-Communist governments that were also against democracy, and frightened away from us socialist governments which should be our friends.

Mr. Decter sees this only as a problem involving "some of our small, inconsequential allies." In 1950, Albert Z. Carr (an associate of Donald Nelson during World War II, then on the White House staff under Truman) published what is still one of the best accounts of the origins of the cold war, *Truman, Stalin and Peace*. Carr says:

> In attempting to prevent the establishment of revolutionary governments allied to Russia, the United States, a nation revolutionary in its origins, democratic in its spirit, and humanitarian in its long-range political tendencies, found itself pushed into the position of opposing popular revolution in general. Side by side with British imperialists, our country became the defender of the status quo. In Italy and France our dollars financed conservative governments which had no hope of survival without us. We strengthened Germany only to restore the hold of the old cartels on the German economy. In Japan our military forces enabled an unpopular rightwing government to come to power. We gave military supplies to China's reactionary regime even though we were well aware that it had lost the loyalty of the Chinese people. In the Middle East we encouraged England in her desperate efforts to bolster the bankrupt semi-feudal system of the Arab world. As late as 1950 Secretary of the State Dean Acheson felt himself compelled to announce our support of the Emperor Bao Dai in Indo-China, in the face of the unmistakable evidence that most of the Indo-Chinese preferred a republican government, free of French overlordship.

I think most of us would agree that this policy, continued through the 1950's, certainly has brought the United States "frustration" and "slow defeat." Mr. Decter

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thinks that in criticizing these alliances with reactionary regimes, I suddenly leave realism behind and become moralistic. The problem seems frighteningly realistic to me. I am convinced that unless the United States can better identify itself with the revolutionary ferment sweeping the colonial world, we will continue to see these countries slipping away from us toward friendship with the Soviet Union. I fear that it might then be ourselves, rather than the Soviets, who would reach for the panic button and start a nuclear holocaust.

IN SUMMARY, it seems to me that Mr. Decter sees the conflict between America and Russia as a struggle of good with evil, and therefore believes that if war came, it would be a just war; whereas I think the cold war arose from a tangled situation to which both sides contributed, and that if war came, it would be caused more by "blundering or hyprocisy or chicanery" than by an irremovable conflict of principle. The human failings which helped to start the cold war were not, as I see it, monopolized by any one nation. Polish pride, American well-intentioned confusion, British determination to retain an empire, all played their parts along with Soviet suspicion and ambition. The problem of Poland was not a simple one: it involved the question of whether the Soviet Union would fulfill the pledges of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration on Liberated Europe, but it also involved Russia's interest in an immediately adjacent country which had repeatedly been made an invasion route, as well as socio-economic conflicts among the Poles themselves.

The deeper cause of the cold war was the underlying conflict of social systems, together with the sudden emergence in 1945 of Russia and America as the two most powerful countries in the world. Here again, I do not see a black-and-white contrast. The United States as well as Russia has vastly augmented its overseas interests since the close of World War II, the United States as well as Russia has retained control of territories which fell under its sway by the happenstance of war (the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific), the United States as well as Russia practices military intervention in the affairs of other countries: would this seem an unequal equation to Nehru, or Tito, or Michael Foote? Nor do I believe the two systems are in substance so irreconcilable that one or the other must destroy its rival. On the contrary, can anyone deny that Soviet society is slowly becoming more liberal and that the United States turns more and more to central state planning? Given time, it would seem to me, there is a reasonable hope that the inherent tension between the two systems will grow less rather than greater. Western democracy, after all, took hundreds of years to grow out from under the iron rule of Plantagenets and Tudors.

To promote appeasement of a ruthless and implacable aggressor under cover of "a patina of sobriety and balance," as Mr. Decter believes I do, would be a grievous responsibility. A heavy burden would likewise fall on him who made the unimaginable horrors of nuclear war more likely by an oversimplification and self-righteousness which caused real possibilities of accommodation to be disregarded.

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SIZING UP THE MASS MEDIA

HARRIS DIENSTFREY

I shall assume that we all know what mass culture is.
—Stanley Edgar Hyman, *Daedalus*
English is a mass medium.
—Edmund Carpenter, *Explorations in Communication*

ONE WAY of approaching an evaluation of the mass media is to ask whether it sees the media as an old or a new thing. Are the media regarded as the purveyors of a type of entertainment and information the United States has always known, and which differs now only because of the country's size and the size of its population? Or are the media taken to be something else entirely, a new land that may not yet have the proper name?

*Introduction to Mass Communications,** a recent textbook by Edwin Emery, Philip H. Ault, and Warren K. Agee, posits a fairly simple "old" view of the media. The authors sometime suggest that a particular medium (broadcasting, for example) has altered "the basic pattern of American living"; but they are much less interested in estimating the range of such alterations than in showing that the media are little more than the response of an electronic age to the demands, both typical and continual, of a populace for information and entertainment.

The text is designed (as its jacket says) "for one- or two-semester college introductory courses" and (as its authors write) to offer "the general reader a comprehensive picture of the mass media upon which he depends so heavily as a citizen." When the book discusses movies, it highlights the documentary. Similarly with the other media: it always emphasizes their information-giving or educational functions. Not surprisingly, then, the medium it refers to most often—its "ideal"—is the newspaper, the one medium primarily designed for informing a citizenry.

Any textbook, of course, tends to present an uncomplicated and settled picture of its subject; yet, here, by underplaying the media's "non-factual" functions, *Introduction* misrepresents the single function even on which it focuses. Its analysis of newspapers provides a good example of how, when a medium is viewed too simply, major characteristics come to seem minor imperfections.

To *Introduction,* newspapers are records of the world's daily events, collections of facts, however incomplete and imperfect. But such a view obscures the additional nuance given to a news story on politics that is printed directly alongside a story on gang wars. Put more broadly: the articles on a newspaper's page—and especially on its front page—achieve a curious unity just by that placement. Every paper presents to its readers not only a document of daily events, but—merely by being a paper—a way of seeing and experiencing the world (at times, as if it were dadaism's best creation) with the result that all newspapers function more like novels than like encyclo-

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* Dodd, Mead & Company, 435 pp., 1960.

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pedias. And they are *read* more like novels than like encyclopedias. The question which this book should ask, but does not, is: How many readers need look to Dickens if they have the New York *Post*?

Underlying the approach of Emery, Ault, and Agee is an attitude common to many discussions of the media: that information, facts, and entertainment are all separate absolutes—that information is always information, facts always facts, entertainment always entertainment, and that each is mainly itself. The two items on politics and delinquency are certainly information, but they are something else as well. Exactly what else (or exactly what advertising is, or what the newsreels sandwiched between films are) is the kind of problem that such an "old" stance avoids confronting as it faces today's media with standards relevant to older forms of communication.

A DIRECTLY OPPOSITE view of the media can produce its own kind of simplifications. Edgar Morin's *The Stars,** a book about the movies, sees them as a unique product of the 20th century, the end result of a revolution in the desires of its audience, something "new." According to Morin, the movies at first had only fictional heroes and heroines; then the actors became as well known as the characters they played; and finally in the 30's—through the accession of the lower class to "the psychological level of middle-class individuality"—"the dialectic of the actor and the role [was] instituted, a machine in which the star descends upon the earth." "Throughout an immense part of the world, for an overwhelming proportion of the film industry, the movies revolve around a kind of solar performer appropriately called a *star*." It is the stars, then, who lure the audience. "Worshipped as heroes, divinized, the stars are more than objects of admiration. They are also subjects of a cult. A religion in embryo has formed around them." Amidst darkness, screen, and pictures, the magic of the stars holds the viewer.

This argument has some obvious weaknesses. It does not account for the magic of those themes and situations which work without stars—cops and robbers, say—nor for the success of certain directors—Hitchcock, for example (and to name Hitchcock indicates at once the film's dependence, both for its magic and development, on elements beyond identification with the stars). Not least, the argument also disregards the fact that films are *seen*. Some of the differences between a "star" of dime novels, like Nick Carter, and a star like Humphrey Bogart are certainly attributable to the simple fact that the first is framed in words and the other in pictures. Stars are not equally radiant on all nights and against every background.

But the most important of Morin's limitations, because it is the most typical of discussions of the media, is his notion that an audience of fans is the only influential audience the movies have. Morin quotes from interviews with young English and American movie-goers and from some fan letters to demonstrate the passion and extent of "fan fever"; but all such documentation seems beside the point. The movie-goers who worship actors and actresses, thereby transforming them into gods and goddesses, clearly represent only one way of looking at a movie. And the range of distinctions suggested by daily film reviews, and suggested as well by films themselves, indicate that it is by no means the only popular way.

Both these books attempt to analyze how a medium is "used": *Introduction* takes the media to be "old" and maintains that they are usually used to fulfill rational—and easily distinguishable—demands for information or entertainment; *The Stars,* on the other hand, considers the movie medium "new" and argues that it is used to fulfill essentially emotional needs. The difficulty, however, is that neither book examines the differences among the various media. Neither considers how or why an audience may shift from one medium to another as it grows older or more mature; nor whether each medium has a different audience or all media have the same audience; nor whether the different media invite different degrees of participation (are consumers and spectators the same?). And so because of these reasons, neither book can really divine how the media daily manage to affect us—the electronic legions that put pictures in our heads, words in our mouths, and who knows what desires in our hearts.

* Translated from the French by Richard Howard. Grove Press, 189 pp., 1960.

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A RECENT issue of *Daedalus*,* drawn from the June 1959 Tamiment Institute conference on "Mass Culture and Mass Media," can be characterized as an attempt by historians, sociologists, social critics, philosophers, media men, and artists to establish—en masse as it were—the necessary context for analyzing the media. Education, high art, taste, national policy, the intellectual—these provide the foci for discussion. Contributors often disagree, sometimes contradict each other, and occasionally speak on different levels; but if *Introduction to Mass Communications* and *The Stars* rely on oversimple critical vocabularies, the *Daedalus* symposium shows how easily the vocabulary can be expanded. The "new/old" alternative, for example, is given some finely shaded nuances.

Edward Shils, discussing "mass society and its culture," argues that the "unprecedented . . . heart of the revolution of mass culture" lies in the "extraordinary quantity of popular music, mediocre and brutal films, periodical literature, and forms of dance . . . produced for and consumed by youth." Examining the production and consumption of cultural objects today, he categorizes them as superior, mediocre, or brutal. "In a mass society," he concludes, somewhat like a Kinsey of culture, "the proportion . . . of cultural objects held by superior culture has shrunk, and correspondingly the share of mediocre and brutal culture has grown." Yet this shift, he argues, is not so dire as some would have us believe.

> The very growth of *Kitsch*, and of the demand which has generated the industry for the production of *Kitsch*, is an indication of a crude aesthetic awakening in classes which previously accepted what was handed down to them or who had practically no aesthetic expression and reception.

Whatever may be unique about culture today, then, does not seem cataclysmic to Shils. For him, the new things are not necessarily the central ones: "The problems of superior culture in mass society are the same as in any society."

Ernest van den Haag disagrees: "In my opinion, emphasis on cultural objects misses the point"—which is not the objects themselves, but the "function of such objects in people's lives," the relation to mass culture of the individuals who consume it. And this relationship has, in fact, led to "the corruption and sterilization of the heritage of the past." For van den Haag, a society that sports a mass culture may be a decaying society; in any case, it is a fundamentally different society from one without such a culture.

According to Norman Jacobs, who edited the *Daedalus* symposium and wrote a preface to the issue, Ernest Nagel spoke for many people at the Tamiment conference "when he expressed his unhappiness with the quality of much of the evidence introduced to support the various positions." Nagel's criticism can be put another way, that the contributors rarely distinguished between statements which were empirically supportable (whether or not evidence for them was available) and those which were not. As a result, any suggestions for research which might add to our understanding of the media remains muted or hidden; and the kinds of questions which might be researchable—how much of popular culture is actually pre-empted by the media? how do movies, as compared with books, work on people?—remain unasked; while abstract issues and moral problems—how great is the danger to high art? can mass culture be controlled?—are overemphasized.

But the more basic difficulty with a collection like this is its failure to establish criteria of relevance. Every essay looks at the subject from another vantage point, and every vantage point seems equally suitable.

Stanley Edgar Hyman's approach is to ambush the media with multiplicity. "I should like to discuss some of the ideals, dangers, and limitations of mass culture." The ideals are aesthetic pluralism, natural evolution of taste (an ideal also suggested by Shils), and the media's rearing of its own critics; the dangers of mass culture are its narcotic effects (one of van den Haag's points), the cults (folk and hip), and the captivity of the audience; the limitations, finally, are "the Law of Raspberry Jam, that the wider you spread it the thinner it is," the nature of art itself (which "is always for an elite"), the timidity of the men who run the media, and the consumer's ignorance. As a college teacher, Hyman proposes to take his stand,

* Spring, 1960.

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or "stands," before this protean complex on a platform he describes with six operative verbs: *reject, embrace, ignore, improve, replace, warn.* Hyman, it should be clear, would use the study of mass culture as a device that might lead to both the understanding of past and the creation of new art.

H. Stuart Hughes, on the other hand, argues that the deficiencies of mass culture mirror the deficiencies of society, and he agrees with Shils and others "that the media cannot be held responsible for 'corrupting' popular taste." He writes: "If almost no one cares to read Milton today, it is not just because we have lost our feeling for traditional culture. It is because most of what an author like Milton has to say has in simple truth become irrelevant to our contemporary lives." Hughes in effect takes a "radical" position as opposed to Hyman's "liberal" one, for he centers not upon the media's effect on art, but upon society. With his outlook, as he himself writes, "we have come to social criticism."

Now these abstractions all have some validity, but they never come together to form a conception under which all the issues involving mass culture and the media might be connected for the purpose of deeper analysis. Disorder may be characteristic of essay collections, but it is worth saying that the media are too often approached through such collections. Going everywhere, as the *Daedalus* symposium does, they go nowhere.

There are only two books I know of which try to grasp the complexity of the media and the problems they raise by means of a few central ideas. One, published several years ago, did not receive the attention it deserves—Reuel Denney's *The Astonished Muse;** the other, *Explorations in Communication,*† is a selection of articles from the defunct Canadian magazine, *Explorations,* which was edited, as is the book, by Edmund Carpenter and Marshall McLuhan. Denney considers the media "new"; the contributors to *Explorations* adopt a more complicated view of the "new/old" question. But taken together, these books form an incisive introduction to the problems of the media and mass culture.

DENNEY'S TITLE comes from a line by Emerson: "The astonished Muse finds thousands at her side." But the thousands here do not attend only the muse of the media. Denney places his discussion of the media among analyses of sports, science fiction, cars, urban architecture, the do-it-yourself movement, and consumer buying habits. And so the media come to appear less singularly crucial—less heroes or villains—and, at the same time, come to reveal traits in common with other aspects of popular culture. *The Astonished Muse* is an attempt to look at the whole of American culture.

The book argues two main propositions, both persuasively. It suggests first that to understand the effects and meanings of popular culture, one must analyze its forms of expression. For it is through form that movies, or science-fiction stories, or sports events establish their basic relationship with an audience. Two of Denney's best examples for this rather abstract argument deal with football and television.

In a chapter entitled "The Decline of Lyric Sport," Denney writes: "We must ask . . . how a specific entertainment form—in this sense the form of a game—gets to be what it is." He approaches the problem by analyzing the rules of American football and comparing them with those of its English counterpart and forebear, Rugby. Denney contends that such factors as the increasingly mixed makeup of American football teams (both socially and ethnically), the democratic ideology of the players ("in favor of equalitarian and codified attitudes"), and football's audience of former players (unlike Rugby's audience of non-players)—factors which apply to most American sports—forced the creation of a "game possessing . . . nationally distinct rules": centering, the minimum yardage-gain rule, the forward pass, etc.

Denney clearly intends this discussion to illuminate the fundamental importance of form for the understanding of any sport. He himself does not bring together the various threads of the discussion, but it seems fair to list them as follows: that form—here the rules of the game—defines and gives meaning to all of a game's elements—from its physical violence to its intellectual complexity; that the form mediates between the game and the audience by providing com-

* University of Chicago Press, 264 pp., 1957.
† Beacon Press, 210 pp., 1960.

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mon standards according to which the players play and the audience judges; and, finally, that the form expresses certain cultural assumptions which, again, are common to players and audience. Denney in effect is saying that when one attempts to understand the meaning of a sport for its audience, one must investigate the game's action, its standards, and its cultural significance; and that none of these can be examined without examining the game's rules.

Denney goes on to argue that form works in much the same way for a medium like television. Here, however, form consists not of rules, but—as in art—of genre. He examines three television programs which were all willing "to arouse popular concern and controversy" by referring to ugly aspects of contemporary life—a film study of the Wassaic School for the Mentally Retarded, a (British) adaptation of Orwell's *1984*, and a documentary-discussion (American) "on the experiences of a seven-year-old girl who had been seized by a sexual pervert"—and he tries to show that their presentations and the audience reactions were determined in each case largely by the genre used. For example, the mixed format of the third program (narrative followed by discussion) expresses an attempt to utilize two distinct ways of handling the same materials, ways that might be categorized roughly as "emotional" and "intellectual," the idea being that the virtues of the narrative function to offset the inadequacies of the discussion, and vice versa. Denney further suggests that audiences will sometimes accept documentary treatment of a serious theme, although they reject a fictional presenation of it; thus, some members of the BBC audience of *1984* thought that "their broadcasters were wrapping too much seriousness in the format they felt to be reserved for less challenging . . . entertainment." As with the rules of football, so with the dictates of different artistic genre: each genre (or set of rules) emphasizes different elements of its material, each posits different standards by which the material should be judged, and each genre is viewed by the audience with different expectations.

Appropriate criteria for judgment, implicit cultural attitudes, the relation between elements—the "formal" approach encompasses all these considerations. Denney has outlined here—successfully, I think—the framework within which the complex relations between popular culture and its audience can be untangled without being improperly disjoined.

THIS ARGUMENT, to its credit, does not in itself imply a covert or preconceived judgment on popular culture. Denney's own estimate is offered in the second of the major propositions he argues in *The Astonished Muse*—that every area of American popular culture, football no less than the media, suffers from excessive "literalism."

> There seems to be a parallel between the way in which the late nineteenth-century conventions of naturalism control our audio-visual media and the way in which legalities resembling Sherman Antitrust legislation control the American football game. In the one case a literalism of the imagination sets undue limits to both fictional and documentary forms; in the other the elaboration of rules and loopholes concentrates the spectator's sensibility on conference meetings that resemble sessions of the United Nations.

Denney finds many examples of this literalism, some of them off-beat and unusual, like the bureaucratization of the hot-rod movement which began as an anti-Detroit consumer revolt, or like the architectural vocabulary of "functionalism" which overlooks everything symbolic in the new "suppliant skyscrapers" (those monuments "to our desire to re-form the skyscraper in the direction of a display case for anybody rather than a fortress for Somebody"). Denney also sees literalism in motivational research—advertising used to be utopian, he writes, "it took motives for granted and proposed real or unreal methods, all involving purchase in the market, to satisfy them"; but now cause and effect are reversed, and the product is taken for granted: "what is thought to be mysterious is why anyone should want it, at a certain time, in a certain circumstance, in a certain way."

Each of these examples points to a different type of literalism; the first touches upon organizational life, the second on aesthetic judgment, and the last on the business world, and the quotation concerning football and the media supplies examples from

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two other areas of popular culture—sports and audio-visual entertainment. It is no doubt true that the examples are not equally convincing, and that Denney's judgment depends at times (in his analysis of the media, for instance) upon a kind of "socio-aesthetic" estimate which mixes sociological analysis with assumptions about reality and how it can be represented. But despite these problems, *The Astonished Muse* still manages to argue with great force that the main tendency of American popular culture is its "tendency towards the literal."

I should make it clear, however, that Denney's critical estimate of current popular culture is not at all meant to be an absolute judgment. On the contrary, his general view is extremely affirmative. Toward the close of his final chapter, he writes:

> The fine works of scholars like Matthiessen, Parrington, Mumford, and others makes us forget sometimes that a little Concord brightness in the nineteenth century did not save the country from intellectual malfeasance from 1870 to 1917. The 1920's, great blooming period of the popular arts in the United States, are certainly the greatest decade in our cultural history, notwithstanding recent attempts of post-Marxist and proto-Conservative pygmies to run it down. The Brown, Mauve, and Pea-green decades of the period 1870–1917 had to be ended by a cultural lynching party, it appears, and the trial was summarily conducted by Judge Nickelodeon.

The Astonished Muse is a difficult book to read; sometimes obscure, it is full of sudden shifts and imperfectly developed points (the final sentence of this last quotation is an example). Even so, it is distinguished by something more than the originality of its ideas. For the *tone* itself of the book is significant, deriving as it does from a recognition that because an American intellectual has an ambiguous relation to popular culture and an inescapable involvement in it, his very estimate of that culture is also a partial estimate of himself. It is the absence of this awareness which marks most of the contributions to the *Daedalus* symposium and, in general, most evaluations of the media. *The Astonished Muse* takes on cultural importance precisely because Denney knows that to discuss popular culture is to discuss the meaning of being an American.

Edmund Carpenter and Marshall McLuhan, the editors of *Explorations in Communication*, would probably not find the muse of the media so much astonished by the thousands attending her as exhilarated and, at the same time, very much in charge. For Carpenter and McLuhan believe that the mass media are almost as old as sound or sight, and that today's media are indeed new but because they are electronic. Whether they have good effects or bad, Carpenter and McLuhan remark, "remains to be seen."

"All languages," Carpenter writes, "are mass media," and it is this assumption that underlay the nine issues of *Explorations* (published intermittently in Canada between 1953 and 1959). According to Carpenter and McLuhan, "*Explorations* explored the grammars of such languages as print, the newspaper format and television." Every medium, it argued—every "language"—structures the message it transmits. Thus, *Moby Dick* in print differs from *Moby Dick* on film because print does things which film cannot and, conversely, because film does things which print cannot. Each medium has its own structure, and each its unique limits.

In many ways, *Explorations'* notion of "grammars" resembles Denney's concept of "form." Both assert that the manner in which a communication is presented determines its meaning and its effect on an audience. But *The Astonished Muse* and *Explorations in Communication* investigate different types of "presentation": Denney mainly discusses different artistic genres, Carpenter and McLuhan different media. Further differences—in emphasis, evidence, and conclusions—flow directly from their focus upon these different enclosures.

Every language, *Explorations* maintains, codifies reality and conceals, as Carpenter writes, "a unique metaphysics"; moreover, the foremost "languages" of each age, embodying its covert metaphysics, codifies reality for that particular age. It argues this thesis impressionistically with examples from all the arts and from various languages—drawn and animated, as well as spoken. And from this formulation to its main prop-

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osition is a quick jump: "that revolutions in the packaging and distribution of ideas and feelings"—changes in the media of communications—*"modified not only human relations but also sensibilities"* (my italics).

THE FIRST GREAT communications revolution, *Explorations* contends, was created by the advent of print: oral authority was overthrown and literacy became king. And accompanying the new "language" came nothing less than a new reality, a new world. "The phonetic alphabet and all its derivatives stress a one-thing-at-a-time analytic awareness in perception." Technology and the assembly line were two inevitable results—"a power of applied knowledge . . . unrivaled in human history." Every individual was changed and in the most subtle parts of his consciousness; for the price of that unrivaled power, of the loss of the oral language, the price of print, was to exist "personally and socially in a state of almost total subliminal awareness."

Now, once again, a great communications revolution is restructuring the world. Print is being overthrown, and its lineal order is dying; and the all-at-once reality of the electronic media is upon us. This re-orientation can be described as the shift from the line to the gestalt, from ordered time to "spherical" space, from the inductive logic of the lawyer's brief to the simultaneity of talk; and "paradoxically, at this moment in our culture, we meet once more preliterate man." The new reality we have entered is the "postliterate age":

> Postliterate man's electronic media contract the world to a village or tribe where everything happens to everyone at the same time: everyone knows about, and therefore participates in, everything that is happening the minute it happens.

Some of this has been said before, but the effects Carpenter and McLuhan see of such all-at-onceness upon human relations and sensibilities are less noted. The "simultaneous sharing of experiences as in a village or tribe creates a village or tribal outlook, and puts a premium on togetherness." "Today we are experiencing the emotional and intellectual jag resulting from the rapid translation of varied visual and auditory media into one another's modalities." This transition affects education: "the present conflict leads to elimination of the motive to learn and to diminution of interest in all previous achievement: it leads to loss of the sense of relevance."

What is happening to us, in short, is the obverse of what a preliterate society experiences in the transition to literacy: "Just as the Eskimo has been de-tribalized via print, going in the course of a few years from primitive nomad to literate technician, so we, in an equally brief period, are becoming tribalized via electronic channels."

The essays by the contributors to *Explorations in Communication,* which examine a variety of subjects in a variety of ways—S. Giedion's "Space Conception in Prehistoric Art," Dorothy Lee's "Linguistic Reflection of Wintu Thought" and "Lineal and Nonlineal Codifications of Reality" (and Robert Graves's comments on the latter), Jean Shepard's "Channel Cat in the Middle Distance" are several examples—all manage to give support to the general framework provided by Carpenter and McLuhan.

There are any number of possible objections to this argument: one might contend that print is not dying, while conceding that the media are indeed creating important changes within the younger generation's conception of reality; that no form of communication is so central to the development and utilization of knowledge (or art) as this book argues; that the categories of preliterate, literate, and postliterate describe real enough differences, but that they are only a by-product of more significant forces. Yet the questions raised by *Explorations in Communication* are serious ones, and their precise validity to one side, they serve to make us aware of what the media may in general be, and of how, as always, they continue to affect our thoughts and our sensibilities.

Yet if *Explorations* is right in thinking that print is obsolescent, then it seems to have lost its best chance for a graceful exit; for had *Explorations* been the last book published, the final act of literacy could then have been a recognition of its own mortality. But no doubt such an orderly and "lineal" fantasy is the product of an imagination that has itself been nurtured by too many lines of tight, straight, and endlessly marching print.

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LETTERS FROM READERS

Medical Services to Consumers

To the Editor of Commentary:

In the report entitled "Medical Care and the Consumer" [November 1960], Edward Chase writes that "what organized medicine scrupulously avoids discussing" is that the "uncontrolled activities of the doctors have led directly to the alarming inflation of medical costs." However, experience in the State of Maryland reveals, to the contrary, a reluctance, if not a resistance by Blue Cross and the hospitals to accept the concept of "significant over-utilization" of hospital facilities. Despite repeated warnings by the medical profession to Blue Cross, to the hospitals, and the public of the hazards of spiralling cost of hospitalization resulting from unnecessary hospital admissions, no action was taken. . . .

Prominent hospital and Blue Cross officials in the State of Maryland, who until very recently consistently denied the existence of over-utilization of hospital facilities, now indicate the solution is "to bring positive pressure to bear upon the physicians responsible for such cases to assure that such instances are not repeated." . . .

The fault is Blue Cross's for issuing a form of policy which covers medically necessary care—such as x-rays and pathology—only when a patient is hospitalized, but not in a doctor's office. . . . The solution is to write a policy for every Blue Cross subscriber who will pay for necessary medical procedures wherever performed. . . .

The opposition rendered by the American College of Radiology in Albany, New York, to the "experimental system of coverage, at no extra premium for certain services like x-rays and basal metabolisms, which would be administered in the out-patient departments of member hospitals," was essentially twofold: first, to restrict benefits to out-patient departments of hospitals not including private offices and, secondly, to provide medical services in a Blue Cross (hospitalization) contract rather than Blue Shield (medical) contract. It is strange . . . that the groups who have been strong advocates of constructive changes are being labeled the opposition, while those who have been most resistent are being credited with progressive attitudes.

Nathan B. Hyman (M.D.)
Baltimore, Maryland

To the Editor of Commentary:

I was impressed with the fairness and objectivity of Edward T. Chase's article. As a physician in solo practice, I am disturbed at finding my early extinction prophesied [but] . . . the bill to provide medical care for the elderly now contains a built-in invitation to serious abuse: the provision that diagnostic work is paid for only if the patient is hospitalized. It is this provision, found in most Blue Cross plans, which has resulted in unnecessary hospitalizations . . . raised costs, and tied-up hospital beds. . . .

Harry J. Kanin (M.D.)
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Mr. Chase *writes:*

It is really wonderful how unanimous the doctors are (Drs. Hyman and Kanin's letters are typical) in pleading for insurance coverage of out-of-hospital medical services, especially diagnostic. The doctors are finally catching up with their lay critics, who have been making this obvious deduction for years now. Blue Cross's fault, the doctors say, or the hospitals', or both. The facts are, of course, that the power in establishing medical procedures—including what services are covered by insurance and where—resides with organized medicine, preeminently at the county society level. Blue Cross is at its mercy, while Blue Shield is simply organized medicine's own baby. . . . Dr. Hyman might look at the thorough two-year study by the United Steelworkers of America of their medical care program; the study reveals the union's inability to persuade doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full compensation for their services.

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The dilemma can be resolved in either of two ways: by the medical profession taking the initiative for reform or, in consequence of its default, by a political resolution. It is the latter which seems most likely.

Dr. Hyman's misreading of the Albany experiment can best be construed as naive. The radiologists' opposition was patently to protect their economic interests, not to advance the cause of comprehensive insurance for ambulatory patients. The millennium isn't that close.

Israel, Diaspora, Jewish Culture

To the Editor of Commentary:

I should like to thank Saul Goodman for his article "Simon Dubnow—A Revaluation" [December 1960]. . . . [However] I do not agree with Mr. Goodman's theory that the Jews in America are a religious or an ethnic group among many other such groups and that their nationality is unambiguously American. . . . In essence we remain the people of Israel. To think otherwise would be tantamount to breaking faith with the covenant established between God and the people Israel almost 4,000 years ago.

Nor do I agree that the difference between the land of Israel and the Diaspora will be "qualitative and quantitative" in terms of their contribution to Jewish national culture. . . . If the people Israel is to shoulder its responsibility in helping to create universal understanding among the nations of the world, which is the prophetic justification for Jewish national culture, how could this be accomplished without having her sons and daughters in the Diaspora? . . . And doesn't the Diaspora need the "inspiration and nourishment" Israel provides? . . . Measuring the contribution of Israel and the Diaspora is like determining which is more important, arms or legs.

Leslie Gruber

Evansville, Indiana

The Working Intelligentsia

To the Editor of Commentary:

In his valuable essay on the new academic generation ["The Rebelling Young Scholars," November 1960], Professor Andrew Hacker refers to a British journal, *New Left Review*, and intimates that its editors are not the sort of people who would be welcome in academic employment. The proposition may well be true, in some ultimate sense, but it is a fact that of twenty-five members of our editorial board, eighteen are university teachers.

Furthermore, Professor Hacker's assertion that dissent among the younger British intelligentsia is somehow due to their being excluded from employment is questionable. . . . Broadcasting, television, the theater, publishing, journalism, a booming art market, and an expanding university system offer a host of jobs, commissions, and opportunities to say one's piece. The difficulty is a deeper one, namely, whether anyone really listens. Here we encounter those omnipresent, but not entirely overt, mechanisms of ideological defense by which British society maintains its present, uneasy equilibrium. That is really what makes the intellectuals angry—but this makes a long story, best not begun here.

Norman Birnbaum

Nuffield College
Oxford, England

[*See Mr. Birnbaum's article elsewhere in this issue.*—Ed.]

"In the Community"

To the Editor of Commentary:

I write this letter not in order to rebut or rebuke Milton Himmelfarb ["In the Community," December 1960], but rather to express my sense of sad resignation to the human factor that makes it possible for someone as thoughtful, learned, and fair as he to so misinterpret a recent public announcement. . . . May I quote some statements from the article and indicate how I would explain the very same facts?

1. "After the Conservative congregational association tabled a motion for affiliation with the World Zionist Organization last year, there was great eagerness to prove that the old Conservative loyalties were not really being betrayed." It is true that the United Synagogue voted to table a resolution on affiliation with the World Zionist Organization, but it was the Rabbinical Assembly which adopted a resolution concerning an American Jewish Assembly. . . . A problem of competitive chaos exists in the American Jewish community. In September of 1959 Khrushchev was here, and

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I still shudder when I recall the shabby and humiliating way in which countless individuals and organizations competed to speak to him on behalf of the oppressed Jewish community in Russia. Several months later we were treated to another circus of press releases and public posturing . . . when some swastikas were smeared on synagogues in different parts of the world. . . . In the spring of 1960, I proposed in a letter to the President of the Synagogue Council of America that the Synagogue Council take the initiative to convene a democratic, representative, over-all American Jewish Assembly.

2. ". . . and the Synagogue Council immediately agreed. . . ." Actually the original proposal was vetoed in the Synagogue Council by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations as premature, etc. Several months later the National Convention of the Rabbinical Assembly adopted the resolution . . . , and only then did the constitutent agencies of the Synagogue Council . . . with all kinds of reservations agree to appoint an exploratory committee to study this proposal.

3. "Since the Synagogue Council can do nothing about such things as the *kashrut* scandals—or rather *hillul ha-Shem,* desecration—it accepts invitations for talking about unity." No one is more painfully aware than the Rabbinical Assembly of shameful scandals often associated with the supervision and distribution of kosher food products. . . . [But] I doubt very much whether the Synagogue Council would be the ideal instrument to investigate and correct the situation since one of its constituents is usually accused of considerable guilt for this hillul ha-Shem, another constituent is completely indifferent to the whole problem of Kashrut, and a third group is suspected by both of not so very Kosher motives in the whole enterprise. . . .

4. It would be improper for me to debate whether we have been generous or self-denying in relation to communal schools or not, but I am sure that the Conservative rabbinate and laity can boast of as many ardent advocates and supporters of community education as any other group.

[Finally] I had always thought that the question of a gored ox was of great interest primarily to the Halachist, and I had always thought that Mr. Himmelfarb was more interested in the Aggadic aspect of our tradition. . . .

WOLFE KELMAN
The Rabbinical Assembly of America
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The few paragraphs titled "The Commissioner and the Rabbis" makes me wonder whether Mr. Himmelfarb explored the background of the dispute. The Commissioner has a laudable ambition to head the F.B.I. if and when that job becomes vacant. The performance during the UN meeting was a performance in an unworthy operatic and undemocratic tradition, done with one eye on the bigwigs in Washington. . . . One Sunday, though the UN was not in session, there were several hundred police on hand. . . . But all the villains were away for the weekend in the country. . . . Commissioner Kennedy was bucking for publicity and a promotion, and Yom Kippur meant nothing to him. . . . But the implication of his action is more vital. Many Jews, even in New York, find it difficult to take the day off during the Holy Days. They are frequently penalized financially and always discouraged. If the government can do this in the guise of an emergency, why can't others? . . .

L. M. KAHN
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

There can be little argument with the main point of Milton Himmelfarb's comments on the intervention of Jewish organizations in the public school Bible reading cases [in Miami]. Of course nothing is gained by winning a court decision and thereby creating a set of more serious problems. . . . [But] to be completely realistic, is it reasonable to expect that in the classroom such scriptural reading occurs in a vacuum, unaffected by the religious background of the teacher? Can Mr. Himmelfarb believe that if the doors of the public school are opened to religious teaching of any kind, that there will not then be greater pressure for Christian teaching and Christian prayer? . . .

More important, however, is his implication that Jews should not oppose Bible reading in public schools because Jews believe in the Bible (Old Testament) and that we should let the non-believers look after them-

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selves. Jews do not belong to the religious majority, and it is thus to their own advantage to uphold the rights of all to dissent. . . .

ALBERT H. NEMAN

Cincinnati, Ohio

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Milton Himmelfarb's rhetorical question ". . . how sensible or fitting is it for Jews to attack Bible reading as equally unacceptable with prayers in the name of Jesus?" does not elicit the desired response in me. . . . It is hypocritical for Jews to object to a ". . . horrendous dramatization of the crucifixion" and at the same time condone other types of sectarian teachings in the public schools as long as they conform to Jewish theology. The only justified objection that Jews can raise is not that the presentation in the public school is Christian and consequently offending to Jewish students, but that the presentation is *religion* (regardless of what sectarian origin) and stands as a direct violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution.

MICHAEL HAHN

University of California
Berkeley, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Although I have enjoyed Milton Himmelfarb's previous comments [April and August 1960], the December piece (and especially the final three items) reeks with arrogance. To paraphrase Job: will all wisdom die with Himmelfarb? Is the American Jewish Committee's stand on community organization the only and final revelation? . . .

(RABBI) MORDECAI L. BRILL

Greenburgh Hebrew Center
Dobbs Ferry, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Milton Himmelfarb's comment on the Miami law suits betrays cowardice and ignorance, the former because it speaks for escape and acquiescence, the latter because it ignores the lesson of history that Jews flourish only when civil liberties flourish.

(PROF.) HARRY RIYA
Hillel Counselor, SOSC

Department of Philosophy
San Diego State College
San Diego, California

MR. HIMMELFARB *writes:*

My friend Rabbi Kelman does not convince me this time. (a) The separation among the Conservative bodies is more formal than real. (b) The "competitive chaos" in the Jewish community is perhaps less fearful than Rabbi Kelman imagines, but in any event his remedy is neither effective nor necessary. There is plenty of chaotic competition among the constituents of the unitary bodies that do exist, and plenty of orderly cooperation in the absence of such bodies. Rabbi Kelman was distressed by the Khrushchev affair in 1959—excessively, I think. A year later Nasser was here. With the same Jewish community organization, there were no scenes, no chaos. It was planned that way. (c) Rabbi Kelman's behind-the-scenes chronology does not change the fact that the formal resolution of the Rabbinical Assembly was followed almost immediately by the formal assent of the Synagogue Council. (d) Rabbi Kelman agrees that the *kashrut* scandal—which I cited only for illustration—is indeed a desecration, but as much as says that the rabbis and congregations and their associations can do nothing about it. He is conceding my point—that they ignore what should be primary for them, because it is difficult and unpopular, while soothing themselves by agitation for what should be secondary. (e) Of course Conservative rabbis and laymen are not less devoted than others to community education. The point is that by their own principles they should be far more devoted—which is not to say that I am fully convinced of the superiority of communal over congregational schooling. (f) With all deference, I suggest that my Halachist friend is confusing the gored with the goring ox.

My enthusiasm for Commissioner Kennedy is this side of idolatry, but I am not impressed by an argument that since nothing happened while so many policemen were about, it was foolish to have them there; I am more inclined to believe that nothing happened precisely because there were so many of them about. Though I do not know enough to debate police administration with Mr. Kahn, I think it would be at least as appropriate to compare police service with military service as with employment.

Mr. Neman ably presents the point of view held by nearly all Jews and Jewish

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organizations. It is quite persuasive and it may be, practically if not theoretically, the only position really available to us. Yet I think it too legal. Our children are so constantly subject to the pressure of Christian and Christian-derived culture, high and especially low—think of the stores and TV in December—that keeping the classroom a little more or a little less antiseptic is not likely to make much difference.

Mr. Hahn's letter is typical in being more militant. It smugly assumes that Jews are just about the only "Americans dedicated to constitutional law" and it is addicted to all-or-nothing thinking—condone Bible reading ("sectarian teachings") and you have no right to object to some enormity. But that is provincial cant. In England the law prescribes far more religion in education than Bible reading, but English Jews would be able to protest at least as successfully as we an Oberammergau in the school.

I am the same now that I have displeased Rabbi Brill as when I pleased him. If he thinks I am a propagandist for the American Jewish Committee's positions, he has an original notion of what they are.

Professor Riya's letter could be used to support a thesis about the dissociation of personality and role in our world. (a) He is a teacher, and prefers invective to discourse. (b) He is a philosopher, and he is not hesitant to say glib, false, and repellent things: glib—let him talk to a convention of the American Philosophical Association about "the lesson of history"; false and repellent—what happened to the Jews of Germany and the rest of Europe must have been a mirage, because in Weimar Germany civil liberties flourished and Hitler's civil liberties were guarded with tender scrupulousness; and when civil liberties flourish, Jews flourish. (c) He is a Jewish educator, of sorts, and he is troubled neither by his students' ignorance of the Bible nor by the conviction of Jewish parents and children, community leaders, and church-state lawyers, that carols in school are tolerable or even pleasant but the Bible is awful.

A Teaching Machine

To the Editor of Commentary:

Dr. Skinner of Harvard is apparently an "aversive stimulus" to Paul Goodman ["The Human Uses of Science," December 1960]. Mr. Goodman indicts Dr. Skinner for the evils of a teaching machine that ". . . is quite irrelevant to the chief factors in either teaching or learning." In a previous article ("The Calling of American Youth" March 1960), Mr. Goodman wrote that Dr. Skinner would ". . . do away with the creative relation of pupil, teacher, and developing subject matter," and extinguish ". . . puzzlement on a child's face . . ." and ". . . the light in his eyes. . . ." Surely, this Dr. Skinner of Harvard must be a fiend.

Mr. Goodman does not explain what the chief factors in learning are. Dr. Skinner and other workers have attempted to do this by an experimental analysis of learning. Dr. Skinner proposes to utilize the techniques emerging from those experimental studies to produce more effective learning. Is it fiendish to want to give the child, as Dr. Skinner suggests [in his collection of essays, *Cumulative Record*], ". . . a genuine competence in reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic . . ." and to enable the teacher ". . . to function, not in lieu of a cheap machine, but through intellectual, cultural, and emotional contacts of that distinctive sort which testify to her status as a human being"?

S. J. Arenson

Chicago, Illinois

The Just French Critics

To the Editor of Commentary:

I was deeply interested in Theodore Solotaroff's review of *The Last of the Just* by André Schwartz-Bart [December 1960]. However, Mr. Solotaroff seems to believe that the reaction of French people and French critics has been mainly a scholarly criticism of style and facts. This is inaccurate. This book, in fact, won the Goncourt prize in 1959 . . . in my opinion proof that the people of France have felt in their heart the depth of its dramatic story. . . .

Yvonne G. Bateson

Washington, D. C.

Omission

We omitted to note last month that Staughton Lynd's "Urban Renewal—For Whom?" was first prepared for a group of Congressmen under the auspices of the Liberal Project.—Ed.

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Albert Camus, Moralist of Feeling*

LIONEL ABEL

PRACTICALLY EVERYONE has agreed to call Albert Camus a moralist, as if it were clear what the term means, at least as applied to him. But is it so clear? As far as I can see, Camus never recommended any particular ethic, nor was he an exceptionally "good" man, certainly not if we judge him by conventional standards. During the Resistance, Camus behaved with heroism; so did many others whom we have no reason to call "moralists." I knew another hero of the Resistance who once said to me: "There is no such thing as courage; believe me, I know." From what I have heard, if anyone ever showed courage, it was this man.

Perhaps in calling Camus a moralist, people mean that he invoked moral norms in judging political action. In fact, I think this is exactly what people do mean—people in this country, that is; in France, the term "moralist" is understood differently, and—why not say it?—more finely. No, we cannot locate Camus the moralist by considering only his political judgments. Though we shall have finally to vindicate these judgments, too; his "morals," after all, gave interest to his "politics."

Camus expressed feelings; this is something few contemporary writers do—or even want to do. Moreover, the kind of feelings he made vivid are those we ourselves have felt only incipiently, not fully, yet recognize that we should have felt more completely when we read their expression by him. He is the poet of what we ought to have felt in a given situation, but did not quite feel. Reading him, we wish we had.

He was a moralist, then, in his attentiveness to, and cult of, the better, the nobler feeling; he was not importantly the moralist of the better or more decisive act. However, action is modified by sensibility, and feeling what ought to be felt is itself a kind of doing. In striving to feel what ought to be felt, there is, of course, always the risk of being insincere, of falling into pose. Nowadays, people generally, and writers particularly, do not like such risk; Camus did; he has been accused of pose; and at times I myself thought the charge just. Yet for me, Camus's best quality is not diminished by the fact that it was not always with him. What you ought, you can, said Kant. He should have added: not always. Besides, there are any number of occasions when it is easier to do what you should than to feel as you ought.

How is one to feel about the death of a friend? Surely this is something we cannot know in any other way than by feeling as we have perhaps not felt. When Camus died, how many of those who had been his friends were able to respond to the event as he himself did to the deaths of persons dear to him? Here is Camus on the death of René Leynaud, a resistance comrade, executed by the Germans in June of 1944: "Truth needs witnesses. Leynaud was one of them, and that is why I miss him today. With him here, I saw more clearly, and his death, far from making me better, as the books of consolation say, made my revolt more blind . . . no good is done to men by killing their friends. . . . And who can ever justify this dreadful death? What are duty, virtue, honors compared to what was irreplaceable in Leynaud? Yes, what are they but the paltry alibis of those who remain alive? We were cheated of a man three years ago. . . ."

How ought one to feel about the fact that each day men are executed by the state in punishment for crime? I am not

* A review of *Resistance, Rebellion, and Death* by Albert Camus, translated by Justin O'Brien (Alfred A. Knopf, 272 pp., $4.00).

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asking what we are to think about the necessity for capital punishment; that question, according to Camus, Arthur Koestler's famous essay answered decisively in the negative. Camus writes: "I share absolutely Koestler's conviction; the death penalty besmirches our society, and its upholders cannot reasonably defend it." But Camus, in his wonderfully eloquent "Reflections on the Guillotine," adds to Koestler's indictment of capital punishment a felt response to the circumstances of state executions in France; his words are bound to move one beyond the force of mere argument: "The state conceals its executions and keeps silent . . . hence it doesn't believe in the exemplary value of the penalty, except by tradition and because it has never bothered to think about the matter . . . the criminal is killed because this has been done for centuries . . . a law is applied without being thought out, and the condemned die in the name of a theory in which the executioners do not believe." Here is Camus again: "Let us leave aside the fact that the law of retaliation is inapplicable and that it would seem just as excessive to punish the incendiary by setting fire to his house as it would be insufficient to punish the thief by deducting from his bank account a sum equal to his theft. Let us admit that it is just and necessary to compensate for the murder of the victim by the death of the murderer. But beheading is not simply death. It is just as different, in essence, from the privation of life as a concentration camp is from prison. It is a murder, to be sure, and one that arithmetically pays for the murder committed. But it adds to death a rule, a public premeditation known to the future victim, an organization, in short, which is in itself a source of moral sufferings more terrible than death. Hence there is no equivalence. Many laws consider a premeditated crime more serious than a crime of pure violence. But what then is capital punishment but the most premeditated of murders, to which no criminal's deed, however calculated it may be, can be compared? For there to be equivalence, the death penalty would have to punish a criminal who had warned his victim of the date at which he would inflict a horrible death on him and who, from that moment onward, had confined him at his mercy for months. Such a monster is not encountered in private life." However well you can reason, if you fall even a little bit short of such indignation, can you really be intelligent on the subject of capital punishment?

I HAVE BEEN quoting from *Resistance, Rebellion, and Death,* a collection of Camus's journalistic pieces and essays, selected by him for translation into English. The volume is just off the press and should add importantly to the image of Camus formed by American readers of his novels and plays. Here we see Camus at his most spontaneous, responding to problems as they arose and to events as they occurred, from the most personal troubles to the invasion of Hungary, and responding as an individual who happens to be able to write, rather than with care for his career as a writer. Yet these twenty-three pieces are beautifully done. People who do not read French may be unacquainted with Camus's journalistic writings; in France he is regarded as one of the great journalists of our time. Indeed, his career suggests that at this particular juncture of human and literary history, it is practically impossible to be a great writer if one disdains to be a journalist. By which I do not mean to suggest that much of what we read in the press or the reviews is even good journalism.

But whether they adapt themselves to journalism or avoid it, other contemporary writers have in the main differed from Camus in this respect: if they dealt with feeling at all, they tried to describe not what ought to be felt but what is in fact felt, and I will make bold to say that when writers address themselves to this objective they end up often enough by describing what ought *not* to be felt, for such feeling is most likely to strike readers as the real thing. If Camus sometimes seems to us falsely noble, we should recognize that his contemporaries, and one of the greatest of them, Sartre, equally often fall into the ignoble, mistaking it for the real. What I want to contrast with Camus's consciously aimed-at "nobility" is the kind of moral pornography so common in contemporary writing, and as conspicuous in a major figure like Jean-Paul Sartre as in a fifth-rate talent like Budd Schulberg.

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(I am writing as if the term "moral pornography" were a cliché of current criticism; unfortunately this is not the case, so I shall have to define it. I mean by it the taking of pleasure in what is disapproved of morally. We are supposed to get pleasure from good action, right feeling; if these do not exist we ought to suffer from their absence; were we more convinced of the above proposition we would be careful never to ignore any real instances of good action or right feeling. But just as the pornographer pure and simple wants to enjoy without sexual desire, many of our writers want to please us and themselves by describing what properly should give them and us pain.)

The interesting point here is that when you strive to feel what ought to be felt you can only succeed by actually feeling. In the description of the morally low, your feelings should be, if anything, even more at stake. But are they? Sartre, for example, has a predilection for describing base people and low actions coldly. Shulberg, being more jejune, does the same thing with even a certain happiness. Now, Camus was at the opposite pole from these writers, both in his successes and in his failures.

Sartre is, to be sure, the greater intellectual figure; I think Camus would have granted this, though he might have asked: "What's the good of so much thinking if he [Sartre] is nearly always wrong?" Which brings me to a final but rather difficult point: in what sense was Camus right—right, that is, in his political judgments, which comprise so important a part of his work?

It cannot be denied that Camus did tend to judge political events morally, and he has to stand or fall, as a thinker, by this attitude. And did not this involve his setting feeling above thought? And if it did, however fine his expression of feeling, should we take his thought seriously?

AT DIFFERENT times, I have been of different minds about this, and some years back I criticized Camus in the pages of *Partisan Review* for minimizing the intellectual element entering into political judgment. I want to retract that criticism here and now. Many things have happened since then, and I am inclined to believe, at this moment, that Camus's judgment was sounder than I thought it was ten years ago. The reason I was against political moralizing was that I was for the distinction Machiavelli had introduced between the political and the moral good, and I thought that Camus's way of thinking tended to obliterate this distinction. But is the distinction really so valid? Machiavelli, after all, could think of no wider horizon than the Florentine Republic; nowadays entities like the United States and the Soviet Union are dwarfed by the felt presence of a larger, if inchoate, entity, humanity. Neither Russia nor the United States can any longer convincingly claim that its self-interest is identical with the interest of everyone. Neither Russia nor the United States can now represent the universal; they have been reduced to the status of particular beings, and as such are subject, suddenly, to moral criticism. Which is what Camus maintained.

It should be observed that political groups or tendencies which, in recent times, set their goals above moral criticism have yielded to the temptations of political pornography, even as certain writers, eliminating any reference to an "ought" in their description of feeling, have fallen, almost inevitably, into moral pornography. Mussolini was pornographic in his "castor oil" criticism of his political victims; Hitler's anti-Semitism was pornography in the most violent form this century has seen; but what else are we to call the Communist charge that the U.S. had used germ warfare in the Korean war? Yet Sartre himself supported this charge, although he knew perfectly well that it was false. In yielding to such pornography, I suggest he was helped along by the moral pornography in his own writings.

Camus had seen a great state, Germany, under Hitler act in defiance of every moral notion we can think of as law. He never forgot that fact; once this had happened he could never accept the view that morality and politics are independent of each other. Sometimes he tried to reduce the political to the moral too simply, as when he argued that all political issues could be reduced to the question: are you for or against murder? If he was willing to apply this question as a test in Hungary, he was much more hesitant when it came to judg-

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ing French policy in Algeria. Yet I think his feeling on this most important matter was sound, and all that has happened recently, and all that is likely to happen, justifies him, morally to be sure, but also intellectually.

Status in the Factory

WORKING-CLASS SUBURB: A STUDY OF AUTO WORKERS IN SUBURBIA. By BENNETT M. BERGER. The University of California Press. 143 pp. $3.50.

Reviewed by RONALD GROSS

"WHAT WILL happen to the worker," David Riesman asked in his introduction to Eli Chinoy's *Automobile Workers and the American Dream,* "when he has his 'nice little modern home?'" *Working-Class Suburb* describes such workers, semi-skilled production workers who got their nice little modern homes *en masse,* when Ford moved its assembly plant in Richmond, California, to Milpitas, a town several miles north of San Jose. Practically all the workers followed the plant, exchanging their apartments in a drab industrial city for new homes on a semi-rural suburban tract. After they and their families had been living in these homes for two and a half years, Dr. Berger entered with his questionnaire. His assumption was that these families would exhibit symptoms of the suburban syndrome he had been reading about in *Fortune* and *Harper's*—symptoms such as transience, anxieties about getting ahead, social hyperactivity, conformism, lack of privacy, political conservatism, and concern about status.

But what Dr. Berger found is happening to these workers, now that they have entered the mainstream of the affluent society, is practically nothing. Neither they nor their wives ran to join the Republican club as soon as they became home-owners. They still don't think wine with dinner is "nice"—it's for "Dagos" to serve with lasagna. They have few fears about status and no aspirations or expectations of future advancement beyond the most minimal salary increments. In other words, although they are earning as much money and enjoying as much domestic comfort as many white-collar suburbanites, they have remained, in a very meaningful sense, working-class people. That is how they define themselves—basing their definition on the purely occupational criteria that they work with their hands, for an hourly wage, in a factory. They know that what they do eight hours of the day, five days a week, determines their life-style, and nobody can fool them into thinking otherwise. The minority who call themselves "middle class" do so hesitatingly and with ambiguous overtones that reflect the confusions of prosperity. One man explained that "around here, the working class *is* the middle class."

WHY is it that these people, unaffected by whatever it is in suburban living which supposedly creates a distinctive life-style, have maintained their realistic common sense in the midst of what, for them, is enormous economic prosperity? Apparently the answer depends on the fact that their advancement was collective: they have been buoyed up by the shift of an entire group. In our highly organized society, such movement has replaced the individual mobility of previous eras which held both greater triumphs and greater anxieties for the individual.

Suburbia, then, is a place, not a way of life. But where does this conclusion leave the image of suburban living on which such a booming business in social commentary has subsisted for the past five years? This image sprang full-blown from the observation of exactly three particular communities—Levittown, Long Island; Park Forest, near Chicago; and Lakewood, near Los Angeles—all of them distinctly middle-class suburbs of very large cities, and inhabited by former city residents working in the white-collar hierarchies of large corporations. In short, the familiar version of the myth of suburbia is the result of a logical error: the typical Organization Man is a suburbanite, therefore the typical suburb is populated by Organization Men.

But such an error still does not explain why the myth is such a favorite of social critics as diverse as the editors of *Dissent* and those of the Luce magazines. In his book's finest piece of analysis, Berger offers the explanation:

. . . the attack on Suburbia has interesting

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> and advantageous consequences for the not-quite-completely-critical intellectual. To heap abuse on suburbia (instead of upon the ethos of success and the demanding conditions of social and economic mobility) . . . renders him respectable and harmless—because, after all, the critique of suburbia is essentially a "cultural" critique, not a political or economic one rife with agitational implications. The critic identifies himself by his criticism with culture and taste, but at the same time he does not expose himself to the retaliations of powerful political and economic interests, precisely because his criticism constitutes no direct threat to them.

In reality, the suburbs are as heterogeneous as are the different sections of large cities, and the style of life in each of them correlates with factors such as the price range of homes, the educational background of residents, and the nature of the region, much more closely than with preconceptions of picture-window living.

BUT if these auto workers do not fit the stereotype of the suburbanite, what *is* the distinctive character of the lives they are leading? Here Berger offers a less satisfactory answer, which suggests that the sociological discipline can itself succumb to a "not-quite-completely-critical" attitude toward contemporary American life.

Berger finds that the workers are quite "well-adjusted" to their "terminal" style of life, and though he never actually asked them whether they *liked* their jobs, he concludes that the social critics who promote the "alienation from work" doctrine are projecting their own refined sensibilities onto people who really have no compunctions about devoting their lives to completely instrumental and inherently meaningless labor. Berger does admit that the workers are resigned, but he argues that this resignation is consistent with contentment because "the . . . hierarchy of class which is meaningful to these workers is not a conceptual framework that applies to society as a whole, but one that is limited rather to *what is possible for them.*"

In *Automobile Workers and the American Dream,* Eli Chinoy, who studied the workers at work and not at home, makes the same point: their aspirations are based on a pretty realistic judgment of possibilities rather than on the traditional image of American opportunity. And, like Berger, he finds that this resignation is characterized by a projection of ambition onto one's children and an emphasis on security rather than advancement. However, Chinoy goes on to say that this resignation affects the worker and leaves him haunted by feelings of guilt and inadequacy at his failure to win a place on the corporate career escalator. "The [American] social order," Chinoy concludes, "is thus protected . . . only at the psychological expense of those who have failed"—and who therefore live, as Harvey Swados recently found, ashamed of their enslavement to a job which provides no other satisfaction than a pay check.

But Berger disagrees with Chinoy's conclusion, arguing that the worker's resigned "redefinition of mobility" allows him to escape from the despair Chinoy describes. More important, Berger claims that Chinoy projects his own value-bias in concluding that "men cannot spend eight hours a day, forty hours each week, in activity which lacks all but instrumental meaning." He insists that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary (indeed, in light of the overwhelming evidence that they can and do), statements like this reveal only that wage labor at the factory level seems terribly unrewarding to Chinoy, and that he has sympathy for those who seem alienated from meaningful work." But Berger's pseudo-realism is a crude oversimplification. Anyone who has worked on an assembly line knows the truth of Chinoy's conclusion: men on the line do everything *but* accept the meaninglessness of their jobs—they fantasize, they play at piling up their output so they can loaf, they take pride in the "style" with which they do their routine jobs, they even identify with the corporation and the product.

Berger's consoling reassurance that the cripple loves his limp is becoming a fashionable motif among social commentators. Speaking for a whole school of economists concerned with problems of "manpower," Eli Ginzberg insists that the modern factory worker is as aware as was the 18th-century craftsman that he is being paid for doing something useful; Ginzberg points to the satisfactions that the worker receives from being able to maintain his family at a high

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level of consumption without having to work as hard as his father did. From another viewpoint, David Riesman rejects as impractical attempts to introduce "joy and meaning" into modern factory and office work; urging further mechanization in order to gain time for the fullest pleasures of consumption, he supports the de-emphasis of work's intrinsic value.

But Berger's own findings refute this "tough" view of the worker's over-all attitude. First, these workers are not *lumpen.* As semi-skilled production workers, many of them must have manipulative abilities of a fairly high order—it is their jobs, not their abilities, that are routine. They know this, and they are desperate to get out of their jobs on the assembly line: one of them, asked whether he thought he could get ahead, said he already *had* gotten ahead, by getting off the line. Moreover, although these workers are enjoying wondrous prosperity, not one of them wanted his children to follow his occupation. Finally, while claiming that the workers "have achieved most of what they feel they have a right to expect out of life," Berger casually notes an "ever-present impulse to escape the factory."

To assert that workers "can and do" spend their lives at jobs beneath their dignity, jobs unredeemed by any genuine social purpose or relation to real human need, is not to resolve the industrial problem; it is merely to state it. The fundamental error in Berger's thinking is that men don't simply adjust or fail to adjust to their work —they are deeply and continually *changed* by the work to which they devote the longest and best hours of their lives. Only by realizing this can sociologists contribute to the definition and direction of that change.

The "Orthodox" Mystics

JEWISH GNOSTICISM, MERKABAH MYSTICISM, AND TALMUDIC TRADITION. By GERSHOM G. SCHOLEM. Jewish Theological Seminary of America. 126 pp. $4.00.

Reviewed by JAKOB J. PETUCHOWSKI

THE 19th century in Germany, which saw the birth of the scientific study of Judaism, was an age that basked in the bright sunshine of Reason. The classics of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* all reflect or refract that light, and to the extent to which their subject matter is amenable to such reflection, these classics have an added measure of usefulness. Yet there are regions of the Jewish past which can be approached only with the light at the extreme ends of the spectrum: they cannot be apprehended in their true nature by clear Reason. Such are the areas of Jewish mysticism.

Scant justice was done to Cabbala and other manifestations of mysticism by men like Heinrich Graetz and Abraham Geiger. This sort of thing did not fit into the paradigm of enlightened religion which—so the claim ran—had always, or almost always, been the nature, the essence, of Judaism. The existence of Jewish mysticism was, of course, not denied: the pioneers of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* were men of honesty and honor. But the subject was approached with a certain amount of embarrassment. The mystics were the villains of the drama of Judaism—the rationalists its heroes. It is not, therefore, surprising to find mysticism described as some kind of distortion of the real Judaism—a regrettable deterioration, something which, by and large, could be credited to the sufferings of the Jews in the Middle Ages.

The 20th century has brought a different understanding to bear on the Jewish mystical heritage. Partly as a result of the disappointment in the anticipated benefits of the Age of Reason, partly as the outcome of a greater acquaintance with depth psychology, and partly, too, as an effect of the purging of Jewish studies of apologetic motives, Jewish scholarship in the present century has attempted to do justice to the phenomenon of mysticism. Men like Martin Buber and Abraham J. Heschel, in their own very different ways, have sought to rescue the insights of Hasidism for the benefit of modern people. The last great luminaries of German Jewry itself, Franz Rosenzweig and Leo Baeck, paid increasing attention to the mystical strand in Jewish thought. But the man who has done most, on a scholarly and scientific basis, to make the study of Jewish mysticism a respectable discipline is the Professor of Jewish Mysticism at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Gershom G. Scholem.

Professor Scholem's latest work is a schol-

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ar's book—in both senses of that phrase. It stands with his previous publications in meticulous scholarship, and in the unwillingness to set much store by unsubstantiated hypotheses; it is, in a way, a highly technical presentation which addresses itself to the reader who has already some knowledge of the field. Indeed, the Israel Goldstein Lectures delivered by Professor Scholem at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in the spring of 1957 form the basis of the present chapters.

Nevertheless, scholar's book though it is in one sense, it also has value and meaning for the non-expert. The intelligent layman is hearing a great deal these days about Gnosticism. The vocabulary of Gnosticism, with its "Unknown God," its concept of the "Alien Man," and its notion of the "Transcendental Self," is not so strange to ears attuned to Existentialist discourse. The problems which, according to the Church Father Tertullian, gave rise to Gnostic speculations, "Whence comes evil? Why is it permitted? What is the origin of man? And in what way does he come?" are problems that still engage a great deal of discussion. Also, once the tumult and the shouting that marked the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls will have died down, we may see an increased interest in the recent find of important Gnostic documents at Nag Hammadi, in Egypt.

FOR SOME time now, the old view of Gnosticism, that it was a specifically Christian heresy, has been given up in favor of the assumption of a pre-Christian Gnosticism. It has even been claimed that the oldest documents of Christian Gnosticism *presuppose* a Jewish Gnosis in which the figure of the Redeemer has not yet acquired a central place. However, Professor Scholem's book does not deal with the origins of Gnosticism as such: it it concerned with the particular form which Gnosticism assumed in the sources of Rabbinic Judaism. For, if Gnosticism is used simply as a "convenient term for the religious movement that proclaimed a mystical esotericism for the elect, based on illumination and the acquisition of a higher knowledge," then it need not be preempted for the dualistic heresies which plagued both Church Fathers and Rabbis. It may, in fact, be used as a name for the mystical endeavors of the Rabbis themselves—particularly for their speculations in connection with the *merkabah*, the divine "throne-chariot" of Ezekiel's vision.

In this sense of the term "Gnosticism," there exists an extensive literature, parts of which have been known for a long time; other parts have been edited and published by Professor Scholem himself. Professor Scholem's present book is primarily concerned with the age of this literature—to be more exact, with the age of parts of the literature. But the book also deals with the "orthodox" nature of this Jewish Gnostic speculation, which, in Scholem's words, "does not conflict with the Biblical concept of God, even though it may conflict with some later philosophical concepts of medieval Judaism." Finally, Scholem discusses some concrete instances illustrating the Jewish origin of certain elements known to us from non-Jewish Gnostic systems.

The work turns mainly, however, on the question of dating the Jewish Gnostic material. The *Hekhalot* literature, in which much of this material is to be found, has generally been ascribed to the 8th and 9th centuries C.E. Statements in this literature attributed to earlier Rabbis—say those of the first three centuries C.E.—have been regarded as merely "put into their mouths." Scholem himself, in his *Major Trends of Jewish Mysticism* (1941), had argued for an earlier date, for a "period before the expansion of Islam." But even he did not, in his previous work, go beyond the 5th and 6th centuries. Now in his present work, he shows, on the basis of a careful analysis of the sources, and of a comparison with the Tannaitic and Pseudepigraphic literatures, that some of the thoughts attributed to the Sages of the first three centuries C.E. in fact do go back to that very time. Some cryptic statements in the earlier literature find their explanation in the later literature, and vice versa. And when the early Rabbinic sources tell us that certain Rabbis engaged in mystical speculations, the later sources (later, that is, in the sense that they were *edited* later) still preserve for us the contents of those very speculations.

What emerges from all this is that our picture of the Tannaim (the Rabbis of the first three centuries) is in some need of revision. If they, the virtuosi of legal dialectics, have been looked upon by us as the exemplars of

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sweet rationality, and if, as disciples of 19th-century *Wissenschaft des Judentums,* we have seen in the literature of Jewish mysticism a later "degeneration," we must now own up to the fact that those early Rabbis were far more complex (and, therefore, also "deeper") personalities than we have been giving them credit for. In effect, this underlines a point made some years ago by Professor Fritz Baer, in his Hebrew book on *Israel among the Nations* (1955), stressing the mystical and "pneumatic" character of Israel's early legalists.

Perhaps it will be said that this revision of the pedigree of Jewish mysticism is as dependent upon our *Zeitgeist* as the denigration of Jewish mysticism by 19th-century Jewish scholars was dependent upon theirs. But those who wish to take such issue with the present re-evaluation would have to come to terms with Professor Scholem's detailed textual studies—a highly difficult, if not impossible, undertaking.

Awake and Sigh

THE BEAT OF LIFE. By BARBARA PROBST SOLOMON. Lippincott. 222 pp. $3.95.

Reviewed by JANE HAYMAN

EVERY four or five years along comes a new younger generation. Watchful observers of the social scene are quick to label and package the latest group, sending it on, hangdog, into its twenties to join the rest of us. If we are to believe the recent talk, a revolution is taking place on our campuses that makes the young people in Barbara Probst Solomon's novel, *The Beat of Life,* look definitely old-hat.

These three post-adolescents—Natasha Thompson, a well-to-do, assimilated Jewish girl, her Gentile lover Tim, and her sinister girl-friend Donella—are fringe members of the beat generation. They are the youngsters who have been betrayed, whose stony regard of their elders is full of bitter, passive reproach. Unlike the students of 1961 who fool around in sit-down strikes and write letters to the newspapers, Mrs. Solomon's trio are unconcerned with causes, except for the lost causes of their parents' day. Their interest in the political and social enthusiasms of twenty and twenty-five years ago is intense, sentimental, and morbid. It is their religion.

The Beat of Life is a first novel. The imaginative gaze of its author is neither broad and encompassing nor close and subtle: it is vague. Nonetheless her writing, which is bright, immediate, and moving, carries the reader along on a plane of increasing assent so that, by the time he is done, he is ready to mourn, with Tim, for the lost world of the 30's and to accept a view of young people that sees as their main characteristic a grim acknowledgment of death.

For Tim, the latest "white hope" at Columbia's School of Russian Studies, spectres from the past obscure the delights of the present. His parents had "a stake in things," they thought that the world could "be good in their time"; the "great sadness of the death camps" and the sterility of the 50's made their failure clear. Tim's legacy is defeat. "I feel nostalgia for a time I never knew," he says, but he forbids Natasha to listen to Bunny Berigan records or to see the old movies at the Thalia because "they are not ours." Foolishness of this sort can soon become a bore, but it is saved by the author's ability to extract the look and feel of youthful despair and force it on the consciousness of the reader.

Tim worries that he cannot "love." This seems to be a common goblin for certain young people, induced perhaps by too much Fromm and too little sense. The author takes him seriously, however, and has him performing the sexual act "to keep from falling into space." (While uncertainty and loneliness are unquestionably part of youth, I doubt that many young men make love for this reason.) If we are to take Tim at face value—and Mrs. Solomon persuades us that we must—he is mainly selfish and inadequate. When Natasha becomes pregnant, his first wild thoughts are of murder; he tries to induce a miscarriage by taking Natasha on a roller coaster and at last decides that he has never loved her. He sneers at his parents' failed liberalism and speaks of his own "sense of sin," but is able to express it only by the recognition that his prurient interest in a burlesque show is indeed prurient. If he is a latent moralist, his dreams of goodness scatter before the first wind of experience. By the story's end he has become an obnoxious young careerist with, as they

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used to say, a hunk of ice where his heart ought to be.

It is the Medusa-like Donella, sometime painter, user of mescaline, seeker of thrills, who leads Natasha to the abortionist's table and, indirectly, into death. In this character Mrs. Solomon has created a frightening little mistress of latter-day evil. Donella, whose only virtue is practicality, is from the start the zombie Tim is afraid of becoming. She is scornful of Natasha's vulnerability and the boy's quest for meaning, and carefully chooses her own adventures to advance her way in the world. Served up to us as one of the by-products of a decadent age, she is quite believable. When the straw shows through her nasty exterior—for example, when describing a skin-diving experience, she declares that it was "the only time in my life I've felt pure"—we overlook it, though cold thought tells us that the author means this to be a distinct revelation of moral (or immoral) character. More cold thought would uncover Donella as a new type of stock company villainess, but one does not look coldly at Mrs. Solomon's book, at least while one is reading it.

LIKE TOO many novels of today, *The Beat of Life* is not a translation of life but the exploitation of a mood. Plot and characters are superimposed on some background music, but it is the music that is important. None of the characters become more than superficially real. They stand apart not only from their elders and from each other but from events—and this contributes to their flatness. It is a special failing of most contemporary young writers that they cannot construct an artistic approximation of the actual friction, the movement-in-depth, of men and objects in the world.

The Beat of Life is no more than funeral music which laments simultaneously the death of old jazz, old movies, and old ideals. It is written in the present tense and in the first person, with each of the two lovers taking up the narrative in turn. These devices, together with a tone that is at once nostalgic and excited, lend it an impressive credibility. Tim and Donella, from whom youth and hope have gone, are not like the twenty-one-year-olds one meets at college parties, not even the beat twenty-one-year-olds. Yet Mrs. Solomon persuades us that they speak for a vast, bitter horde. The reader is moved by an undertow of truth; this is the kind of genre writing that validates its own pretensions.

The characterization of Natasha, the hero of this tale, has some further contemporary interest. She is not drawn as well as the other two, but the author is more ambitious for her. As the Jew of the piece she is first pet, then victim, and around her has been constructed a blurry race-mysticism. Pretty and sweet, if a little slow, Natasha comes from a family of prosperous, Anglicized Jews who have raised her on a pleasant blend of plum pudding and gefülte fish. Jewishness, *per se,* means nothing to her until she is wakened into self-consciousness by one of her lover's remarks. Her new-found identity leads her at first into the nauseating role of "real" Jew: she learns a few Yiddish words and pretends that she is dark and exotic-looking. This phase passes, however, and subsequent mention of the Jews by both Natasha and Tim, as well as the over-all presentation of the girl, provide the reader with some brief glances at the current-day interest in the martyr. Comments on the subject include these of her lover: ". . . on account of all those millions of years, and Hitler and Germany, and me being a Christian and never having any trouble—the baby has got to be a Jew." Or again: "I will love him desperately and he will always be vulnerable and my love for him will make me part of the world. Having a son that's a Jew, well, Christ, then you're committed."

In the minds of many, Hitler has defined once and for all the role of the Jew. Where in the past he has played the dissenter, our conscience as well as our scapegoat, today's Jew is definitely "in." Now that we are all outsiders, the Jew stands in relation to his Gentile friends not as critic or unwilling victim but as congressional representative. We embrace Jewish forgiveness and Jewish passivity, ignoring traditions of rationalism, radicalism, and stubborn pride.

For Natasha—according to Tim—"the world is a familiar place," and she is envied by her less fortunate friends. Most ignorant and innocent of the three, she is the only one who—for reasons which are not explained, but presumably have something to do with her Jewishness—can truly love. Forced by the others into having an un-

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wanted abortion that stills within her the beat of life already stilled in Donella and Tim, Natasha, clutching her Catholic aunt's garnet cross, commits suicide in a dénouement of touching bad taste.

Natasha has earlier asked, ". . . what right have we to our gentle Passovers, our conscience tithe of bonds for Israel? How do we get off so easily? Why do we call ourselves Jews?" Her right to the name is obviously established by her death.

Mrs. Solomon's own conception of Jewishness, if she has one, is not defined in her novel. In the jumble, however, one picture is clear. Once again the Jew, betrayed in love but superior in pain, places his head in a gas oven. Such is the way of the world, sighs the modern reader.

Faith, Hope, and the Facts: Three Views of Affluence

AMERICA IN THE SIXTIES: THE ECONOMY AND THE SOCIETY. By the EDITORS OF FORTUNE. Harper Torchbooks. 266 pp. $1.85.

BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE. By GUNNAR MYRDAL. Yale University Press. 287 pp. $4.50.

THE POWERFUL CONSUMER. By GEORGE KATONA. McGraw-Hill. 276 pp. $6.50.

Reviewed by LEWIS A. COSER

THESE three books are all concerned with topics that border on the area between sociology and economics. But they are otherwise most dissimilar.

America in the Sixties, ostensibly an effort by the editors of *Fortune* to forecast the major social and economic trends of the 60's, reveals more about the Luce mind than about the 60's. Written in the characteristic self-congratulatory and breathless style of *Fortune*—"[The consumer market of the 60's] will reflect a new American way of life, yeasty with new Americans"—it exhibits that willed commitment to a roseate view of the future which we have come to expect from the Luce publications (though not, interestingly enough, from the ex-Luce men). As one reads these projections about the miracles of rising income, rising productivity, rising consumption, one would never suspect that in the first year of this new decade more than 5 per cent of the civilian labor force was unemployed, that 10 to 15 per cent of our productive capacities were unused, and that the steel industry alone operated from last summer until now at about only 50 per cent of its capacity. The authors of *America in the Sixties* are momentarily brought up short when they consider the high divorce rates of the postwar years. But they console themselves by reflecting that the many divorces can be explained by the high level of income: in earlier years "a lot of Americans simply could not afford them." In the prosperous 60's, no doubt we shall all be able to afford a second divorce along with a second car and a second television set. Cheer up, boys!

According to governmental investigations, more than one family in four lives below an income level considered essential to maintaining even minimum standards of health and decency. But *Fortune* writes that soon the poor will no longer be with us; and in the meantime "only" 3,600,000 families have incomes under $2,000, and if a family makes over $2,000, it cannot "really" be considered poor at all! Families with after-tax incomes of over $4,000, according to *Fortune,* have a supply of "discretionary income" which allows them to spend freely over and above the necessities of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, etc. Such families "can take a small flyer in the stock market."

This can be called the "midtown view" of economic realities. Were *Fortune's* writers to take an occasional trip some sixty blocks further downtown, they would learn that people with this income might sometimes try their luck at the races or with the numbers game, but hardly in the stock market. Indeed, George Katona, in *The Powerful Consumer,* sets the limits above which income can allow some "discretionary spending" at a more realistic $6,000. But such realism would tend to spoil the picture so lovingly composed by *Fortune.*

IN THE LUCE WORLD to speak of a group's relative deprivation, of drags on productivity, of a lag in school construction, of deteriorating public plants, or of wasteful expenditures for shoddy consumer goods, is considered a mark of disaffection, perhaps even of disloyalty. Above all, one must never

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mention the effects of planning or the lack thereof. In *Beyond the Welfare State,* Gunnar Myrdal, the distinguished Swedish economist, suggests that it is high time we give a decent burial to residual notions about free enterprise. He shows that all nations of the world, developed and underdeveloped, East as well as West, have adopted policies of national economic planning, and that this trend is irreversible. Professor Frederick von Hayek and his disciples provide myths about a primeval paradisial era, but they are out of touch with contemporary economic reality. Economic planning "is becoming increasingly the common experience of people who live together in organized society."

Economic liberalism, says Myrdal, prided itself on its rationalism, yet what it actually implied was the prevalence in society of people who were the very opposite of the rational "economic man." The theory worked only as long as a population was traditionalistic and inhibited strongly by taboos and conventions. But as these folkways and mores broke down under the impact of industrialization, geographic and social mobility, secularization, and so forth, people began in fact to act *more* like the theoretical "economic man"—and the bottom fell out of economic liberalism. Just as more rationalistic attitudes in family institutions led to the acceptance of "planned parenthood," so as more rationalistic criteria asserted themselves in the economic order, planning replaced superstitious reliance on the automatism of the market.

"Social taboos," says Myrdal, "are shy like virtue; once lost there is no remedy." Thus the old gold standard depended on the magic belief, shared by bankers and politicians in all countries, that nothing should be allowed to interfere with the standard's automatic operation. But today no country, least of all the United States, is willing to let its level of economic activities and employment be determined by the "automatic" changes in its international payment situation. Everybody now knows that monetary matters can be influenced by national policy, and so no longer are outside of politics.

While Myrdal discerns an irreversible worldwide trend, he also notices that planning proceeds by crucially different methods both in the Soviet and non-Soviet world, and in the rich and poor non-Soviet countries. In the rich Western nations, economic planning gradually forced itself upon the community; it became a *fait accompli* even though the citizens often were unwilling to accept it ideologically. In the underdeveloped countries, on the other hand, the idea precedes the realization. There planning becomes a precondition for development rather than a consequence of it, for the underveloped countries cannot depend on what Veblen once called the "sluggish advance by inertia" which characterized Western economic development in the 19th century. Myrdal argues that since underdeveloped countries still have a social structure reflecting the stagnation and traditionalism from which they want to rise, state policy there must both create and guide the organs of self-government and cooperation that make central planning effective. Such programmatic planning must be comprehensive and complete, not pragmatic and piecemeal as in the West, and it must utilize policies which in the light of Western developments appear as shortcuts.

THE RICH and the poor nations, however much planning within the two differs, are nevertheless interdependent. Myrdal states that only a sharp reversal of policy among the rich nations will enable the poor ones to plan effectively. Western countries have achieved the democratic welfare state within a protectionist and nationalistic framework, and at the expense of continued underdevelopment in the rest of the non-Soviet world. Since current international economic arrangements increase these disparities—the economic differences between rich and poor countries have actually widened in recent years—Myrdal suggests that underdeveloped countries will be tempted to achieve their ends by using totalitarian methods. To avoid this, the West must give more than economic aid; it must shape its general economic policies in the interest of underdeveloped nations. An example of a policy that would help the have-not nations much more powerfully than direct aid would be the planned stabilization of world prices for those primary goods which constitute the bulk of the exports of underdeveloped nations. In other words, only if the present efforts at national planning are extended to the world scene can further polarization between rich and

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poor lands be avoided. "International idealism" has become the only realistic policy.

To those who believe that the welfare state necessarily brings in its wake increasing centralization and regimentation, Myrdal replies that it should be the proper function of planning constantly to strengthen non-governmental structures within the community. A strengthened welfare state will aim to simplify and eliminate direct intervention; it will insist on decentralization of state controls and will substitute over-all policies for detailed directives. The national community, Myrdal argues, by maximizing the participation of non-governmental organizations in the planning process, shall slowly be reconditioned to rely on the collaboration and collective bargaining of people and groups rather than on governmental command. Here, however, as in some other sections of his book, Myrdal seems to me somewhat too sanguine and too easily inclined to overlook the tremendous complications and obstacles that lie in the path he has charted; he is somewhat too prone to reason that if Sweden's planning can be ordered so successfully, so can the planning of other countries. Yet in a day when many writers on social and economic topics indulge in apocalyptic visions, a little optimism can go a long way.

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IN UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS the income of most of the population helps to satisfy only its most elementary needs, and there is no consumers' choice. But in the West, where many (though by no means everyone) have incomes which allow them to spend beyond the relatively fixed outlays for necessities, consumer choices and preferences, given wider latitude, are also much more volatile. George Katona, an economist as well as a psychologist, has pioneered the survey-research studies of the motives, attitudes, and expectations of American consumers. His book, *The Powerful Consumer,* which summarizes and analyzes a great number of such surveys, should help to demolish some of the traditional overrationalistic assumptions of consumers' behavior. Space allows only a few illustrative examples:

Conventional economic wisdom has tended to see the consumer as a kind of mechanical link between current income and consumption; his propensity to spend was a fairly stable function of his income. But Katona's research shows that in contemporary America, consumers' reactions do not necessarily follow income changes in this manner. People whose income declined temporarily often did not reduce their expenditures but rather drew on past savings to maintain their habitual standard of living. Conformity to community or class standards prevailed over purely economic motivations. In an affluent society, consumer expenditures are sticky downward and flexible upward.

Traditional economic thinking assumed that the more an individual has of some object, the smaller his incentive to add to it. But Katona's studies show that the gratification of one need may raise an individual's general level of aspiration and increase his desire for others. Katona's researches illustrate Emile Durkheim's dictum: "The more one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of fill-

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ing needs." But while Durkheim, who wrote in an age when the connection between social criticism and social investigation was not yet severed, considered a society sick when it did not limit the material appetites of its members, Katona only notes the facts and then comments that "such sentiments represent the heart of the psychological climate in which prosperity flourishes."

Katona's book, then, is full of revealing data about that new species, the affluent consumer—we learn a good deal about his attitudes and motivations, his status strivings, his insatiable needs, his temporary gratifications, and permanent aspirations—but the book makes almost no attempt to put this information into a larger perspective, to evaluate it critically. The new fetishism of commodities requires an analysis of the same critical power that Marx employed in his indictment of its older form. When Katona permits himself to go beyond his data and correlations, he can only come up with such a platitude as, "The unorganized consumer is a stabilizing force in our economy." But then it is hardly fair to blame an author for not writing the book one wants him to write rather than the book *he* cared to write. Katona is no social critic, he is a survey analyst.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

LIONEL ABEL, who contributed "Art While Being Ruled" to our May issue, is a playwright and critic.

RONALD GROSS's reviews have appeared in the *New Leader* and *Commonweal* as well as in COMMENTARY.

JAKOB J. PETUCHOWSKI is associate professor of Rabbinics at Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati.

JANE HAYMAN is a young free-lance writer living in New York. This is her first appearance in COMMENTARY.

LEWIS A. COSER, a frequent contributor to these pages, is professor of sociology at Brandeis University.

IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES

Art, Pornography, and Censorship — PAUL GOODMAN

The Peace Movement — NATHAN GLAZER

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

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

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